Merge branch 'icasefs-symlink-confusion'

This topic branch fixes two vulnerabilities:

- Recursive clones on case-insensitive filesystems that support symbolic
  links are susceptible to case confusion that can be exploited to
  execute just-cloned code during the clone operation.

- Repositories can be configured to execute arbitrary code during local
  clones. To address this, the ownership checks introduced in v2.30.3
  are now extended to cover cloning local repositories.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This commit is contained in:
Johannes Schindelin 2024-03-31 00:22:41 +01:00
commit 86cb6a3f05
16 changed files with 559 additions and 57 deletions

View file

@ -55,6 +55,37 @@ ENVIRONMENT
admins may need to configure some transports to allow this
variable to be passed. See the discussion in linkgit:git[1].
`GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH`::
When cloning or fetching from a partial repository (i.e., one
itself cloned with `--filter`), the server-side `upload-pack`
may need to fetch extra objects from its upstream in order to
complete the request. By default, `upload-pack` will refuse to
perform such a lazy fetch, because `git fetch` may run arbitrary
commands specified in configuration and hooks of the source
repository (and `upload-pack` tries to be safe to run even in
untrusted `.git` directories).
+
This is implemented by having `upload-pack` internally set the
`GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH` variable to `1`. If you want to override it
(because you are fetching from a partial clone, and you are sure
you trust it), you can explicitly set `GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH` to
`0`.
SECURITY
--------
Most Git commands should not be run in an untrusted `.git` directory
(see the section `SECURITY` in linkgit:git[1]). `upload-pack` tries to
avoid any dangerous configuration options or hooks from the repository
it's serving, making it safe to clone an untrusted directory and run
commands on the resulting clone.
For an extra level of safety, you may be able to run `upload-pack` as an
alternate user. The details will be platform dependent, but on many
systems you can run:
git clone --no-local --upload-pack='sudo -u nobody git-upload-pack' ...
SEE ALSO
--------
linkgit:gitnamespaces[7]

View file

@ -1032,6 +1032,37 @@ The index is also capable of storing multiple entries (called "stages")
for a given pathname. These stages are used to hold the various
unmerged version of a file when a merge is in progress.
SECURITY
--------
Some configuration options and hook files may cause Git to run arbitrary
shell commands. Because configuration and hooks are not copied using
`git clone`, it is generally safe to clone remote repositories with
untrusted content, inspect them with `git log`, and so on.
However, it is not safe to run Git commands in a `.git` directory (or
the working tree that surrounds it) when that `.git` directory itself
comes from an untrusted source. The commands in its config and hooks
are executed in the usual way.
By default, Git will refuse to run when the repository is owned by
someone other than the user running the command. See the entry for
`safe.directory` in linkgit:git-config[1]. While this can help protect
you in a multi-user environment, note that you can also acquire
untrusted repositories that are owned by you (for example, if you
extract a zip file or tarball from an untrusted source). In such cases,
you'd need to "sanitize" the untrusted repository first.
If you have an untrusted `.git` directory, you should first clone it
with `git clone --no-local` to obtain a clean copy. Git does restrict
the set of options and hooks that will be run by `upload-pack`, which
handles the server side of a clone or fetch, but beware that the
surface area for attack against `upload-pack` is large, so this does
carry some risk. The safest thing is to serve the repository as an
unprivileged user (either via linkgit:git-daemon[1], ssh, or using
other tools to change user ids). See the discussion in the `SECURITY`
section of linkgit:git-upload-pack[1].
FURTHER DOCUMENTATION
---------------------

