make pack-objects a bit more resilient to repo corruption

Right now, packing valid objects could fail when creating a thin pack
simply because a pack edge object used as a preferred base is corrupted.
Since preferred base objects are not strictly needed to produce a valid
pack, let's not consider the inability to read them as a fatal error.
Delta compression may well be attempted against other objects in the
search window.  To avoid warning storms (we are in the inner loop of
the delta search window) a warning is emitted only on the first
occurrence.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This commit is contained in:
Nicolas Pitre 2010-10-22 16:26:23 -04:00 committed by Junio C Hamano
parent 8a90438506
commit 71064a956b

View file

@ -1298,9 +1298,23 @@ static int try_delta(struct unpacked *trg, struct unpacked *src,
read_lock();
src->data = read_sha1_file(src_entry->idx.sha1, &type, &sz);
read_unlock();
if (!src->data)
if (!src->data) {
if (src_entry->preferred_base) {
static int warned = 0;
if (!warned++)
warning("object %s cannot be read",
sha1_to_hex(src_entry->idx.sha1));
/*
* Those objects are not included in the
* resulting pack. Be resilient and ignore
* them if they can't be read, in case the
* pack could be created nevertheless.
*/
return 0;
}
die("object %s cannot be read",
sha1_to_hex(src_entry->idx.sha1));
}
if (sz != src_size)
die("object %s inconsistent object length (%lu vs %lu)",
sha1_to_hex(src_entry->idx.sha1), sz, src_size);