Further shuffling of declarations across header files to streamline
file dependencies.
* cw/compat-util-header-cleanup:
git-compat-util: move alloc macros to git-compat-util.h
treewide: remove unnecessary includes for wrapper.h
kwset: move translation table from ctype
sane-ctype.h: create header for sane-ctype macros
git-compat-util: move wrapper.c funcs to its header
git-compat-util: move strbuf.c funcs to its header
Reduce reliance on a global state in the config reading API.
* gc/config-context:
config: pass source to config_parser_event_fn_t
config: add kvi.path, use it to evaluate includes
config.c: remove config_reader from configsets
config: pass kvi to die_bad_number()
trace2: plumb config kvi
config.c: pass ctx with CLI config
config: pass ctx with config files
config.c: pass ctx in configsets
config: add ctx arg to config_fn_t
urlmatch.h: use config_fn_t type
config: inline git_color_default_config
Header files cleanup.
* en/header-split-cache-h-part-3: (28 commits)
fsmonitor-ll.h: split this header out of fsmonitor.h
hash-ll, hashmap: move oidhash() to hash-ll
object-store-ll.h: split this header out of object-store.h
khash: name the structs that khash declares
merge-ll: rename from ll-merge
git-compat-util.h: remove unneccessary include of wildmatch.h
builtin.h: remove unneccessary includes
list-objects-filter-options.h: remove unneccessary include
diff.h: remove unnecessary include of oidset.h
repository: remove unnecessary include of path.h
log-tree: replace include of revision.h with simple forward declaration
cache.h: remove this no-longer-used header
read-cache*.h: move declarations for read-cache.c functions from cache.h
repository.h: move declaration of the_index from cache.h
merge.h: move declarations for merge.c from cache.h
diff.h: move declaration for global in diff.c from cache.h
preload-index.h: move declarations for preload-index.c from elsewhere
sparse-index.h: move declarations for sparse-index.c from cache.h
name-hash.h: move declarations for name-hash.c from cache.h
run-command.h: move declarations for run-command.c from cache.h
...
Plumb "struct key_value_info" through all code paths that end in
die_bad_number(), which lets us remove the helper functions that read
analogous values from "struct config_reader". As a result, nothing reads
config_reader.config_kvi any more, so remove that too.
In config.c, this requires changing the signature of
git_configset_get_value() to 'return' "kvi" in an out parameter so that
git_configset_get_<type>() can pass it to git_config_<type>(). Only
numeric types will use "kvi", so for non-numeric types (e.g.
git_configset_get_string()), pass NULL to indicate that the out
parameter isn't needed.
Outside of config.c, config callbacks now need to pass "ctx->kvi" to any
of the git_config_<type>() functions that parse a config string into a
number type. Included is a .cocci patch to make that refactor.
The only exceptional case is builtin/config.c, where git_config_<type>()
is called outside of a config callback (namely, on user-provided input),
so config source information has never been available. In this case,
die_bad_number() defaults to a generic, but perfectly descriptive
message. Let's provide a safe, non-NULL for "kvi" anyway, but make sure
not to change the message.
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Add a new "const struct config_context *ctx" arg to config_fn_t to hold
additional information about the config iteration operation.
config_context has a "struct key_value_info kvi" member that holds
metadata about the config source being read (e.g. what kind of config
source it is, the filename, etc). In this series, we're only interested
in .kvi, so we could have just used "struct key_value_info" as an arg,
but config_context makes it possible to add/adjust members in the future
without changing the config_fn_t signature. We could also consider other
ways of organizing the args (e.g. moving the config name and value into
config_context or key_value_info), but in my experiments, the
incremental benefit doesn't justify the added complexity (e.g. a
config_fn_t will sometimes invoke another config_fn_t but with a
different config value).
In subsequent commits, the .kvi member will replace the global "struct
config_reader" in config.c, making config iteration a global-free
operation. It requires much more work for the machinery to provide
meaningful values of .kvi, so for now, merely change the signature and
call sites, pass NULL as a placeholder value, and don't rely on the arg
in any meaningful way.
Most of the changes are performed by
contrib/coccinelle/config_fn_ctx.pending.cocci, which, for every
config_fn_t:
- Modifies the signature to accept "const struct config_context *ctx"
- Passes "ctx" to any inner config_fn_t, if needed
- Adds UNUSED attributes to "ctx", if needed
Most config_fn_t instances are easily identified by seeing if they are
called by the various config functions. Most of the remaining ones are
manually named in the .cocci patch. Manual cleanups are still needed,
but the majority of it is trivial; it's either adjusting config_fn_t
that the .cocci patch didn't catch, or adding forward declarations of
"struct config_context ctx" to make the signatures make sense.