View file

@ -294,6 +294,9 @@ static void runcommand_in_submodule_cb(const struct cache_entry *list_item,
struct child_process cp = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
char *displaypath;
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
displaypath = get_submodule_displaypath(path, info->prefix);
sub = submodule_from_path(the_repository, null_oid(), path);
@ -620,6 +623,9 @@ static void status_submodule(const char *path, const struct object_id *ce_oid,
.free_removed_argv_elements = 1,
};
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
if (!submodule_from_path(the_repository, null_oid(), path))
die(_("no submodule mapping found in .gitmodules for path '%s'"),
path);
@ -1220,6 +1226,9 @@ static void sync_submodule(const char *path, const char *prefix,
if (!is_submodule_active(the_repository, path))
return;
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
sub = submodule_from_path(the_repository, null_oid(), path);
if (sub && sub->url) {
@ -1360,6 +1369,9 @@ static void deinit_submodule(const char *path, const char *prefix,
struct strbuf sb_config = STRBUF_INIT;
char *sub_git_dir = xstrfmt("%s/.git", path);
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
sub = submodule_from_path(the_repository, null_oid(), path);
if (!sub || !sub->name)
@ -1641,16 +1653,42 @@ static char *clone_submodule_sm_gitdir(const char *name)
return sm_gitdir;
}
static int dir_contains_only_dotgit(const char *path)
{
DIR *dir = opendir(path);
struct dirent *e;
int ret = 1;
if (!dir)
return 0;
e = readdir_skip_dot_and_dotdot(dir);
if (!e)
ret = 0;
else if (strcmp(DEFAULT_GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT, e->d_name) ||
(e = readdir_skip_dot_and_dotdot(dir))) {
error("unexpected item '%s' in '%s'", e->d_name, path);
ret = 0;
}
closedir(dir);
return ret;
}
static int clone_submodule(const struct module_clone_data *clone_data,
struct string_list *reference)
{
char *p;
char *sm_gitdir = clone_submodule_sm_gitdir(clone_data->name);
char *sm_alternate = NULL, *error_strategy = NULL;
struct stat st;
struct child_process cp = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
const char *clone_data_path = clone_data->path;
char *to_free = NULL;
if (validate_submodule_path(clone_data_path) < 0)
exit(128);
if (!is_absolute_path(clone_data->path))
clone_data_path = to_free = xstrfmt("%s/%s", get_git_work_tree(),
clone_data->path);
@ -1660,6 +1698,10 @@ static int clone_submodule(const struct module_clone_data *clone_data,
"git dir"), sm_gitdir);
if (!file_exists(sm_gitdir)) {
if (clone_data->require_init && !stat(clone_data_path, &st) &&
!is_empty_dir(clone_data_path))
die(_("directory not empty: '%s'"), clone_data_path);
if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(sm_gitdir) < 0)
die(_("could not create directory '%s'"), sm_gitdir);
@ -1704,10 +1746,18 @@ static int clone_submodule(const struct module_clone_data *clone_data,
if(run_command(&cp))
die(_("clone of '%s' into submodule path '%s' failed"),
clone_data->url, clone_data_path);
if (clone_data->require_init && !stat(clone_data_path, &st) &&
!dir_contains_only_dotgit(clone_data_path)) {
char *dot_git = xstrfmt("%s/.git", clone_data_path);
unlink(dot_git);
free(dot_git);
die(_("directory not empty: '%s'"), clone_data_path);
}
} else {
char *path;
if (clone_data->require_init && !access(clone_data_path, X_OK) &&
if (clone_data->require_init && !stat(clone_data_path, &st) &&
!is_empty_dir(clone_data_path))
die(_("directory not empty: '%s'"), clone_data_path);
if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(clone_data_path) < 0)
@ -1717,6 +1767,23 @@ static int clone_submodule(const struct module_clone_data *clone_data,
free(path);
}
/*
* We already performed this check at the beginning of this function,
* before cloning the objects. This tries to detect racy behavior e.g.
* in parallel clones, where another process could easily have made the
* gitdir nested _after_ it was created.
*
* To prevent further harm coming from this unintentionally-nested
* gitdir, let's disable it by deleting the `HEAD` file.
*/
if (validate_submodule_git_dir(sm_gitdir, clone_data->name) < 0) {
char *head = xstrfmt("%s/HEAD", sm_gitdir);
unlink(head);
free(head);
die(_("refusing to create/use '%s' in another submodule's "
"git dir"), sm_gitdir);
}
connect_work_tree_and_git_dir(clone_data_path, sm_gitdir, 0);
p = git_pathdup_submodule(clone_data_path, "config");
@ -2490,6 +2557,9 @@ static int update_submodule(struct update_data *update_data)
{
int ret;
if (validate_submodule_path(update_data->sm_path) < 0)
return -1;
ret = determine_submodule_update_strategy(the_repository,
update_data->just_cloned,
update_data->sm_path,
@ -2597,12 +2667,21 @@ static int update_submodules(struct update_data *update_data)
for (i = 0; i < suc.update_clone_nr; i++) {
struct update_clone_data ucd = suc.update_clone[i];
int code;
int code = 128;
oidcpy(&update_data->oid, &ucd.oid);
update_data->just_cloned = ucd.just_cloned;
update_data->sm_path = ucd.sub->path;
/*
* Verify that the submodule path does not contain any
* symlinks; if it does, it might have been tampered with.
* TODO: allow exempting it via
* `safe.submodule.path` or something
*/
if (validate_submodule_path(update_data->sm_path) < 0)
goto fail;
code = ensure_core_worktree(update_data->sm_path);
if (code)
goto fail;
@ -3309,6 +3388,9 @@ static int module_add(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
normalize_path_copy(add_data.sm_path, add_data.sm_path);
strip_dir_trailing_slashes(add_data.sm_path);
if (validate_submodule_path(add_data.sm_path) < 0)
exit(128);
die_on_index_match(add_data.sm_path, force);
die_on_repo_without_commits(add_data.sm_path);

