safe.bareRepository=explicit is a safer default mode of operation, since
it guards against the embedded bare repository attack [1]. Most end
users don't use bare repositories directly, so they should be able to
set safe.bareRepository=explicit, with the expectation that they can
reenable bare repositories by specifying GIT_DIR or --git-dir.
However, the user might use a tool that invokes Git on bare repositories
without setting GIT_DIR (e.g. "go mod" will clone bare repositories
[2]), so even if a user wanted to use safe.bareRepository=explicit, it
wouldn't be feasible until their tools learned to set GIT_DIR.
To make this transition easier, add a trace message to note when we
attempt to set up a bare repository without setting GIT_DIR. This allows
users and tool developers to audit which of their tools are problematic
and report/fix the issue. When they are sufficiently confident, they
would switch over to "safe.bareRepository=explicit".
Note that this uses trace2_data_string(), which isn't supported by the
"normal" GIT_TRACE2 target, only _EVENT or _PERF.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/git/kl6lsfqpygsj.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com/
[2] https://go.dev/ref/mod
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Steadmon <steadmon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Protected config is implemented by reading a fixed set of paths,
which ignores config [include]-s. Replace this implementation with a
call to config_with_options(), which handles [include]-s and saves us
from duplicating the logic of 1) identifying which paths to read and 2)
reading command line config.
As a result, git_configset_add_parameters() is unused, so remove it. It
was introduced alongside protected config in 5b3c650777 (config: learn
`git_protected_config()`, 2022-07-14) as a way to handle command line
config.
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
There is a known social engineering attack that takes advantage of the
fact that a working tree can include an entire bare repository,
including a config file. A user could run a Git command inside the bare
repository thinking that the config file of the 'outer' repository would
be used, but in reality, the bare repository's config file (which is
attacker-controlled) is used, which may result in arbitrary code
execution. See [1] for a fuller description and deeper discussion.
A simple mitigation is to forbid bare repositories unless specified via
`--git-dir` or `GIT_DIR`. In environments that don't use bare
repositories, this would be minimally disruptive.
Create a config variable, `safe.bareRepository`, that tells Git whether
or not to die() when working with a bare repository. This config is an
enum of:
- "all": allow all bare repositories (this is the default)
- "explicit": only allow bare repositories specified via --git-dir
or GIT_DIR.
If we want to protect users from such attacks by default, neither value
will suffice - "all" provides no protection, but "explicit" is
impractical for bare repository users. A more usable default would be to
allow only non-embedded bare repositories ([2] contains one such
proposal), but detecting if a repository is embedded is potentially
non-trivial, so this work is not implemented in this series.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/kl6lsfqpygsj.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/5b969c5e-e802-c447-ad25-6acc0b784582@github.com
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>