Three tests in t1300-config.sh check that "git config --get" barfs when
syntax errors are present in the config file. The tests redirect
standard output and standard error of "git config --get" to files,
"actual" and "error" correspondingly. They assert presence of an error
message in file "error". However, these tests don't use file "actual"
for assertions.
Don't redirect standard output of "git config --get" to file "actual" in
t1300-config.sh to avoid creating unnecessary files.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Rybak <rybak.a.v@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Three tests in t1300-config.sh check that "git config --get" barfs when
the config file contains various syntax errors: key=value pair without
equals sign, broken section line, and broken value string. The sample
config files include a comment describing the kind of broken syntax.
This description seems to have been copy-pasted from the "broken section
line" sample to the other two samples.
Fix descriptions of broken config file syntax in samples used in
t1300-config.sh.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Rybak <rybak.a.v@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Test 'credential config with partial URLs' in t0300-credentials.sh
contains three "git credential fill" invocations. For two of the
invocations, the test asserts presence or absence of string "yep" in the
standard output. For the third test it checks for an error message in
standard error.
Don't redirect standard output of "git credential" to file "stdout" in
t0300-credentials.sh to avoid creating an unnecessary file when only
standard error is checked.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Rybak <rybak.a.v@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The code to render callouts for manpages comes from 17 years ago:
776e994af5 (Properly render asciidoc "callouts" in git man pages.,
2006-04-28), and it was needed back then, but DocBook Stylesheets added
support for that in 2008 [1], since 1.74.0 it hasn't been necessary.
What's worse: the format of the upstream callouts is much nicer than our
hacked version.
Compare this:
$ git diff (1)
$ git diff --cached (2)
$ git diff HEAD (3)
1. Changes in the working tree not yet staged for the next
commit.
2. Changes between the index and your last commit; what you
would be committing if you run git commit without -a
option.
3. Changes in the working tree since your last commit; what
you would be committing if you run git commit -a
To this:
$ git diff (1)
$ git diff --cached (2)
$ git diff HEAD (3)
1. Changes in the working tree not yet staged for the next commit.
2. Changes between the index and your last commit; what you would
be committing if you run git commit without -a option.
3. Changes in the working tree since your last commit; what you
would be committing if you run git commit -a
Let's drop our unnecessary inferior custom format and use the official
one.
[1] https://sourceforge.net/p/docbook/code/7842/
Signed-off-by: Felipe Contreras <felipe.contreras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Mark strtok() and strtok_r() to be banned.
* tb/ban-strtok:
banned.h: mark `strtok()` and `strtok_r()` as banned
t/helper/test-json-writer.c: avoid using `strtok()`
t/helper/test-oidmap.c: avoid using `strtok()`
t/helper/test-hashmap.c: avoid using `strtok()`
string-list: introduce `string_list_setlen()`
string-list: multi-delimiter `string_list_split_in_place()`
The output given by "git blame" that attributes a line to contents
taken from the file specified by the "--contents" option shows it
differently from a line attributed to the working tree file.
* jk/blame-fake-commit-label:
blame: use different author name for fake commit generated by --contents
A small API fix to the ort merge strategy backend.
* en/ort-finalize-after-0-merges-fix:
merge-ort: fix calling merge_finalize() with no intermediate merge
The completion script used to use bare "read" without the "-r"
option to read the contents of various state files, which risked
getting confused with backslashes in them. This has been
corrected.
* ek/completion-use-read-r-to-read-literally:
completion: suppress unwanted unescaping of `read`
The character classifiers are supposed to allow passing EOF to them, a
negative value. It isn't part of any character class. Extend the tests
to cover that.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In 0d30feef3c (fsck: create scaffolding for rev-index checks,
2023-04-17) and later 5a6072f631 (fsck: validate .rev file header,
2023-04-17), the check_pack_rev_indexes() method was created with a
'struct repository *r' parameter. However, this parameter was unused and
instead 'the_repository' was used in its place.