View file

@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ int cmd_upload_pack(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
packet_trace_identity("upload-pack");
read_replace_refs = 0;
/* TODO: This should use NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENVIRONMENT */
xsetenv("GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH", "1", 0);
argc = parse_options(argc, argv, prefix, options, upload_pack_usage, 0);

12
cache.h
View file

@ -606,6 +606,18 @@ void set_git_work_tree(const char *tree);
#define ALTERNATE_DB_ENVIRONMENT "GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES"
/*
* Check if a repository is safe and die if it is not, by verifying the
* ownership of the worktree (if any), the git directory, and the gitfile (if
* any).
*
* Exemptions for known-safe repositories can be added via `safe.directory`
* config settings; for non-bare repositories, their worktree needs to be
* added, for bare ones their git directory.
*/
void die_upon_dubious_ownership(const char *gitfile, const char *worktree,
const char *gitdir);
void setup_work_tree(void);
/*
* Find the commondir and gitdir of the repository that contains the current

2
path.c
View file

@ -840,6 +840,7 @@ const char *enter_repo(const char *path, int strict)
if (!suffix[i])
return NULL;
gitfile = read_gitfile(used_path.buf);
die_upon_dubious_ownership(gitfile, NULL, used_path.buf);
if (gitfile) {
strbuf_reset(&used_path);
strbuf_addstr(&used_path, gitfile);
@ -850,6 +851,7 @@ const char *enter_repo(const char *path, int strict)
}
else {
const char *gitfile = read_gitfile(path);
die_upon_dubious_ownership(gitfile, NULL, path);
if (gitfile)
path = gitfile;
if (chdir(path))

View file

@ -20,6 +20,16 @@ static int fetch_objects(struct repository *repo,
int i;
FILE *child_in;
/* TODO: This should use NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENVIRONMENT */
if (git_env_bool("GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH", 0)) {
static int warning_shown;
if (!warning_shown) {
warning_shown = 1;
warning(_("lazy fetching disabled; some objects may not be available"));
}
return -1;
}
child.git_cmd = 1;
child.in = -1;
if (repo != the_repository)

