* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Previous changes introduced a regression which will prevent root for
accessing repositories owned by thyself if using sudo because SUDO_UID
takes precedence.
Loosen that restriction by allowing root to access repositories owned
by both uid by default and without having to add a safe.directory
exception.
A previous workaround that was documented in the tests is no longer
needed so it has been removed together with its specially crafted
prerequisite.
Helped-by: Johanness Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Add a support library that provides one function that can be used
to run a "scriplet" of commands through sudo and that helps invoking
sudo in the slightly awkward way that is required to ensure it doesn't
block the call (if shell was allowed as tested in the prerequisite)
and it doesn't run the command through a different shell than the one
we intended.
Add additional negative tests as suggested by Junio and that use a
new workspace that is owned by root.
Document a regression that was introduced by previous commits where
root won't be able anymore to access directories they own unless
SUDO_UID is removed from their environment.
The tests document additional ways that this new restriction could
be worked around and the documentation explains why it might be instead
considered a feature, but a "fix" is planned for a future change.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
bdc77d1d68 (Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the
current user, 2022-03-02) checks for the effective uid of the running
process using geteuid() but didn't account for cases where that user was
root (because git was invoked through sudo or a compatible tool) and the
original uid that repository trusted for its config was no longer known,
therefore failing the following otherwise safe call:
guy@renard ~/Software/uncrustify $ sudo git describe --always --dirty
[sudo] password for guy:
fatal: unsafe repository ('/home/guy/Software/uncrustify' is owned by someone else)
Attempt to detect those cases by using the environment variables that
those tools create to keep track of the original user id, and do the
ownership check using that instead.
This assumes the environment the user is running on after going
privileged can't be tampered with, and also adds code to restrict that
the new behavior only applies if running as root, therefore keeping the
most common case, which runs unprivileged, from changing, but because of
that, it will miss cases where sudo (or an equivalent) was used to change
to another unprivileged user or where the equivalent tool used to raise
privileges didn't track the original id in a sudo compatible way.
Because of compatibility with sudo, the code assumes that uid_t is an
unsigned integer type (which is not required by the standard) but is used
that way in their codebase to generate SUDO_UID. In systems where uid_t
is signed, sudo might be also patched to NOT be unsigned and that might
be able to trigger an edge case and a bug (as described in the code), but
it is considered unlikely to happen and even if it does, the code would
just mostly fail safely, so there was no attempt either to detect it or
prevent it by the code, which is something that might change in the future,
based on expected user feedback.
Reported-by: Guy Maurel <guy.j@maurel.de>
Helped-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Randall Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Originally reported after release of v2.35.2 (and other maint branches)
for CVE-2022-24765 and blocking otherwise harmless commands that were
done using sudo in a repository that was owned by the user.
Add a new test script with very basic support to allow running git
commands through sudo, so a reproduction could be implemented and that
uses only `git status` as a proxy of the issue reported.
Note that because of the way sudo interacts with the system, a much
more complete integration with the test framework will require a lot
more work and that was therefore intentionally punted for now.
The current implementation requires the execution of a special cleanup
function which should always be kept as the last "test" or otherwise
the standard cleanup functions will fail because they can't remove
the root owned directories that are used. This also means that if
failures are found while running, the specifics of the failure might
not be kept for further debugging and if the test was interrupted, it
will be necessary to clean the working directory manually before
restarting by running:
$ sudo rm -rf trash\ directory.t0034-root-safe-directory/
The test file also uses at least one initial "setup" test that creates
a parallel execution directory under the "root" sub directory, which
should be used as top level directory for all repositories that are
used in this test file. Unlike all other tests the repository provided
by the test framework should go unused.
Special care should be taken when invoking commands through sudo, since
the environment is otherwise independent from what the test framework
setup and might have changed the values for HOME, SHELL and dropped
several relevant environment variables for your test. Indeed `git status`
was used as a proxy because it doesn't even require commits in the
repository to work and usually doesn't require much from the environment
to run, but a future patch will add calls to `git init` and that will
fail to honor the default branch name, unless that setting is NOT
provided through an environment variable (which means even a CI run
could fail that test if enabled incorrectly).
A new SUDO prerequisite is provided that does some sanity checking
to make sure the sudo command that will be used allows for passwordless
execution as root without restrictions and doesn't mess with git's
execution path. This matches what is provided by the macOS agents that
are used as part of GitHub actions and probably nowhere else.
Most of those characteristics make this test mostly only suitable for
CI, but it might be executed locally if special care is taken to provide
for all of them in the local configuration and maybe making use of the
sudo credential cache by first invoking sudo, entering your password if
needed, and then invoking the test with:
$ GIT_TEST_ALLOW_SUDO=YES ./t0034-root-safe-directory.sh
If it fails to run, then it means your local setup wouldn't work for the
test because of the configuration sudo has or other system settings, and
things that might help are to comment out sudo's secure_path config, and
make sure that the account you are using has no restrictions on the
commands it can run through sudo, just like is provided for the user in
the CI.