Fix this situation with the obvious replacement.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
If a filesystem-level corruption occurs in a .bitmap file, Git can react
poorly. This could take the form of a run-time error due to failing to
parse an EWAH bitmap or be more subtle such as returning the wrong set
of objects to a fetch or clone.
A natural first response to either of these kinds of errors is to run
'git fsck' to see if any files are corrupt. This currently ignores all
.bitmap files.
Add checks to 'git fsck' for all .bitmap files that are currently
associated with a multi-pack-index or pack file. Verify their checksums
using the hashfile API.
We iterate through all multi-pack-indexes and pack-files to be sure to
check all .bitmap files, not just the one that would be read by the
process. For example, a multi-pack-index bitmap overrules a pack-bitmap.
However, if the multi-pack-index is removed, the pack-bitmap may be
selected instead. Be thorough to include every file that could become
active in such a way. This includes checking files in alternates.
There is potential that we could extend this effort to check the
structure of the reachability bitmaps themselves, but it is very
expensive to do so. At minimum, it's as expensive as generating the
bitmaps in the first place, and that's assuming that we don't use the
trivial algorithm of verifying each bitmap individually. The trivial
algorithm will result in quadratic behavior (number of objects times
number of bitmapped commits) while the bitmap building operation
constructs a lattice of commits to build bitmaps incrementally and then
generate the final bitmaps from a subset of those commits.
If we were to extend 'git fsck' to check .bitmap file contents more
closely like this, then we would likely want to hide it behind an option
that signals the user is more willing to do expensive operations such as
this.
For testing, set up a repository with a pack-bitmap _and_ a
multi-pack-index bitmap. This requires some file movement to avoid
deleting the pack-bitmap during the repack that creates the
multi-pack-index bitmap. We can then verify that 'git fsck' is checking
all files, not just the "active" bitmap.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
We need to provide `--trailer sign` since the command won’t output
anything if you don’t give it an input and/or a
`--trailer`. Furthermore, the message which already contains an s-o-b is
wrong:
$ git interpret-trailers --trailer sign <msg.txt
Signed-off-by: Alice <alice@example.com>
Signed-off-by: Alice <alice@example.com>
This can’t be what was originally intended.
So change the messages in this example to use the typical
“subject/message” file.
Signed-off-by: Kristoffer Haugsbakk <code@khaugsbakk.name>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
`command` has been deprecated since commit c364b7ef51 (trailer: add new
.cmd config option, 2021-05-03).
Use the commit message of c364b7ef51 as a guide to replace the use of
`$ARG` and to use a script instead of an inline command.[1] Also,
explicitly trigger the command by passing in `--trailer=see`, since
this config is not automatically used.[2]
[1]: “Instead of "$ARG", users can refer to the value as positional
argument, $1, in their scripts.”
[2]: “At the same time, in order to allow `git interpret-trailers` to
better simulate the behavior of `git command -s`,
'trailer.<token>.cmd' will not automatically execute.”
Acked-by: ZheNing Hu <adlternative@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kristoffer Haugsbakk <code@khaugsbakk.name>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Use input redirection instead of invoking cat(1) on a single file. This
is more straightforward, saves a process, and often makes the line
shorter.
Suggested-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Kristoffer Haugsbakk <code@khaugsbakk.name>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This file contains four instances of trailing spaces from its inception
in commit [1]. These spaces might be intentional, since a user would be
prompted with `> ` in an interactive session. On the one hand, this is a
whitespace error according to `git diff --check`; on the other hand, the
raw documentation—it makes no difference in the rendered output—is just
staying faithful to the simulation of the interactive prompt.
Let’s get rid of these whitespace errors and also make the examples more
friendly to cut-and-paste by replacing the heredocs with files which are
shown with cat(1).