View file

@ -1186,19 +1186,32 @@ static int has_dir_name(struct index_state *istate,
istate->cache[istate->cache_nr - 1]->name,
&len_eq_last);
if (cmp_last > 0) {
if (len_eq_last == 0) {
if (name[len_eq_last] != '/') {
/*
* The entry sorts AFTER the last one in the
* index and their paths have no common prefix,
* so there cannot be a F/D conflict.
* index.
*
* If there were a conflict with "file", then our
* name would start with "file/" and the last index
* entry would start with "file" but not "file/".
*
* The next character after common prefix is
* not '/', so there can be no conflict.
*/
return retval;
} else {
/*
* The entry sorts AFTER the last one in the
* index, but has a common prefix. Fall through
* to the loop below to disect the entry's path
* and see where the difference is.
* index, and the next character after common
* prefix is '/'.
*
* Either the last index entry is a file in
* conflict with this entry, or it has a name
* which sorts between this entry and the
* potential conflicting file.
*
* In both cases, we fall through to the loop
* below and let the regular search code handle it.
*/
}
} else if (cmp_last == 0) {
@ -1222,53 +1235,6 @@ static int has_dir_name(struct index_state *istate,
}
len = slash - name;
if (cmp_last > 0) {
/*
* (len + 1) is a directory boundary (including
* the trailing slash). And since the loop is
* decrementing "slash", the first iteration is
* the longest directory prefix; subsequent
* iterations consider parent directories.
*/
if (len + 1 <= len_eq_last) {
/*
* The directory prefix (including the trailing
* slash) also appears as a prefix in the last
* entry, so the remainder cannot collide (because
* strcmp said the whole path was greater).
*
* EQ: last: xxx/A
* this: xxx/B
*
* LT: last: xxx/file_A
* this: xxx/file_B
*/
return retval;
}
if (len > len_eq_last) {
/*
* This part of the directory prefix (excluding
* the trailing slash) is longer than the known
* equal portions, so this sub-directory cannot
* collide with a file.
*
* GT: last: xxxA
* this: xxxB/file
*/
return retval;
}
/*
* This is a possible collision. Fall through and
* let the regular search code handle it.
*
* last: xxx
* this: xxx/file
*/
}
pos = index_name_stage_pos(istate, name, len, stage, EXPAND_SPARSE);
if (pos >= 0) {
/*

21
setup.c
View file

@ -1165,6 +1165,27 @@ static int ensure_valid_ownership(const char *gitfile,
return data.is_safe;
}
void die_upon_dubious_ownership(const char *gitfile, const char *worktree,
const char *gitdir)
{
struct strbuf report = STRBUF_INIT, quoted = STRBUF_INIT;
const char *path;
if (ensure_valid_ownership(gitfile, worktree, gitdir, &report))
return;
strbuf_complete(&report, '\n');
path = gitfile ? gitfile : gitdir;
sq_quote_buf_pretty(&quoted, path);
die(_("detected dubious ownership in repository at '%s'\n"
"%s"
"To add an exception for this directory, call:\n"
"\n"
"\tgit config --global --add safe.directory %s"),
path, report.buf, quoted.buf);
}
static int allowed_bare_repo_cb(const char *key, const char *value, void *d)
{
enum allowed_bare_repo *allowed_bare_repo = d;