For example (assuming a username of marta for you) something probably
similar to the following entry in your /etc/sudoers (or equivalent) file:
marta ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
Reported-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
With the addition of the safe.directory in 8959555ce
(setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory,
2022-03-02) released in v2.35.2, we are receiving feedback from a
variety of users about the feature.
Some users have a very large list of shared repositories and find it
cumbersome to add this config for every one of them.
In a more difficult case, certain workflows involve running Git commands
within containers. The container boundary prevents any global or system
config from communicating `safe.directory` values from the host into the
container. Further, the container almost always runs as a different user
than the owner of the directory in the host.
To simplify the reactions necessary for these users, extend the
definition of the safe.directory config value to include a possible '*'
value. This value implies that all directories are safe, providing a
single setting to opt-out of this protection.
Note that an empty assignment of safe.directory clears all previous
values, and this is already the case with the "if (!value || !*value)"
condition.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It seems that nothing is ever checking to make sure the safe directories
in the configs actually have the key safe.directory, so some unrelated
config that has a value with a certain directory would also make it a
safe directory.
Signed-off-by: Matheus Valadares <me@m28.io>
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It is difficult to change the ownership on a directory in our test
suite, so insert a new GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER environment
variable to trick Git into thinking we are in a differently-owned
directory. This allows us to test that the config is parsed correctly.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
When determining the length of the longest ancestor of a given path with
respect to to e.g. `GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES`, we special-case the root
directory by returning 0 (i.e. we pretend that the path `/` does not end
in a slash by virtually stripping it).
That is the correct behavior because when normalizing paths, the root
directory is special: all other directory paths have their trailing
slash stripped, but not the root directory's path (because it would
become the empty string, which is not a legal path).
However, this special-casing of the root directory in
`longest_ancestor_length()` completely forgets about Windows-style root
directories, e.g. `C:\`. These _also_ get normalized with a trailing
slash (because `C:` would actually refer to the current directory on
that drive, not necessarily to its root directory).
In fc56c7b34b (mingw: accomodate t0060-path-utils for MSYS2,
2016-01-27), we almost got it right. We noticed that
`longest_ancestor_length()` expects a slash _after_ the matched prefix,
and if the prefix already ends in a slash, the normalized path won't
ever match and -1 is returned.
But then that commit went astray: The correct fix is not to adjust the
_tests_ to expect an incorrect -1 when that function is fed a prefix
that ends in a slash, but instead to treat such a prefix as if the
trailing slash had been removed.
Likewise, that function needs to handle the case where it is fed a path
that ends in a slash (not only a prefix that ends in a slash): if it
matches the prefix (plus trailing slash), we still need to verify that
the path does not end there, otherwise the prefix is not actually an
ancestor of the path but identical to it (and we need to return -1 in
that case).
With these two adjustments, we no longer need to play games in t0060
where we only add `$rootoff` if the passed prefix is different from the
MSYS2 pseudo root, instead we also add it for the MSYS2 pseudo root
itself. We do have to be careful to skip that logic entirely for Windows
paths, though, because they do are not subject to that MSYS2 pseudo root
treatment.
This patch fixes the scenario where a user has set
`GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES=C:\`, which would be ignored otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
baf8ec8d3a (rebase -r: don't write .git/MERGE_MSG when
fast-forwarding, 2021-08-20) stopped reading the author script in
run_git_commit() when rewording a commit. This is normally safe
because "git commit --amend" preserves the authorship. However if the
user passes "--committer-date-is-author-date" then we need to read the
author date from the author script when rewording. Fix this regression
by tightening the check for when it is safe to skip reading the author
script.
Reported-by: Jonas Kittner <jonas.kittner@ruhr-uni-bochum.de>
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This reverts commit fd680bc5 (logmsg_reencode(): warn when iconv()
fails, 2021-08-27). Throwing a warning for each and every commit
that gets reencoded, without allowing a way to squelch, would make
it unpleasant for folks who have to deal with an ancient part of the
history in an old project that used wrong encoding in the commits.
Protocol v0 clients can get stuck parsing a malformed feature line.
* ah/connect-parse-feature-v0-fix:
connect: also update offset for features without values
Sensitive data in the HTTP trace were supposed to be redacted, but
we failed to do so in HTTP/2 requests.
* jk/http-redact-fix:
http: match headers case-insensitively when redacting
"git cvsserver" had a long-standing bug in its authentication code,
which has finally been corrected (it is unclear and is a separate
question if anybody is seriously using it, though).
* cb/cvsserver:
Documentation: cleanup git-cvsserver
git-cvsserver: protect against NULL in crypt(3)
git-cvsserver: use crypt correctly to compare password hashes
"git clone" from a repository whose HEAD is unborn into a bare
repository didn't follow the branch name the other side used, which
is corrected.
* jk/clone-unborn-head-in-bare:
clone: handle unborn branch in bare repos
"git stash", where the tentative change involves changing a
directory to a file (or vice versa), was confused, which has been
corrected.