[1]: dfd66ddf5a (Documentation: add documentation for 'git
interpret-trailers', 2014-10-13)
Suggested-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Kristoffer Haugsbakk <code@khaugsbakk.name>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
safe.bareRepository=explicit is a safer default mode of operation, since
it guards against the embedded bare repository attack [1]. Most end
users don't use bare repositories directly, so they should be able to
set safe.bareRepository=explicit, with the expectation that they can
reenable bare repositories by specifying GIT_DIR or --git-dir.
However, the user might use a tool that invokes Git on bare repositories
without setting GIT_DIR (e.g. "go mod" will clone bare repositories
[2]), so even if a user wanted to use safe.bareRepository=explicit, it
wouldn't be feasible until their tools learned to set GIT_DIR.
To make this transition easier, add a trace message to note when we
attempt to set up a bare repository without setting GIT_DIR. This allows
users and tool developers to audit which of their tools are problematic
and report/fix the issue. When they are sufficiently confident, they
would switch over to "safe.bareRepository=explicit".
Note that this uses trace2_data_string(), which isn't supported by the
"normal" GIT_TRACE2 target, only _EVENT or _PERF.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/git/kl6lsfqpygsj.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com/
[2] https://go.dev/ref/mod
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Steadmon <steadmon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
As in previous commits, harden the wincred credential helper against the
aforementioned protocol injection attack.
Unlike the approached used for osxkeychain and libsecret, where a
fixed-size buffer was replaced with `getline()`, we must take a
different approach here. There is no `getline()` equivalent in Windows,
and the function is not available to us with ordinary compiler settings.
Instead, allocate a larger (still fixed-size) buffer in which to process
each line. The value of 100 KiB is chosen to match the maximum-length
header that curl will allow, CURL_MAX_HTTP_HEADER.
To ensure that we are reading complete lines at a time, and that we
aren't susceptible to a similar injection attack (albeit with more
padding), ensure that each read terminates at a newline (i.e., that no
line is more than 100 KiB long).
Note that it isn't sufficient to turn the old loop into something like:
while (len && strchr("\r\n", buf[len - 1])) {
buf[--len] = 0;
ends_in_newline = 1;
}
because if an attacker sends something like:
[aaaaa.....]\r
host=example.com\r\n
the credential helper would fill its buffer after reading up through the
first '\r', call fgets() again, and then see "host=example.com\r\n" on
its line.
Note that the original code was written in a way that would trim an
arbitrary number of "\r" and "\n" from the end of the string. We should
get only a single "\n" (since the point of `fgets()` is to return the
buffer to us when it sees one), and likewise would not expect to see
more than one associated "\r". The new code trims a single "\r\n", which
matches the original intent.
[1]: https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_HEADERFUNCTION.html
Tested-by: Matthew John Cheetham <mjcheetham@outlook.com>
Helped-by: Matthew John Cheetham <mjcheetham@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The libsecret credential helper reads the newline-delimited
protocol stream one line at a time by repeatedly calling fgets() into a
fixed-size buffer, and is thus affected by the vulnerability described
in the previous commit.
To mitigate this attack, avoid using a fixed-size buffer, and instead
rely on getline() to allocate a buffer as large as necessary to fit the
entire content of the line, preventing any protocol injection.
In most parts of Git we don't assume that every platform has getline().
But libsecret is primarily used on Linux, where we do already assume it
(using a knob in config.mak.uname). POSIX also added getline() in 2008,
so we'd expect other recent Unix-like operating systems to have it
(e.g., FreeBSD also does).
Note that the buffer was already allocated on the heap in this case, but
we'll swap `g_free()` for `free()`, since it will now be allocated by
the system `getline()`, rather than glib's `g_malloc()`.
Tested-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The libsecret credential helper does not mark its build artifact as
ignored, so running "make" results in a dirty working tree.
Mark the "git-credential-libsecret" binary as ignored to avoid the above.
Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
libgnome-keyring was deprecated in 2014 (in favor of libsecret), more
than nine years ago [1].