View file

@ -1005,6 +1005,9 @@ static int submodule_has_commits(struct repository *r,
.super_oid = super_oid
};
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
oid_array_for_each_unique(commits, check_has_commit, &has_commit);
if (has_commit.result) {
@ -1127,6 +1130,9 @@ static int push_submodule(const char *path,
const struct string_list *push_options,
int dry_run)
{
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
if (for_each_remote_ref_submodule(path, has_remote, NULL) > 0) {
struct child_process cp = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
strvec_push(&cp.args, "push");
@ -1176,6 +1182,9 @@ static void submodule_push_check(const char *path, const char *head,
struct child_process cp = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
int i;
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
strvec_push(&cp.args, "submodule--helper");
strvec_push(&cp.args, "push-check");
strvec_push(&cp.args, head);
@ -1507,6 +1516,9 @@ static struct fetch_task *fetch_task_create(struct submodule_parallel_fetch *spf
struct fetch_task *task = xmalloc(sizeof(*task));
memset(task, 0, sizeof(*task));
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
task->sub = submodule_from_path(spf->r, treeish_name, path);
if (!task->sub) {
@ -1879,6 +1891,9 @@ unsigned is_submodule_modified(const char *path, int ignore_untracked)
const char *git_dir;
int ignore_cp_exit_code = 0;
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
strbuf_addf(&buf, "%s/.git", path);
git_dir = read_gitfile(buf.buf);
if (!git_dir)
@ -1955,6 +1970,9 @@ int submodule_uses_gitfile(const char *path)
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
const char *git_dir;
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
strbuf_addf(&buf, "%s/.git", path);
git_dir = read_gitfile(buf.buf);
if (!git_dir) {
@ -1994,6 +2012,9 @@ int bad_to_remove_submodule(const char *path, unsigned flags)
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
int ret = 0;
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
if (!file_exists(path) || is_empty_dir(path))
return 0;
@ -2044,6 +2065,9 @@ void submodule_unset_core_worktree(const struct submodule *sub)
{
struct strbuf config_path = STRBUF_INIT;
if (validate_submodule_path(sub->path) < 0)
exit(128);
submodule_name_to_gitdir(&config_path, the_repository, sub->name);
strbuf_addstr(&config_path, "/config");
@ -2066,6 +2090,9 @@ static int submodule_has_dirty_index(const struct submodule *sub)
{
struct child_process cp = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
if (validate_submodule_path(sub->path) < 0)
exit(128);
prepare_submodule_repo_env(&cp.env);
cp.git_cmd = 1;
@ -2083,6 +2110,10 @@ static int submodule_has_dirty_index(const struct submodule *sub)
static void submodule_reset_index(const char *path)
{
struct child_process cp = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
prepare_submodule_repo_env(&cp.env);
cp.git_cmd = 1;
@ -2146,10 +2177,27 @@ int submodule_move_head(const char *path,
if (old_head) {
if (!submodule_uses_gitfile(path))
absorb_git_dir_into_superproject(path);
else {
char *dotgit = xstrfmt("%s/.git", path);
char *git_dir = xstrdup(read_gitfile(dotgit));
free(dotgit);
if (validate_submodule_git_dir(git_dir,
sub->name) < 0)
die(_("refusing to create/use '%s' in "
"another submodule's git dir"),
git_dir);
free(git_dir);
}
} else {
struct strbuf gitdir = STRBUF_INIT;
submodule_name_to_gitdir(&gitdir, the_repository,
sub->name);
if (validate_submodule_git_dir(gitdir.buf,
sub->name) < 0)
die(_("refusing to create/use '%s' in another "
"submodule's git dir"),
gitdir.buf);
connect_work_tree_and_git_dir(path, gitdir.buf, 0);
strbuf_release(&gitdir);
@ -2270,6 +2318,34 @@ int validate_submodule_git_dir(char *git_dir, const char *submodule_name)
return 0;
}
int validate_submodule_path(const char *path)
{
char *p = xstrdup(path);
struct stat st;
int i, ret = 0;
char sep;
for (i = 0; !ret && p[i]; i++) {
if (!is_dir_sep(p[i]))
continue;
sep = p[i];
p[i] = '\0';
/* allow missing components, but no symlinks */
ret = lstat(p, &st) || !S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) ? 0 : -1;
p[i] = sep;
if (ret)
error(_("expected '%.*s' in submodule path '%s' not to "
"be a symbolic link"), i, p, p);
}
if (!lstat(p, &st) && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))
ret = error(_("expected submodule path '%s' not to be a "
"symbolic link"), p);
free(p);
return ret;
}
/*
* Embeds a single submodules git directory into the superprojects git dir,
* non recursively.
@ -2280,6 +2356,9 @@ static void relocate_single_git_dir_into_superproject(const char *path)
struct strbuf new_gitdir = STRBUF_INIT;
const struct submodule *sub;
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
if (submodule_uses_worktrees(path))
die(_("relocate_gitdir for submodule '%s' with "
"more than one worktree not supported"), path);
@ -2320,6 +2399,9 @@ static void absorb_git_dir_into_superproject_recurse(const char *path)
struct child_process cp = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
cp.dir = path;
cp.git_cmd = 1;
cp.no_stdin = 1;
@ -2342,6 +2424,10 @@ void absorb_git_dir_into_superproject(const char *path)
int err_code;
const char *sub_git_dir;
struct strbuf gitdir = STRBUF_INIT;
if (validate_submodule_path(path) < 0)
exit(128);
strbuf_addf(&gitdir, "%s/.git", path);
sub_git_dir = resolve_gitdir_gently(gitdir.buf, &err_code);
@ -2484,6 +2570,9 @@ int submodule_to_gitdir(struct strbuf *buf, const char *submodule)
const char *git_dir;
int ret = 0;
if (validate_submodule_path(submodule) < 0)
exit(128);
strbuf_reset(buf);
strbuf_addstr(buf, submodule);
strbuf_complete(buf, '/');

