71201ab0e5 (t/lib-credential.sh: ensure credential helpers handle long
headers, 2023-05-01) added a test which stores credentials with the host
victim.example.com but this was never cleaned up, leaving residual data
in the credential store after running the tests.
Add a cleanup call for this credential to resolve this issue.
Signed-off-by: Bo Anderson <mail@boanderson.me>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The way authentication related data other than passwords (e.g.
oath token and password expiration data) are stored in libsecret
keyrings has been rethought.
* mh/credential-libsecret-attrs:
credential/libsecret: store new attributes
d208bfd (credential: new attribute password_expiry_utc, 2023-02-18)
and a5c76569e7 (credential: new attribute oauth_refresh_token)
introduced new credential attributes.
libsecret assumes attribute values are non-confidential and
unchanging, so we encode the new attributes in the secret, separated by
newline:
hunter2
password_expiry_utc=1684189401
oauth_refresh_token=xyzzy
This is extensible and backwards compatible. The credential protocol
already assumes that attribute values do not contain newlines.
Alternatives considered: store password_expiry_utc in a libsecret
attribute. This has the problem that libsecret creates new items
rather than overwrites when attribute values change.
Signed-off-by: M Hickford <mirth.hickford@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
`credential reject` sends the erase action to each helper, but the
exact behaviour of erase isn't specified in documentation or tests.
Some helpers (such as credential-store and credential-libsecret) delete
all matching credentials, others (such as credential-cache) delete at
most one matching credential.
Test that helpers erase all matching credentials. This behaviour is
easiest to reason about. Users expect that `echo
"url=https://example.com" | git credential reject` or `echo
"url=https://example.com\nusername=tim" | git credential reject` erase
all matching credentials.
Fix credential-cache.
Signed-off-by: M Hickford <mirth.hickford@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Test that credential helpers do not erase a password distinct from the
input. Such calls can happen when multiple credential helpers are
configured.
Fixes for credential-cache and credential-store.
Signed-off-by: M Hickford <mirth.hickford@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Add a test ensuring that the "wwwauth[]" field cannot be used to
inject malicious data into the credential helper stream.
Many of the credential helpers in contrib/credential read the
newline-delimited protocol stream one line at a time by repeatedly
calling fgets() into a fixed-size buffer.
This assumes that each line is no more than 1024 characters long, since
each iteration of the loop assumes that it is parsing starting at the
beginning of a new line in the stream. However, similar to a5bb10fd5e
(config: avoid fixed-sized buffer when renaming/deleting a section,
2023-04-06), if a line is longer than 1024 characters, a malicious actor
can embed another command within an existing line, bypassing the usual
checks introduced in 9a6bbee800 (credential: avoid writing values with
newlines, 2020-03-11).
As with the problem fixed in that commit, specially crafted input can
cause the helper to return the credential for the wrong host, letting an
attacker trick the victim into sending credentials for one host to
another.
Luckily, all parts of the credential helper protocol that are available
in a tagged release of Git are immune to this attack:
- "protocol" is restricted to known values, and is thus immune.
- "host" is immune because curl will reject hostnames that have a '='
character in them, which would be required to carry out this attack.
- "username" is immune, because the buffer characters to fill out the
first `fgets()` call would pollute the `username` field, causing the
credential helper to return nothing (because it would match a
username if present, and the username of the credential to be stolen
is likely not 1024 characters).
- "password" is immune because providing a password instructs
credential helpers to avoid filling credentials in the first place.
- "path" is similar to username; if present, it is not likely to match
any credential the victim is storing. It's also not enabled by
default; the victim would have to set credential.useHTTPPath
explicitly.