The credential helper implemented using libgnome-keyring has had a small
handful of commits since 2013, none of which implemented or changed any
functionality. The last commit to do substantial work in this area was
15f7221686 (contrib/git-credential-gnome-keyring.c: support really
ancient gnome-keyring, 2013-09-23), just shy of nine years ago.
This credential helper suffers from the same `fgets()`-related injection
attack (using the new "wwwauth[]" feature) as in the previous commit.
Instead of patching it, let's remove this helper as deprecated.
[1]: https://mail.gnome.org/archives/commits-list/2014-January/msg01585.html
Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The macOS Keychain-based credential helper reads the newline-delimited
protocol stream one line at a time by repeatedly calling fgets() into a
fixed-size buffer, and is thus affected by the vulnerability described
in the previous commit.
To mitigate this attack, avoid using a fixed-size buffer, and instead
rely on getline() to allocate a buffer as large as necessary to fit the
entire content of the line, preventing any protocol injection.
We solved a similar problem in a5bb10fd5e (config: avoid fixed-sized
buffer when renaming/deleting a section, 2023-04-06) by switching to
strbuf_getline(). We can't do that here because the contrib helpers do
not link with the rest of Git, and so can't use a strbuf. But we can use
the system getline() directly, which works similarly.
In most parts of Git we don't assume that every platform has getline().
But this helper is run only on OS X, and that platform added support in
10.7 ("Lion") which was released in 2011.
Tested-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Add a test ensuring that the "wwwauth[]" field cannot be used to
inject malicious data into the credential helper stream.
Many of the credential helpers in contrib/credential read the
newline-delimited protocol stream one line at a time by repeatedly
calling fgets() into a fixed-size buffer.
This assumes that each line is no more than 1024 characters long, since
each iteration of the loop assumes that it is parsing starting at the
beginning of a new line in the stream. However, similar to a5bb10fd5e
(config: avoid fixed-sized buffer when renaming/deleting a section,
2023-04-06), if a line is longer than 1024 characters, a malicious actor
can embed another command within an existing line, bypassing the usual
checks introduced in 9a6bbee800 (credential: avoid writing values with
newlines, 2020-03-11).
As with the problem fixed in that commit, specially crafted input can
cause the helper to return the credential for the wrong host, letting an
attacker trick the victim into sending credentials for one host to
another.
Luckily, all parts of the credential helper protocol that are available
in a tagged release of Git are immune to this attack:
- "protocol" is restricted to known values, and is thus immune.
- "host" is immune because curl will reject hostnames that have a '='
character in them, which would be required to carry out this attack.
- "username" is immune, because the buffer characters to fill out the
first `fgets()` call would pollute the `username` field, causing the
credential helper to return nothing (because it would match a
username if present, and the username of the credential to be stolen
is likely not 1024 characters).
- "password" is immune because providing a password instructs
credential helpers to avoid filling credentials in the first place.
- "path" is similar to username; if present, it is not likely to match
any credential the victim is storing. It's also not enabled by
default; the victim would have to set credential.useHTTPPath
explicitly.
However, the new "wwwauth[]" field introduced via 5f2117b24f
(credential: add WWW-Authenticate header to cred requests, 2023-02-27)
can be used to inject data into the credential helper stream. For
example, running:
{
printf 'HTTP/1.1 401\r\n'
printf 'WWW-Authenticate: basic realm='
perl -e 'print "a" x 1024'
printf 'host=victim.com\r\n'
} | nc -Nlp 8080
in one terminal, and then:
git clone http://localhost:8080
in another would result in a line like:
wwwauth[]=basic realm=aaa[...]aaahost=victim.com
being sent to the credential helper. If we tweak that "1024" to align
our output with the helper's buffer size and the rest of the data on the
line, it can cause the helper to see "host=victim.com" on its own line,
allowing motivated attackers to exfiltrate credentials belonging to
"victim.com".
