The receive.denyCurrentBranch config option controls what happens if
you push to a branch that is checked out into a non-bare repository.
By default, it rejects it. It can be disabled via `ignore` or `warn`.
Another yet trickier option is `updateInstead`.
However, this setting was forgotten when the git worktree command was
introduced: only the main worktree's current branch is respected.
With this change, all worktrees are respected.
That change also leads to revealing another bug,
i.e. `receive.denyCurrentBranch = true` was ignored when pushing into a
non-bare repository's unborn current branch using ref namespaces. As
`is_ref_checked_out()` returns 0 which means `receive-pack` does not get
into conditional statement to switch `deny_current_branch` accordingly
(ignore, warn, refuse, unconfigured, updateInstead).
receive.denyCurrentBranch uses the function `refs_resolve_ref_unsafe()`
(called via `resolve_refdup()`) to resolve the symbolic ref HEAD, but
that function fails when HEAD does not point at a valid commit.
As we replace the call to `refs_resolve_ref_unsafe()` with
`find_shared_symref()`, which has no problem finding the worktree for a
given branch even if it is unborn yet, this bug is fixed at the same
time: receive.denyCurrentBranch now also handles worktrees with unborn
branches as intended even while using ref namespaces.
Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Hariom Verma <hariom18599@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
`receive.denyCurrentBranch` currently has a bug where it allows pushing
into non-bare repository using namespaces as long as it does not have any
commits. This would cause t5509 to fail once that bug is fixed because it
pushes into an unborn current branch.
In t5509, no operations are performed inside `pushee`, as it is only a
target for `git push` and `git ls-remote` calls. Therefore it does not
need to have a worktree. So, it is safe to change `pushee` to a bare
repository.
Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Hariom Verma <hariom18599@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Since 7171d8c15f (upload-pack: send symbolic ref information as
capability, 2013-09-17), we've sent cloning and fetching clients special
information about which branch HEAD is pointing to, so that they don't
have to guess based on matching up commit ids.
However, this feature has never worked properly with the GIT_NAMESPACE
feature. Because upload-pack uses head_ref_namespaced(find_symref), we
do find and report on refs/namespaces/foo/HEAD instead of the actual
HEAD of the repo. This makes sense, since the branch pointed to by the
top-level HEAD may not be advertised at all. But we do two things wrong:
1. We report the full name refs/namespaces/foo/HEAD, instead of just
HEAD. Meaning no client is going to bother doing anything with that
symref, since we're not otherwise advertising it.
2. We report the symref destination using its full name (e.g.,
refs/namespaces/foo/refs/heads/master). That's similarly useless to
the client, who only saw "refs/heads/master" in the advertisement.
We should be stripping the namespace prefix off of both places (which
this patch fixes).
Likely nobody noticed because we tend to do the right thing anyway. Bug
(1) means that we said nothing about HEAD (just refs/namespace/foo/HEAD).
And so the client half of the code, from a45b5f0552 (connect: annotate
refs with their symref information in get_remote_head(), 2013-09-17),
does not annotate HEAD, and we use the fallback in guess_remote_head(),
matching refs by object id. Which is usually right. It only falls down
in ambiguous cases, like the one laid out in the included test.
This also means that we don't have to worry about breaking anybody who
was putting pre-stripped names into their namespace symrefs when we fix
bug (2). Because of bug (1), nobody would have been using the symref we
advertised in the first place (not to mention that those symrefs would
have appeared broken for any non-namespaced access).
Note that we have separate fixes here for the v0 and v2 protocols. The
symref advertisement moved in v2 to be a part of the ls-refs command.
This actually gets part (1) right, since the symref annotation
piggy-backs on the existing ref advertisement, which is properly
stripped. But it still needs a fix for part (2). The included tests
cover both protocols.
Reported-by: Bryan Turner <bturner@atlassian.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Using 'test_must_be_empty' is more idiomatic than 'test_cmp /dev/null
out', and its message on error is perhaps a bit more to the point.
This patch was basically created by running:
sed -i -e 's%test_cmp /dev/null%test_must_be_empty%' t[0-9]*.sh
with the exception of the change in 'should not fail in an empty repo'
in 't7401-submodule-summary.sh', where it was 'test_cmp output
/dev/null'.
Signed-off-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Previously the `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` environment variable was used to
specify a whitelist of protocols to be used in clone/fetch/push
commands. This patch introduces new configuration options for more
fine-grained control for allowing/disallowing protocols. This also has
the added benefit of allowing easier construction of a protocol
whitelist on systems where setting an environment variable is
non-trivial.
Now users can specify a policy to be used for each type of protocol via
the 'protocol.<name>.allow' config option. A default policy for all
unconfigured protocols can be set with the 'protocol.allow' config
option. If no user configured default is made git will allow known-safe
protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file), disallow known-dangerous
protocols (ext), and have a default policy of `user` for all other
protocols.
The supported policies are `always`, `never`, and `user`. The `user`
policy can be used to configure a protocol to be usable when explicitly
used by a user, while disallowing it for commands which run
clone/fetch/push commands without direct user intervention (e.g.
recursive initialization of submodules). Commands which can potentially
clone/fetch/push from untrusted repositories without user intervention
can export `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` with a value of '0' to prevent
protocols configured to the `user` policy from being used.
Fix remote-ext tests to use the new config to allow the ext
protocol to be tested.
Based on a patch by Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Test whether regular and full hideRefs patterns work as expected when
namespaces are used.
Helped-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer <lfleischer@lfos.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Test pushing, pulling, and mirroring of repositories with ref
namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Signed-off-by: Jamey Sharp <jamey@minilop.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