The non-trivial changes are in cases where we are invoking a config_fn_t
outside of config machinery, and we now need to decide what value of
"ctx" to pass. These cases are:
- trace2/tr2_cfg.c:tr2_cfg_set_fl()
This is indirectly called by git_config_set() so that the trace2
machinery can notice the new config values and update its settings
using the tr2 config parsing function, i.e. tr2_cfg_cb().
- builtin/checkout.c:checkout_main()
This calls git_xmerge_config() as a shorthand for parsing a CLI arg.
This might be worth refactoring away in the future, since
git_xmerge_config() can call git_default_config(), which can do much
more than just parsing.
Handle them by creating a KVI_INIT macro that initializes "struct
key_value_info" to a reasonable default, and use that to construct the
"ctx" arg.
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This also made it clear that several .c files that depended upon path.h
were missing a #include for it; add the missing includes while at it.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The functions init_db() and initialize_repository_version() were shared
by builtin/init-db.c and builtin/clone.c, and declared in cache.h.
Move these functions, plus their several helpers only used by these
functions, to setup.[ch].
Diff best viewed with `--color-moved`.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
discover_git_directory() started modifying the_repository in ebaf3bcf1a
(repository: move global r_f_p_c to repo struct, 2021-06-17), when, in
the repository setup process, we started copying members from the
"struct repository_format" we're inspecting to the appropriate "struct
repository". However, discover_git_directory() isn't actually used in
the setup process (its only caller in the Git binary is
read_early_config()), so it shouldn't be doing this setup at all!
As explained by 16ac8b8db6 (setup: introduce the
discover_git_directory() function, 2017-03-13) and the comment on its
declaration, discover_git_directory() is intended to be an entrypoint
into setup.c machinery that allows the Git directory to be discovered
without side effects, e.g. so that read_early_config() can read
".git/config" before the_repository has been set up.
Fortunately, we didn't start to rely on this unintended behavior between
then and now, so we let's just remove it. It isn't harming anyone, but
it's confusing.
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Move 'repository_format_worktree_config' out of the global scope and into
the 'repository' struct. This change is similar to how
'repository_format_partial_clone' was moved in ebaf3bcf1a (repository: move
global r_f_p_c to repo struct, 2021-06-17), adding it to the 'repository'
struct and updating 'setup.c' & 'repository.c' functions to assign the value
appropriately.
The primary goal of this change is to be able to load the worktree config of
a submodule depending on whether that submodule - not its superproject - has
'extensions.worktreeConfig' enabled. To ensure 'do_git_config_sequence()'
has access to the newly repo-scoped configuration, add a 'struct repository'
argument to 'do_git_config_sequence()' and pass it the 'repo' value from
'config_with_options()'.
Finally, add/update tests in 't3007-ls-files-recurse-submodules.sh' to
verify 'extensions.worktreeConfig' is read an used independently by
superprojects and submodules.
Signed-off-by: Victoria Dye <vdye@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
safe.bareRepository=explicit is a safer default mode of operation, since
it guards against the embedded bare repository attack [1]. Most end
users don't use bare repositories directly, so they should be able to
set safe.bareRepository=explicit, with the expectation that they can
reenable bare repositories by specifying GIT_DIR or --git-dir.
However, the user might use a tool that invokes Git on bare repositories
without setting GIT_DIR (e.g. "go mod" will clone bare repositories
[2]), so even if a user wanted to use safe.bareRepository=explicit, it
wouldn't be feasible until their tools learned to set GIT_DIR.
To make this transition easier, add a trace message to note when we
attempt to set up a bare repository without setting GIT_DIR. This allows
users and tool developers to audit which of their tools are problematic
and report/fix the issue. When they are sufficiently confident, they
would switch over to "safe.bareRepository=explicit".