The below test demonstrates these failures and provides us with a test
to ensure that our fix is correct. That said, it has a couple of
shortcomings:
- it's in t0303, since that's the only mechanism we have for testing
random helpers. But that means nobody is going to run it under
normal circumstances.
- to get the attack right, it has to line up the stuffed name with the
buffer size, so we depend on the exact buffer size. I parameterized
it so it could be used to test other helpers, but in practice it's
not likely for anybody to do that.
Still, it's the best we can do, and will help us confirm the presence of
the problem (and our fixes) in the new few patches.
Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Teach git-credential to read "wwwauth[]" value(s) when parsing the
output of a credential helper.
These extra headers are not needed for Git's own HTTP support to use the
feature internally, but the feature would not be available for a
scripted caller (say, git-remote-mediawiki providing the header in the
same way).
As a bonus, this also makes it easier to use wwwauth[] in synthetic
credential inputs in our test suite.
Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The email format does not allow blank lines in headers; detect such
input and report it as malformed and add a test for it.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Sometimes, adding a header different than CC or TO is desirable; for
example, when using Debbugs, it is best to use 'X-Debbugs-Cc' headers
to keep people in CC; this is an example use case enabled by the new
'--header-cmd' option.
The header unfolding logic is extracted to a subroutine so that it can
be reused; a test is added for coverage.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This refactor is to pave the way for the addition of the new
'--header-cmd' option to the send-email command.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The file started out as a test for picks and reverts with renames, but
has been subsequently populated with all kinds of basic tests, in
accordance with its generic name. Adjust the description to reflect
that.
Signed-off-by: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The "%GT" placeholder for the "--format" option of "git log" and
friends caused BUG() to trigger on a commit signed with an unknown
key, which has been corrected.
* jk/gpg-trust-level-fix:
gpg-interface: set trust level of missing key to "undefined"
When "gc" needs to retain unreachable objects, packing them into
cruft packs (instead of exploding them into loose object files) has
been offered as a more efficient option for some time. Now the use
of cruft packs has been made the default and no longer considered
an experimental feature.
* tb/enable-cruft-packs-by-default:
repository.h: drop unused `gc_cruft_packs`
builtin/gc.c: make `gc.cruftPacks` enabled by default
t/t9300-fast-import.sh: prepare for `gc --cruft` by default
t/t6500-gc.sh: add additional test cases
t/t6500-gc.sh: refactor cruft pack tests
t/t6501-freshen-objects.sh: prepare for `gc --cruft` by default
t/t5304-prune.sh: prepare for `gc --cruft` by default
builtin/gc.c: ignore cruft packs with `--keep-largest-pack`
builtin/repack.c: fix incorrect reference to '-C'
pack-write.c: plug a leak in stage_tmp_packfiles()
Support for "less secure apps" ended May 30, 2022.
This effectively reverts 155067a (git-send-email.txt: mention less secure
app access with Gmail, 2021-01-08).
Signed-off-by: Jouke Witteveen <j.witteveen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
These are conscious violations of the usual rules for error messages,
based on this reasoning:
- If an error message is directly followed by another sentence, it
needs to be properly terminated with a period, lest the grammar
looks broken and becomes hard to read.
- That second sentence isn't actually an error message any more, so
it should abide to conventional language rules for good looks and
legibility. Arguably, these should be converted to advice
messages (which the user can squelch, too), but that's a much
bigger effort to get right.
- Neither of these apply to the first hunk in do_exec(), but this
two-line message looks just too much like a real sentence to not
terminate it. Also, leaving it alone would make it asymmetrical
to the other hunk.
Signed-off-by: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
N_() is meant to be used on strings that are subsequently _()'d, which
isn't the case here.
The affected construct is a bit questionable from an i18n perspective,
as it pieces together a sentence from separate strings. However, it
doesn't appear to be that bad, as the "assembly instructions" are in a
translatable message as well. Lacking specific complaints from
translators, it doesn't seem worth changing this.