However, the new "wwwauth[]" field introduced via 5f2117b24f
(credential: add WWW-Authenticate header to cred requests, 2023-02-27)
can be used to inject data into the credential helper stream. For
example, running:
{
printf 'HTTP/1.1 401\r\n'
printf 'WWW-Authenticate: basic realm='
perl -e 'print "a" x 1024'
printf 'host=victim.com\r\n'
} | nc -Nlp 8080
in one terminal, and then:
git clone http://localhost:8080
in another would result in a line like:
wwwauth[]=basic realm=aaa[...]aaahost=victim.com
being sent to the credential helper. If we tweak that "1024" to align
our output with the helper's buffer size and the rest of the data on the
line, it can cause the helper to see "host=victim.com" on its own line,
allowing motivated attackers to exfiltrate credentials belonging to
"victim.com".
The below test demonstrates these failures and provides us with a test
to ensure that our fix is correct. That said, it has a couple of
shortcomings:
- it's in t0303, since that's the only mechanism we have for testing
random helpers. But that means nobody is going to run it under
normal circumstances.
- to get the attack right, it has to line up the stuffed name with the
buffer size, so we depend on the exact buffer size. I parameterized
it so it could be used to test other helpers, but in practice it's
not likely for anybody to do that.
Still, it's the best we can do, and will help us confirm the presence of
the problem (and our fixes) in the new few patches.
Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Git authentication with OAuth access token is supported by every popular
Git host including GitHub, GitLab and BitBucket [1][2][3]. Credential
helpers Git Credential Manager (GCM) and git-credential-oauth generate
OAuth credentials [4][5]. Following RFC 6749, the application prints a
link for the user to authorize access in browser. A loopback redirect
communicates the response including access token to the application.
For security, RFC 6749 recommends that OAuth response also includes
expiry date and refresh token [6]. After expiry, applications can use
the refresh token to generate a new access token without user
reauthorization in browser. GitLab and BitBucket set the expiry at two
hours [2][3]. (GitHub doesn't populate expiry or refresh token.)
However the Git credential protocol has no attribute to store the OAuth
refresh token (unrecognised attributes are silently discarded). This
means that the user has to regularly reauthorize the helper in browser.
On a browserless system, this is particularly intrusive, requiring a
second device.
Introduce a new attribute oauth_refresh_token. This is especially
useful when a storage helper and a read-only OAuth helper are configured
together. Recall that `credential fill` calls each helper until it has a
non-expired password.
```
[credential]
helper = storage # eg. cache or osxkeychain
helper = oauth
```
The OAuth helper can use the stored refresh token forwarded by
`credential fill` to generate a fresh access token without opening the
browser. See
https://github.com/hickford/git-credential-oauth/pull/3/files
for an implementation tested with this patch.
Add support for the new attribute to credential-cache. Eventually, I
hope to see support in other popular storage helpers.
Alternatives considered: ask helpers to store all unrecognised
attributes. This seems excessively complex for no obvious gain.
Helpers would also need extra information to distinguish between
confidential and non-confidential attributes.
Workarounds: GCM abuses the helper get/store/erase contract to store the
refresh token during credential *get* as the password for a fictitious
host [7] (I wrote this hack). This workaround is only feasible for a
monolithic helper with its own storage.
[1] https://github.blog/2012-09-21-easier-builds-and-deployments-using-git-over-https-and-oauth/
[2] https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/api/oauth2.html#access-git-over-https-with-access-token
[3] https://support.atlassian.com/bitbucket-cloud/docs/use-oauth-on-bitbucket-cloud/#Cloning-a-repository-with-an-access-token
[4] https://github.com/GitCredentialManager/git-credential-manager
[5] https://github.com/hickford/git-credential-oauth
[6] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-5.1
[7] 66b94e489a/src/shared/GitLab/GitLabHostProvider.cs (L207)
Signed-off-by: M Hickford <mirth.hickford@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
As a follow-up to d162b25f95 (tests: remove support for
GIT_TEST_GETTEXT_POISON, 2021-01-20) remove most uses of test_i18ncmp
via a simple s/test_i18ncmp/test_cmp/g search-replacement.