Note that this uses trace2_data_string(), which isn't supported by the
"normal" GIT_TRACE2 target, only _EVENT or _PERF.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/git/kl6lsfqpygsj.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com/
[2] https://go.dev/ref/mod
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Steadmon <steadmon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
cache.h's nature of a dumping ground of includes prevented it from
being included in some compat/ files, forcing us into a workaround
of having a double forward declaration of the read_in_full() function
(see commit 14086b0a13 ("compat/pread.c: Add a forward declaration to
fix a warning", 2007-11-17)). Now that we have moved functions like
read_in_full() from cache.h to wrapper.h, and wrapper.h isn't littered
with unrelated and scary #defines, get rid of the extra forward
declaration and just have compat/pread.c include wrapper.h.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Calvin Wan <calvinwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Dozens of files made use of trace and trace2 functions, without
explicitly including trace.h or trace2.h. This made it more difficult
to find which files could remove a dependence on cache.h. Make C files
explicitly include trace.h or trace2.h if they are using them.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Calvin Wan <calvinwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This is another step towards letting us remove the include of cache.h in
strbuf.c. It does mean that we also need to add includes of abspath.h
in a number of C files.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Dozens of files made use of gettext functions, without explicitly
including gettext.h. This made it more difficult to find which files
could remove a dependence on cache.h. Make C files explicitly include
gettext.h if they are using it.
However, while compat/fsmonitor/fsm-ipc-darwin.c should also gain an
include of gettext.h, it was left out to avoid conflicting with an
in-flight topic.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Platform-specific code that determines if a directory is OK to use
as a repository has been taught to report more details, especially
on Windows.
* js/safe-directory-plus:
mingw: handle a file owned by the Administrators group correctly
mingw: be more informative when ownership check fails on FAT32
mingw: provide details about unsafe directories' ownership
setup: prepare for more detailed "dubious ownership" messages
setup: fix some formatting
When verifying the ownership of the Git directory, we sometimes would
like to say a bit more about it, e.g. when using a platform-dependent
code path (think: Windows has the permission model that is so different
from Unix'), but only when it is a appropriate to actually say
something.
To allow for that, collect that information and hand it back to the
caller (whose responsibility it is to show it or not).
Note: We do not actually fill in any platform-dependent information yet,
this commit just adds the infrastructure to be able to do so.
Based-on-an-idea-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In preparation for touching code that was introduced in 3b0bf27049
(setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765, 2022-05-10) and
that was formatted differently than preferred in the Git project, fix
the indentation before actually modifying the code.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
There is a known social engineering attack that takes advantage of the
fact that a working tree can include an entire bare repository,
including a config file. A user could run a Git command inside the bare
repository thinking that the config file of the 'outer' repository would
be used, but in reality, the bare repository's config file (which is
attacker-controlled) is used, which may result in arbitrary code
execution. See [1] for a fuller description and deeper discussion.
A simple mitigation is to forbid bare repositories unless specified via
`--git-dir` or `GIT_DIR`. In environments that don't use bare
repositories, this would be minimally disruptive.
Create a config variable, `safe.bareRepository`, that tells Git whether
or not to die() when working with a bare repository. This config is an
enum of:
- "all": allow all bare repositories (this is the default)
- "explicit": only allow bare repositories specified via --git-dir
or GIT_DIR.
If we want to protect users from such attacks by default, neither value
will suffice - "all" provides no protection, but "explicit" is
impractical for bare repository users. A more usable default would be to
allow only non-embedded bare repositories ([2] contains one such
proposal), but detecting if a repository is embedded is potentially
non-trivial, so this work is not implemented in this series.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/kl6lsfqpygsj.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/5b969c5e-e802-c447-ad25-6acc0b784582@github.com
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Use git_protected_config() to read `safe.directory` instead of
read_very_early_config(), making it 'protected configuration only'.
As a result, `safe.directory` now respects "-c", so update the tests and
docs accordingly. It used to ignore "-c" due to how it was implemented,
not because of security or correctness concerns [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/git/xmqqlevabcsu.fsf@gitster.g/
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.35:
Git 2.35.4
Git 2.34.4
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.4
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
8959555cee (setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level
directory, 2022-03-02), adds a function to check for ownership of
repositories using a directory that is representative of it, and ways to
add exempt a specific repository from said check if needed, but that
check didn't account for owership of the gitdir, or (when used) the
gitfile that points to that gitdir.
An attacker could create a git repository in a directory that they can
write into but that is owned by the victim to work around the fix that
was introduced with CVE-2022-24765 to potentially run code as the
victim.
An example that could result in privilege escalation to root in *NIX would
be to set a repository in a shared tmp directory by doing (for example):
$ git -C /tmp init
To avoid that, extend the ensure_valid_ownership function to be able to
check for all three paths.