Signed-off-by: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Instead of the time the formatter was run, show the timestamp
recorded in the commit in the documentation.
* fc/doc-use-datestamp-in-commit:
doc: set actual revdate for manpages
The on-disk reverse index that allows mapping from the pack offset
to the object name for the object stored at the offset has been
enabled by default.
* tb/pack-revindex-on-disk:
t: invert `GIT_TEST_WRITE_REV_INDEX`
config: enable `pack.writeReverseIndex` by default
pack-revindex: introduce `pack.readReverseIndex`
pack-revindex: introduce GIT_TEST_REV_INDEX_DIE_ON_DISK
pack-revindex: make `load_pack_revindex` take a repository
t5325: mark as leak-free
pack-write.c: plug a leak in stage_tmp_packfiles()
The previous few commits improved the parsing of dates in malformed
commit objects. But there's one big case left implicit: we may still
feed garbage to parse_timestamp(). This is preferable to trying to be
more strict, but let's document the thinking in a comment.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The comment in parse_commit_date() claims that parse_timestamp() will
not walk past the end of the buffer we've been given, since it will hit
the newline at "eol" and stop. This is usually true, when dateptr
contains actual numbers to parse. But with a line like:
committer name <email> \n
with just whitespace, and no numbers, parse_timestamp() will consume
that newline as part of the leading whitespace, and we may walk past our
"tail" pointer (which itself is set from the "size" parameter passed in
to parse_commit_buffer()).
In practice this can't cause us to walk off the end of an array, because
we always add an extra NUL byte to the end of objects we load from disk
(as a defense against exactly this kind of bug). However, you can see
the behavior in action when "committer" is the final header (which it
usually is, unless there's an encoding) and the subject line can be
parsed as an integer. We walk right past the newline on the committer
line, as well as the "\n\n" separator, and mistake the subject for the
timestamp.
We can solve this by trimming the whitespace ourselves, making sure that
it has some non-whitespace to parse. Note that we need to be a bit
careful about the definition of "whitespace" here, as our isspace()
doesn't match exotic characters like vertical tab or formfeed. We can
work around that by checking for an actual number (see the in-code
comment). This is slightly more restrictive than the current code, but
in practice the results are either the same (we reject "foo" as "0", but
so would parse_timestamp()) or extremely unlikely even for broken
commits (parse_timestamp() would allow "\v123" as "123", but we'll now
make it "0").
I did also allow "-" here, which may be controversial, as we don't
currently support negative timestamps. My reasoning was two-fold. One,
the design of parse_timestamp() is such that we should be able to easily
switch it to handling signed values, and this otherwise creates a
hard-to-find gotcha that anybody doing that work would get tripped up
on. And two, the status quo is that we currently parse them, though the
result of course ends up as a very large unsigned value (which is likely
to just get clamped to "0" for display anyway, since our date routines
can't handle it).
The new test checks the commit parser (via "--until") for both vanilla
spaces and the vertical-tab case. I also added a test to check these
against the pretty-print formatter, which uses split_ident_line(). It's
not subject to the same bug, because it already insists that there be
one or more digits in the timestamp.
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To find the committer timestamp, we parse left-to-right looking for the
closing ">" of the email, and then expect the timestamp right after
that. But we've seen some broken cases in the wild where this fails, but
we _could_ find the timestamp with a little extra work. E.g.:
Name <Name<email>> 123456789 -0500
This means that features that rely on the committer timestamp, like
--since or --until, will treat the commit as happening at time 0 (i.e.,
1970).
This is doubly confusing because the pretty-print parser learned to
handle these in 03818a4a94 (split_ident: parse timestamp from end of
line, 2013-10-14). So printing them via "git show", etc, makes
everything look normal, but --until, etc are still broken (despite the
fact that that commit explicitly mentioned --until!).