View file

@ -148,6 +148,11 @@ void submodule_name_to_gitdir(struct strbuf *buf, struct repository *r,
*/
int validate_submodule_git_dir(char *git_dir, const char *submodule_name);
/*
* Make sure that the given submodule path does not follow symlinks.
*/
int validate_submodule_path(const char *path);
#define SUBMODULE_MOVE_HEAD_DRY_RUN (1<<0)
#define SUBMODULE_MOVE_HEAD_FORCE (1<<1)
int submodule_move_head(const char *path,

View file

@ -1200,6 +1200,34 @@ test_expect_success 'very long name in the index handled sanely' '
test $len = 4098
'
# D/F conflict checking uses an optimization when adding to the end.
# make sure it does not get confused by `a-` sorting _between_
# `a` and `a/`.
test_expect_success 'more update-index D/F conflicts' '
# empty the index to make sure our entry is last
git read-tree --empty &&
cacheinfo=100644,$(test_oid empty_blob) &&
git update-index --add --cacheinfo $cacheinfo,path5/a &&
test_must_fail git update-index --add --cacheinfo $cacheinfo,path5/a/file &&
test_must_fail git update-index --add --cacheinfo $cacheinfo,path5/a/b/file &&
test_must_fail git update-index --add --cacheinfo $cacheinfo,path5/a/b/c/file &&
# "a-" sorts between "a" and "a/"
git update-index --add --cacheinfo $cacheinfo,path5/a- &&
test_must_fail git update-index --add --cacheinfo $cacheinfo,path5/a/file &&
test_must_fail git update-index --add --cacheinfo $cacheinfo,path5/a/b/file &&
test_must_fail git update-index --add --cacheinfo $cacheinfo,path5/a/b/c/file &&
cat >expected <<-\EOF &&
path5/a
path5/a-
EOF
git ls-files >actual &&
test_cmp expected actual
'
test_expect_success 'test_must_fail on a failing git command' '
test_must_fail git notacommand
'