This will have the side effect of tripling the number of stat() calls
when a repository is detected, but the effect is expected to be likely
minimal, as it is done only once during the directory walk in which Git
looks for a repository.
Additionally make sure to resolve the gitfile (if one was used) to find
the relevant gitdir for checking.
While at it change the message printed on failure so it is clear we are
referring to the repository by its worktree (or gitdir if it is bare) and
not to a specific directory.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <junio@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
The reference given to users when the result of
setup_git_directory_gently_1() is unexpected is incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Cleber Rosa <crosa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Prior to Git 2.35.0, git could be run from an inaccessible working
directory so long as the git repository specified by options and/or
environment variables was accessible. For example:
git init repo
mkdir -p a/b
cd a/b
chmod u-x ..
git -C "${PWD%/a/b}/repo" status
If this example seems a bit contrived, consider running with the
repository owner as a substitute UID (e.g. with runuser(1) or sudo(8))
without ensuring the working directory is accessible by that user.
The code added by e6f8861bd4 ("setup: introduce
startup_info->original_cwd") to preserve the working directory attempts
to normalize the path using strbuf_realpath(). If that fails, as in the
case above, it is treated as a fatal error.
This commit treats strbuf_realpath() errors as non-fatal. If an error
occurs, setup_original_cwd() will continue without applying removal
prevention for cwd, resulting in the pre-2.35.0 behavior. The risk
should be minimal, since git will not operate on a repository with
inaccessible ancestors, this behavior is only known to occur when cwd is
a descendant of the repository, an ancestor of cwd is inaccessible, and
no ancestors of the repository are inaccessible.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Locke <kevin@kevinlocke.name>
Reviewed-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Introduce and apply coccinelle rule to discourage an explicit
comparison between a pointer and NULL, and applies the clean-up to
the maintenance track.
* ep/maint-equals-null-cocci:
tree-wide: apply equals-null.cocci
tree-wide: apply equals-null.cocci
contrib/coccinnelle: add equals-null.cocci
With the addition of the safe.directory in 8959555ce
(setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory,
2022-03-02) released in v2.35.2, we are receiving feedback from a
variety of users about the feature.
Some users have a very large list of shared repositories and find it
cumbersome to add this config for every one of them.
In a more difficult case, certain workflows involve running Git commands
within containers. The container boundary prevents any global or system
config from communicating `safe.directory` values from the host into the
container. Further, the container almost always runs as a different user
than the owner of the directory in the host.
To simplify the reactions necessary for these users, extend the
definition of the safe.directory config value to include a possible '*'
value. This value implies that all directories are safe, providing a
single setting to opt-out of this protection.
Note that an empty assignment of safe.directory clears all previous
values, and this is already the case with the "if (!value || !*value)"
condition.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It seems that nothing is ever checking to make sure the safe directories
in the configs actually have the key safe.directory, so some unrelated
config that has a value with a certain directory would also make it a
safe directory.
Signed-off-by: Matheus Valadares <me@m28.io>
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It is difficult to change the ownership on a directory in our test
suite, so insert a new GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER environment
variable to trick Git into thinking we are in a differently-owned
directory. This allows us to test that the config is parsed correctly.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.2
Git 2.33.2
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
GIT-VERSION-GEN: bump to v2.33.1
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
It poses a security risk to search for a git directory outside of the
directories owned by the current user.
For example, it is common e.g. in computer pools of educational
institutes to have a "scratch" space: a mounted disk with plenty of
space that is regularly swiped where any authenticated user can create
a directory to do their work. Merely navigating to such a space with a
Git-enabled `PS1` when there is a maliciously-crafted `/scratch/.git/`
can lead to a compromised account.
The same holds true in multi-user setups running Windows, as `C:\` is
writable to every authenticated user by default.
To plug this vulnerability, we stop Git from accepting top-level
directories owned by someone other than the current user. We avoid
looking at the ownership of each and every directories between the
current and the top-level one (if there are any between) to avoid
introducing a performance bottleneck.
This new default behavior is obviously incompatible with the concept of
shared repositories, where we expect the top-level directory to be owned
by only one of its legitimate users. To re-enable that use case, we add
support for adding exceptions from the new default behavior via the
config setting `safe.directory`.
The `safe.directory` config setting is only respected in the system and
global configs, not from repository configs or via the command-line, and
can have multiple values to allow for multiple shared repositories.
We are particularly careful to provide a helpful message to any user
trying to use a shared repository.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