So let's use the same trick as 03818a4a94: find the end of the line, and
parse back to the final ">". In theory we could use split_ident_line()
here, but it's actually a bit more strict. In particular, it requires a
valid time-zone token, too. That should be present, of course, but we
wouldn't want to break --until for cases that are working currently.
We might want to teach split_ident_line() to become more lenient there,
but it would require checking its many callers (since right now they can
assume that if date_start is non-NULL, so is tz_start).
So for now we'll just reimplement the same trick in the commit parser.
The test is in t4212, which already covers similar cases, courtesy of
03818a4a94. We'll just adjust the broken commit to munge both the author
and committer timestamps. Note that we could match (author|committer)
here, but alternation can't be used portably in sed. Since we wouldn't
expect to see ">" except as part of an ident line, we can just match
that character on any line.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
We wouldn't expect cat-file to fail here, but it's good practice to
avoid putting git on the upstream of a pipe, as we otherwise ignore its
exit code.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
`strtok()` has a couple of drawbacks that make it undesirable to have
any new instances. In addition to being thread-unsafe, it also
encourages confusing data flows, where `strtok()` may be called from
multiple functions with its first argument as NULL, making it unclear
from the immediate context which string is being tokenized.
Now that we have removed all instances of `strtok()` from the tree,
let's ban `strtok()` to avoid introducing new ones in the future. If new
callers should arise, they are encouraged to use
`string_list_split_in_place()` (and `string_list_remove_empty_items()`,
if applicable).
string_list_split_in_place() is not a perfect drop-in replacement
for `strtok_r()`, particularly if the caller is processing a string with
an arbitrary number of tokens, and wants to process each token one at a
time.
But there are no instances of this in Git's tree which are more
well-suited to `strtok_r()` than the friendlier
`string_list_split_in_place()`, so ban `strtok_r()`, too.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The mark_common() method in negotiator/skipping.c was converted
from recursive to iterative in 4654134976 (negotiator/skipping:
avoid stack overflow, 2022-10-25), but there is some more work
to do:
1. prio_queue() should be used with clear_prio_queue(), otherwise there
will be a memory leak.
2. It does not do duplicate protection before prio_queue_put().
(The COMMON bit would work here, too.)
3. When it translated from recursive to iterative it kept "return"
statements that should probably be "continue" statements.
4. It does not attempt to parse commits, and instead returns
immediately when finding an unparsed commit. This is something
that it did in its original version, so maybe it is by design,
but it doesn't match the doc comment for the method.
Helped-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Han Xin <hanxin.hx@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
mark_common() in negotiator/default.c may overflow the stack due to
recursive function calls. Avoid this by instead recursing using a
heap-allocated data structure.
This is the same case as 4654134976 (negotiator/skipping: avoid
stack overflow, 2022-10-25)
Reported-by: Xin Xing <xingxin.xx@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Han Xin <hanxin.hx@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The version reported by e.g. x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc on Debian bullseye
looks like:
gcc version 10-win32 20210110 (GCC)
This ends up with detect-compiler failing with:
./detect-compiler: 30: test: Illegal number: 10-win32
This change removes the two known suffixes known to exist in GCC versions
in Debian: -win32 and -posix.
Signed-off-by: Mike Hommey <mh@glandium.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The phrasing "is currently ignored" was prone to be misinterpreted
as if we were wishing if it were honored. Rephrase it to make it
clear that the experimental variable will be ignored.
In the longer term, after/when we allow incremental/over-the-wire
migration of the object-format, i.e. cloning from an SHA-1
repository to create an SHA-256 repository (or vice versa) and
fetching and pushing between them would bidirectionally convert the
object format on the fly, it is likely that we would teach a new
option "--object-format" to "git clone" to say "you would use
whatever object format the origin uses by default, but this time, I
am telling you to use this format on our side, doing on-the-fly
object format conversion as needed". So it is perfectly OK to
ignore the settings of this experimental variable, even after such
an extension happens that makes it necessary for us to have a way to
create a new repository that uses different object format from the
origin repository.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
