Despite POSIX states that:
> The old egrep and fgrep commands are likely to be supported for many
> years to come as implementation extensions, allowing historical
> applications to operate unmodified.
GNU grep 3.8 started to warn[1]:
> The egrep and fgrep commands, which have been deprecated since
> release 2.5.3 (2007), now warn that they are obsolescent and should
> be replaced by grep -E and grep -F.
Prepare for their removal in the future.
[1]: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/info-gnu/2022-09/msg00001.html
Signed-off-by: Đoàn Trần Công Danh <congdanhqx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Adjust the test so that it uses the $EMPTY_BLOB value instead of
hard-coding the hash.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Avoid:
# ./t1304-default-acl.sh
ok 1 - checking for a working acl setup
ok 2 - Setup test repo
not ok 3 - Objects creation does not break ACLs with restrictive umask
#
# # SHA1 for empty blob
# check_perms_and_acl .git/objects/e6/9de29bb2d1d6434b8b29ae775ad8c2e48c5391
#
not ok 4 - git gc does not break ACLs with restrictive umask
#
# git gc &&
# check_perms_and_acl .git/objects/pack/*.pack
#
# failed 2 among 4 test(s)
1..4
on systems where USER isn't set. It's usually set by the login
process, but it isn't set when launching some Docker images. For
example:
$ docker run --rm debian env
HOME=/
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
HOSTNAME=b2dfdfe797ed
'id -u -n' has been in POSIX from Issue 2 through 2013 [1], so I don't
expect compatibility issues.
[1]: http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/utilities/id.html
Signed-off-by: W. Trevor King <wking@tremily.us>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
t1304 first runs setfacl as an experiment to see whether the
filesystem supports ACLs, and skips the remaining tests if
it does not. However, our setfacl run did not exercise the
ACLs very well, and some filesystems may support our initial
setfacl, but not the rest of the test.
In particular, some versions of ecryptfs will erroneously
apply the umask on top of an inherited directory ACL,
causing our tests to fail. Let's be more careful and make
sure both that we can read back the user ACL we set, and
that the inherited ACL is propagated correctly. The latter
catches the ecryptfs bug, but may also catch other bugs
(e.g., an implementation which does not handle inherited
ACLs at all).
Since we're making the setup more complex, let's move it
into its own test. This will hide the output for us unless
the user wants to run "-v" to see it (and we don't need to
bother printing anything about setfacl failing; the
remaining tests will properly print "skip" due to the
missing prerequisite).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
For some reason $LOGNAME is not set anymore for me after an upgrade from
Ubuntu 11.04 to 11.10. Use $USER in such a case.
Signed-off-by: Rene Scharfe <rene.scharfe@lsrfire.ath.cx>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Change this test to skip test with test prerequisites, and to do setup
work in tests. This improves the skipped statistics on platforms where
the test isn't run.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
SKIP messages are now part of the TAP plan. A TAP harness now knows
why a particular test was skipped and can report that information. The
non-TAP harness built into Git's test-lib did nothing special with
these messages, and is unaffected by these changes.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Solaris only uses one colon in the listing of the ACL mask, Linux uses two,
so substitute egrep for grep and make the second colon optional.
The -q option for Solaris 7's /usr/xpg4/bin/egrep does not appear to be
implemented, so redirect output to /dev/null.
Signed-off-by: Brandon Casey <casey@nrlssc.navy.mil>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Some implementations of setfacl do not recalculate the effective rights
mask when the ACL is modified. So, set the effective rights mask
explicitly to ensure that the ACL's that are set on the directories will
have effect.
Signed-off-by: Brandon Casey <casey@nrlssc.navy.mil>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This test was using the group read permission bit as an indicator of the
default ACL mask. This behavior is valid on Linux but not on other
platforms like Solaris. So, rather than looking at mode bits, just test
readability for the user. This, along with the checks for the existence
of the ACL's that were set on the parent directories, should be enough.
Signed-off-by: Brandon Casey <casey@nrlssc.navy.mil>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
According to the Linux setfacl man page, in order for an ACL to be valid,
the following rules must be satisfied:
* Whenever an ACL contains any Default ACL entries, the three Default
ACL base entries (default owner, default group, and default others)
must also exist.
* Whenever a Default ACL contains named user entries or named group
objects, it must also contain a default effective rights mask.
Some implementations of setfacl (Linux) do this automatically when
necessary, some (Solaris) do not. Solaris's setfacl croaks when trying to
create a default user ACL if the above rules are not satisfied. So, create
them before modifying the default user ACL's.
Signed-off-by: Brandon Casey <casey@nrlssc.navy.mil>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Some platforms (Solaris) have a setfacl whose -d switch works differently
than the one on Linux. On Linux, it causes all operations to be applied
to the Default ACL. There is a notation for operating on the Default ACL:
[d[efault]:] [u[ser]:]uid [:perms]
so use it instead of the -d switch.
Signed-off-by: Brandon Casey <casey@nrlssc.navy.mil>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
We used to unnecessarily give the read permission to group and others,
regardless of the umask, which isn't serious because the objects are
still protected by their containing directory, but isn't necessary
either.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Moy <Matthieu.Moy@imag.fr>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
We used to create 0600 files, and then use chmod to set the group and
other permission bits to the umask. This usually has the same effect
as a normal file creation with a umask.
But in the presence of ACLs, the group permission plays the role of
the ACL mask: the "g" bits of newly created files are chosen according
to default ACL mask of the directory, not according to the umask, and
doing a chmod() on these "g" bits affect the ACL's mask instead of
actual group permission.
In other words, creating files with 0600 and then doing a chmod to the
umask creates files which are unreadable by users allowed in the
default ACL. To create the files without breaking ACLs, we let the
umask do it's job at the file's creation time, and get rid of the
later chmod.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Moy <Matthieu.Moy@imag.fr>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Right now, Git creates unreadable pack files on non-shared
repositories when the user has a umask of 077, even when the default
ACLs for the directory would give read/write access to a specific
user.
Loose object files are created world-readable, which doesn't break ACLs,
but isn't necessarily desirable.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Moy <Matthieu.Moy@imag.fr>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