78
t/t0411-clone-from-partial.sh Executable file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
#!/bin/sh
test_description='check that local clone does not fetch from promisor remotes'
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'create evil repo' '
git init tmp &&
test_commit -C tmp a &&
git -C tmp config uploadpack.allowfilter 1 &&
git clone --filter=blob:none --no-local --no-checkout tmp evil &&
rm -rf tmp &&
git -C evil config remote.origin.uploadpack \"\$TRASH_DIRECTORY/fake-upload-pack\" &&
write_script fake-upload-pack <<-\EOF &&
echo >&2 "fake-upload-pack running"
>"$TRASH_DIRECTORY/script-executed"
exit 1
EOF
export TRASH_DIRECTORY &&
# empty shallow file disables local clone optimization
>evil/.git/shallow
'
test_expect_success 'local clone must not fetch from promisor remote and execute script' '
rm -f script-executed &&
test_must_fail git clone \
--upload-pack="GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER=true git-upload-pack" \
evil clone1 2>err &&
grep "detected dubious ownership" err &&
! grep "fake-upload-pack running" err &&
test_path_is_missing script-executed
'
test_expect_success 'clone from file://... must not fetch from promisor remote and execute script' '
rm -f script-executed &&
test_must_fail git clone \
--upload-pack="GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER=true git-upload-pack" \
"file://$(pwd)/evil" clone2 2>err &&
grep "detected dubious ownership" err &&
! grep "fake-upload-pack running" err &&
test_path_is_missing script-executed
'
test_expect_success 'fetch from file://... must not fetch from promisor remote and execute script' '
rm -f script-executed &&
test_must_fail git fetch \
--upload-pack="GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER=true git-upload-pack" \
"file://$(pwd)/evil" 2>err &&
grep "detected dubious ownership" err &&
! grep "fake-upload-pack running" err &&
test_path_is_missing script-executed
'
test_expect_success 'pack-objects should fetch from promisor remote and execute script' '
rm -f script-executed &&
echo "HEAD" | test_must_fail git -C evil pack-objects --revs --stdout >/dev/null 2>err &&
grep "fake-upload-pack running" err &&
test_path_is_file script-executed
'
test_expect_success 'clone from promisor remote does not lazy-fetch by default' '
rm -f script-executed &&
test_must_fail git clone evil no-lazy 2>err &&
grep "lazy fetching disabled" err &&
test_path_is_missing script-executed
'
test_expect_success 'promisor lazy-fetching can be re-enabled' '
rm -f script-executed &&
test_must_fail env GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH=0 \
git clone evil lazy-ok 2>err &&
grep "fake-upload-pack running" err &&
test_path_is_file script-executed
'
test_done

View file

@ -1179,4 +1179,52 @@ test_expect_success 'submodule update --recursive skip submodules with strategy=
test_cmp expect.err actual.err
'
test_expect_success CASE_INSENSITIVE_FS,SYMLINKS \
'submodule paths must not follow symlinks' '
# This is only needed because we want to run this in a self-contained
# test without having to spin up an HTTP server; However, it would not
# be needed in a real-world scenario where the submodule is simply
# hosted on a public site.
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
# Make sure that Git tries to use symlinks on Windows
test_config_global core.symlinks true &&
tell_tale_path="$PWD/tell.tale" &&
git init hook &&
(
cd hook &&
mkdir -p y/hooks &&
write_script y/hooks/post-checkout <<-EOF &&
echo HOOK-RUN >&2
echo hook-run >"$tell_tale_path"
EOF
git add y/hooks/post-checkout &&
test_tick &&
git commit -m post-checkout
) &&
hook_repo_path="$(pwd)/hook" &&
git init captain &&
(
cd captain &&
git submodule add --name x/y "$hook_repo_path" A/modules/x &&
test_tick &&
git commit -m add-submodule &&
printf .git >dotgit.txt &&
git hash-object -w --stdin <dotgit.txt >dot-git.hash &&
printf "120000 %s 0\ta\n" "$(cat dot-git.hash)" >index.info &&
git update-index --index-info <index.info &&
test_tick &&
git commit -m add-symlink
) &&
test_path_is_missing "$tell_tale_path" &&
test_must_fail git clone --recursive captain hooked 2>err &&
grep "directory not empty" err &&
test_path_is_missing "$tell_tale_path"
'
test_done