* en/stash-df-fix:
stash: restore untracked files AFTER restoring tracked files
stash: avoid feeding directories to update-index
t3903: document a pair of directory/file bugs
When "git am --abort" fails to abort correctly, it still exited
with exit status of 0, which has been corrected.
* en/am-abort-fix:
am: fix incorrect exit status on am fail to abort
t4151: add a few am --abort tests
git-am.txt: clarify --abort behavior
"git update-ref --stdin" failed to flush its output as needed,
which potentially led the conversation to a deadlock.
* ps/update-ref-batch-flush:
t1400: avoid SIGPIPE race condition on fifo
update-ref: fix streaming of status updates
The "git apply -3" code path learned not to bother the lower level
merge machinery when the three-way merge can be trivially resolved
without the content level merge.
* jc/trivial-threeway-binary-merge:
apply: resolve trivial merge without hitting ll-merge with "--3way"
Doc update plus improved error reporting.
* jk/log-warn-on-bogus-encoding:
docs: use "character encoding" to refer to commit-object encoding
logmsg_reencode(): warn when iconv() fails
The output from "git fast-export", when its anonymization feature
is in use, showed an annotated tag incorrectly.
* tk/fast-export-anonymized-tag-fix:
fast-export: fix anonymized tag using original length
Even when running "git send-email" without its own threaded
discussion support, a threading related header in one message is
carried over to the subsequent message to result in an unwanted
threading, which has been corrected.
* mh/send-email-reset-in-reply-to:
send-email: avoid incorrect header propagation
Buggy tests could damage repositories outside the throw-away test
area we created. We now by default export GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES
to limit the damage from such a stray test.
* sg/set-ceiling-during-tests:
test-lib: set GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES to protect the surrounding repository
"git upload-pack" which runs on the other side of "git fetch"
forgot to take the ref namespaces into account when handling
want-ref requests.
* ka/want-ref-in-namespace:
docs: clarify the interaction of transfer.hideRefs and namespaces
upload-pack.c: treat want-ref relative to namespace
t5730: introduce fetch command helper
"git branch -D <branch>" used to refuse to remove a broken branch
ref that points at a missing commit, which has been corrected.
* rs/branch-allow-deleting-dangling:
branch: allow deleting dangling branches with --force
The delayed checkout code path in "git checkout" etc. were chatty
even when --quiet and/or --no-progress options were given.
* mt/quiet-with-delayed-checkout:
checkout: make delayed checkout respect --quiet and --no-progress
"git diff --relative" segfaulted and/or produced incorrect result
when there are unmerged paths.
* dd/diff-files-unmerged-fix:
diff-lib: ignore paths that are outside $cwd if --relative asked
Various bugs in "git rebase -r" have been fixed.
* pw/rebase-r-fixes:
rebase -r: fix merge -c with a merge strategy
rebase -r: don't write .git/MERGE_MSG when fast-forwarding
rebase -i: add another reword test
rebase -r: make 'merge -c' behave like reword
Checking out all the paths from HEAD during the last conflicted
step in "git rebase" and continuing would cause the step to be
skipped (which is expected), but leaves MERGE_MSG file behind in
$GIT_DIR and confuses the next "git commit", which has been
corrected.
* pw/rebase-skip-final-fix:
rebase --continue: remove .git/MERGE_MSG
rebase --apply: restore some tests
t3403: fix commit authorship
"git commit --fixup" now works with "--edit" again, after it was
broken in v2.32.
* jk/commit-edit-fixup-fix:
commit: restore --edit when combined with --fixup
"git apply" miscounted the bytes and failed to read to the end of
binary hunks.
* jk/apply-binary-hunk-parsing-fix:
apply: keep buffer/size pair in sync when parsing binary hunks
"git pull" had various corner cases that were not well thought out
around its --rebase backend, e.g. "git pull --ff-only" did not stop
but went ahead and rebased when the history on other side is not a
descendant of our history. The series tries to fix them up.
* en/pull-conflicting-options:
pull: fix handling of multiple heads
pull: update docs & code for option compatibility with rebasing
pull: abort by default when fast-forwarding is not possible
pull: make --rebase and --no-rebase override pull.ff=only
pull: since --ff-only overrides, handle it first
pull: abort if --ff-only is given and fast-forwarding is impossible
t7601: add tests of interactions with multiple merge heads and config
t7601: test interaction of merge/rebase/fast-forward flags and options
Bugfix for common ancestor negotiation recently introduced in "git
push" codepath.
* jt/push-negotiation-fixes:
fetch: die on invalid --negotiation-tip hash
send-pack: fix push nego. when remote has refs
send-pack: fix push.negotiate with remote helper
Input validation of "git pack-objects --stdin-packs" has been
corrected.
* ab/pack-stdin-packs-fix:
pack-objects: fix segfault in --stdin-packs option
pack-objects tests: cover blindspots in stdin handling
