mirror of
https://github.com/git/git
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abd4d67ab0
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
60 lines
2.2 KiB
Text
60 lines
2.2 KiB
Text
Git v2.30.6 Release Notes
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=========================
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This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-39253 and
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CVE-2022-39260.
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Fixes since v2.30.5
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-------------------
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* CVE-2022-39253:
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When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences
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symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks
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(or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository.
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This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are
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present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious
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repository.
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Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local`
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clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that
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have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.
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Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be
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"user" by default.
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* CVE-2022-39260:
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An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in
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overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and
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remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory
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`$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists.
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`git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are
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longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject
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inputs larger than 2GiB.
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Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The
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fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin.
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Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub.
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The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau.
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Jeff King (2):
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shell: add basic tests
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shell: limit size of interactive commands
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Kevin Backhouse (1):
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alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline()
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Taylor Blau (11):
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builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks
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t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules
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t/t1NNN: allow local submodules
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t/2NNNN: allow local submodules
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t/t3NNN: allow local submodules
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t/t4NNN: allow local submodules
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t/t5NNN: allow local submodules
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t/t6NNN: allow local submodules
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t/t7NNN: allow local submodules
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t/t9NNN: allow local submodules
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transport: make `protocol.file.allow` be "user" by default
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