I'm leaving t6300-for-each-ref.sh out due to a conflict with in-flight
changes between "master" and "seen", as well as the prerequisite
itself due to other changes between "master" and "next/seen" which add
new test_i18ncmp uses.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
There's no need for shell libraries to have the executable bit. They're
meant to be sourced, and running them stand-alone is pointless. Let's
reduce any possible confusion by making it more clear they're not meant
to be run this way.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The purpose of lib-credential.sh is to be sourced into other test
scripts. It doesn't need a "#!/bin/sh" line, as running it directly
makes no sense. Nor does it serve any real filetype documentation
purpose, as the file is clearly named with a ".sh" extension.
In the spirit of c74c72034f (test: replace shebangs with descriptions in
shell libraries, 2013-11-25), let's replace it with a human-readable
description.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The credential tests have a "check" function which feeds some input to
git-credential and checks the stdout and stderr. We look for exact
matches in the output. For stdout, this makes sense; the output is
the credential protocol. But for stderr, we may be showing various
diagnostic messages, or the prompts fed to the askpass program, which
could be translated. Let's mark them as such.
Make sure the helper does not crash when blank username and password is
provided. If the helper can save such credentials, it should be able to
read them back.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Bereżański <kuba@berezanscy.pl>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Use write_script to create the helper "askpass" script, instead of
hand-creating it with hardcoded "#!/bin/sh" to make sure we use the
shell the user told us to use.
Signed-off-by: Ben Walton <bdwalton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The Git CodingGuidelines prefer the $(...) construct for command
substitution instead of using the backquotes `...`.
The backquoted form is the traditional method for command
substitution, and is supported by POSIX. However, all but the
simplest uses become complicated quickly. In particular, embedded
command substitutions and/or the use of double quotes require
careful escaping with the backslash character.
The patch was generated by:
for _f in $(find . -name "*.sh")
do
sed -i 's@`\(.*\)`@$(\1)@g' ${_f}
done
and then carefully proof-read.
Signed-off-by: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Moy <Matthieu.Moy@imag.fr>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Since the Windows port of Git expects binary pipes, we need to make
sure the helper-end also sets up binary pipes.
Side-step CRLF-issue in test to make it pass.
Signed-off-by: Erik Faye-Lund <kusmabite@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Instead of outputing only the username and password, print all the
attributes, even those that already appeared in the input.
This is closer to what the C API does, and allows one to take the exact
output of "git credential fill" as input to "git credential approve" or
"git credential reject".
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The credential API is in C, and not available to scripting languages.
Expose the functionalities of the API by wrapping them into a new
plumbing command "git credentials".
In other words, replace the internal "test-credential" by an official Git
command.
Most documentation writen by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Volek <Pavel.Volek@ensimag.imag.fr>
Signed-off-by: Kim Thuat Nguyen <Kim-Thuat.Nguyen@ensimag.imag.fr>
Signed-off-by: Javier Roucher Iglesias <Javier.Roucher-Iglesias@ensimag.imag.fr>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Moy <Matthieu.Moy@imag.fr>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
If you access repositories over smart-http using http
authentication, then it can be annoying to have git ask you
for your password repeatedly. We cache credentials in
memory, of course, but git is composed of many small
programs. Having to input your password for each one can be
frustrating.
This patch introduces a credential helper that will cache
passwords in memory for a short period of time.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
There are a few places in git that need to get a username
and password credential from the user; the most notable one
is HTTP authentication for smart-http pushing.
Right now the only choices for providing credentials are to
put them plaintext into your ~/.netrc, or to have git prompt
you (either on the terminal or via an askpass program). The
former is not very secure, and the latter is not very
convenient.
Unfortunately, there is no "always best" solution for
password management. The details will depend on the tradeoff
you want between security and convenience, as well as how
git can integrate with other security systems (e.g., many
operating systems provide a keychain or password wallet for
single sign-on).
This patch provides an abstract notion of credentials as a
data item, and provides three basic operations:
- fill (i.e., acquire from external storage or from the
user)
- approve (mark a credential as "working" for further
storage)
- reject (mark a credential as "not working", so it can
be removed from storage)
These operations can be backed by external helper processes
that interact with system- or user-specific secure storage.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