67
t/t7423-submodule-symlinks.sh Executable file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
#!/bin/sh
test_description='check that submodule operations do not follow symlinks'
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'prepare' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always &&
test_commit initial &&
git init upstream &&
test_commit -C upstream upstream submodule_file &&
git submodule add ./upstream a/sm &&
test_tick &&
git commit -m submodule
'
test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'git submodule update must not create submodule behind symlink' '
rm -rf a b &&
mkdir b &&
ln -s b a &&
test_path_is_missing b/sm &&
test_must_fail git submodule update &&
test_path_is_missing b/sm
'
test_expect_success SYMLINKS,CASE_INSENSITIVE_FS 'git submodule update must not create submodule behind symlink on case insensitive fs' '
rm -rf a b &&
mkdir b &&
ln -s b A &&
test_must_fail git submodule update &&
test_path_is_missing b/sm
'
prepare_symlink_to_repo() {
rm -rf a &&
mkdir a &&
git init a/target &&
git -C a/target fetch ../../upstream &&
ln -s target a/sm
}
test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'git restore --recurse-submodules must not be confused by a symlink' '
prepare_symlink_to_repo &&
test_must_fail git restore --recurse-submodules a/sm &&
test_path_is_missing a/sm/submodule_file &&
test_path_is_dir a/target/.git &&
test_path_is_missing a/target/submodule_file
'
test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'git restore --recurse-submodules must not migrate git dir of symlinked repo' '
prepare_symlink_to_repo &&
rm -rf .git/modules &&
test_must_fail git restore --recurse-submodules a/sm &&
test_path_is_dir a/target/.git &&
test_path_is_missing .git/modules/a/sm &&
test_path_is_missing a/target/submodule_file
'
test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'git checkout -f --recurse-submodules must not migrate git dir of symlinked repo when removing submodule' '
prepare_symlink_to_repo &&
rm -rf .git/modules &&
test_must_fail git checkout -f --recurse-submodules initial &&
test_path_is_dir a/target/.git &&
test_path_is_missing .git/modules/a/sm
'
test_done

View file

@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ test_expect_success WINDOWS 'prevent git~1 squatting on Windows' '
fi
'
test_expect_success 'git dirs of sibling submodules must not be nested' '
test_expect_success 'setup submodules with nested git dirs' '
git init nested &&
test_commit -C nested nested &&
(
@ -310,9 +310,39 @@ test_expect_success 'git dirs of sibling submodules must not be nested' '
git add .gitmodules thing1 thing2 &&
test_tick &&
git commit -m nested
) &&
)
'
test_expect_success 'git dirs of sibling submodules must not be nested' '
test_must_fail git clone --recurse-submodules nested clone 2>err &&
test_i18ngrep "is inside git dir" err
'
test_expect_success 'submodule git dir nesting detection must work with parallel cloning' '
test_must_fail git clone --recurse-submodules --jobs=2 nested clone_parallel 2>err &&
cat err &&
grep -E "(already exists|is inside git dir|not a git repository)" err &&
{
test_path_is_missing .git/modules/hippo/HEAD ||
test_path_is_missing .git/modules/hippo/hooks/HEAD
}
'
test_expect_success 'checkout -f --recurse-submodules must not use a nested gitdir' '
git clone nested nested_checkout &&
(
cd nested_checkout &&
git submodule init &&
git submodule update thing1 &&
mkdir -p .git/modules/hippo/hooks/refs &&
mkdir -p .git/modules/hippo/hooks/objects/info &&
echo "../../../../objects" >.git/modules/hippo/hooks/objects/info/alternates &&
echo "ref: refs/heads/master" >.git/modules/hippo/hooks/HEAD
) &&
test_must_fail git -C nested_checkout checkout -f --recurse-submodules HEAD 2>err &&
cat err &&
grep "is inside git dir" err &&
test_path_is_missing nested_checkout/thing2/.git
'
test_done