2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
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#include "../git-compat-util.h"
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2008-09-27 08:43:01 +00:00
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#include "win32.h"
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2009-06-01 06:41:45 +00:00
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#include <conio.h>
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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#include <wchar.h>
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2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
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#include "../strbuf.h"
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2011-02-07 20:51:21 +00:00
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#include "../run-command.h"
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2014-07-17 15:37:55 +00:00
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#include "../cache.h"
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2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
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2016-01-15 13:24:34 +00:00
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#define HCAST(type, handle) ((type)(intptr_t)handle)
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2011-02-07 20:50:26 +00:00
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static const int delay[] = { 0, 1, 10, 20, 40 };
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2010-01-15 20:12:20 +00:00
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int err_win_to_posix(DWORD winerr)
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2009-01-24 14:04:39 +00:00
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{
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int error = ENOSYS;
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switch(winerr) {
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case ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_ACCOUNT_DISABLED: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_ALREADY_ASSIGNED: error = EBUSY; break;
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case ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS: error = EEXIST; break;
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case ERROR_ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW: error = ERANGE; break;
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case ERROR_BAD_COMMAND: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_BAD_DEVICE: error = ENODEV; break;
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case ERROR_BAD_DRIVER_LEVEL: error = ENXIO; break;
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case ERROR_BAD_EXE_FORMAT: error = ENOEXEC; break;
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case ERROR_BAD_FORMAT: error = ENOEXEC; break;
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case ERROR_BAD_LENGTH: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_BAD_PATHNAME: error = ENOENT; break;
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case ERROR_BAD_PIPE: error = EPIPE; break;
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case ERROR_BAD_UNIT: error = ENODEV; break;
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case ERROR_BAD_USERNAME: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_BROKEN_PIPE: error = EPIPE; break;
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case ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW: error = ENAMETOOLONG; break;
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case ERROR_BUSY: error = EBUSY; break;
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case ERROR_BUSY_DRIVE: error = EBUSY; break;
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case ERROR_CALL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED: error = ENOSYS; break;
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case ERROR_CANNOT_MAKE: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_CANTOPEN: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_CANTREAD: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_CANTWRITE: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_CRC: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_CURRENT_DIRECTORY: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_DEVICE_IN_USE: error = EBUSY; break;
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case ERROR_DEV_NOT_EXIST: error = ENODEV; break;
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case ERROR_DIRECTORY: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_DIR_NOT_EMPTY: error = ENOTEMPTY; break;
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case ERROR_DISK_CHANGE: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_DISK_FULL: error = ENOSPC; break;
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case ERROR_DRIVE_LOCKED: error = EBUSY; break;
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case ERROR_ENVVAR_NOT_FOUND: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_EXE_MARKED_INVALID: error = ENOEXEC; break;
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case ERROR_FILENAME_EXCED_RANGE: error = ENAMETOOLONG; break;
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case ERROR_FILE_EXISTS: error = EEXIST; break;
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case ERROR_FILE_INVALID: error = ENODEV; break;
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case ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND: error = ENOENT; break;
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case ERROR_GEN_FAILURE: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_HANDLE_DISK_FULL: error = ENOSPC; break;
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case ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER: error = ENOMEM; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_ACCESS: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_ADDRESS: error = EFAULT; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_BLOCK: error = EFAULT; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_DATA: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_DRIVE: error = ENODEV; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_EXE_SIGNATURE: error = ENOEXEC; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_FLAGS: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION: error = ENOSYS; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE: error = EBADF; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_LOGON_HOURS: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_NAME: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_OWNER: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_PASSWORD: error = EPERM; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_PRIMARY_GROUP: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_SIGNAL_NUMBER: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_TARGET_HANDLE: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_INVALID_WORKSTATION: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_IO_DEVICE: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_IO_INCOMPLETE: error = EINTR; break;
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case ERROR_LOCKED: error = EBUSY; break;
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case ERROR_LOCK_VIOLATION: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_MAPPED_ALIGNMENT: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_META_EXPANSION_TOO_LONG: error = E2BIG; break;
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case ERROR_MORE_DATA: error = EPIPE; break;
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case ERROR_NEGATIVE_SEEK: error = ESPIPE; break;
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case ERROR_NOACCESS: error = EFAULT; break;
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case ERROR_NONE_MAPPED: error = EINVAL; break;
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case ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY: error = ENOMEM; break;
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case ERROR_NOT_READY: error = EAGAIN; break;
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case ERROR_NOT_SAME_DEVICE: error = EXDEV; break;
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case ERROR_NO_DATA: error = EPIPE; break;
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case ERROR_NO_MORE_SEARCH_HANDLES: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_NO_PROC_SLOTS: error = EAGAIN; break;
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case ERROR_NO_SUCH_PRIVILEGE: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_OPEN_FAILED: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_OPEN_FILES: error = EBUSY; break;
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case ERROR_OPERATION_ABORTED: error = EINTR; break;
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case ERROR_OUTOFMEMORY: error = ENOMEM; break;
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case ERROR_PASSWORD_EXPIRED: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_PATH_BUSY: error = EBUSY; break;
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case ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND: error = ENOENT; break;
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case ERROR_PIPE_BUSY: error = EBUSY; break;
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case ERROR_PIPE_CONNECTED: error = EPIPE; break;
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case ERROR_PIPE_LISTENING: error = EPIPE; break;
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case ERROR_PIPE_NOT_CONNECTED: error = EPIPE; break;
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case ERROR_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_READ_FAULT: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_SEEK: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_SEEK_ON_DEVICE: error = ESPIPE; break;
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case ERROR_SHARING_BUFFER_EXCEEDED: error = ENFILE; break;
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case ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION: error = EACCES; break;
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case ERROR_STACK_OVERFLOW: error = ENOMEM; break;
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case ERROR_SWAPERROR: error = ENOENT; break;
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case ERROR_TOO_MANY_MODULES: error = EMFILE; break;
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case ERROR_TOO_MANY_OPEN_FILES: error = EMFILE; break;
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case ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_MEDIA: error = ENXIO; break;
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case ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_VOLUME: error = ENODEV; break;
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case ERROR_WAIT_NO_CHILDREN: error = ECHILD; break;
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case ERROR_WRITE_FAULT: error = EIO; break;
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case ERROR_WRITE_PROTECT: error = EROFS; break;
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}
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return error;
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}
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2011-02-07 20:50:26 +00:00
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static inline int is_file_in_use_error(DWORD errcode)
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{
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switch (errcode) {
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case ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION:
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case ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED:
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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2011-02-07 20:51:21 +00:00
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static int read_yes_no_answer(void)
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{
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char answer[1024];
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if (fgets(answer, sizeof(answer), stdin)) {
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size_t answer_len = strlen(answer);
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int got_full_line = 0, c;
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/* remove the newline */
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if (answer_len >= 2 && answer[answer_len-2] == '\r') {
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answer[answer_len-2] = '\0';
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got_full_line = 1;
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} else if (answer_len >= 1 && answer[answer_len-1] == '\n') {
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answer[answer_len-1] = '\0';
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got_full_line = 1;
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}
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/* flush the buffer in case we did not get the full line */
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if (!got_full_line)
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while ((c = getchar()) != EOF && c != '\n')
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;
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} else
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/* we could not read, return the
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* default answer which is no */
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return 0;
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if (tolower(answer[0]) == 'y' && !answer[1])
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return 1;
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if (!strncasecmp(answer, "yes", sizeof(answer)))
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return 1;
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if (tolower(answer[0]) == 'n' && !answer[1])
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return 0;
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if (!strncasecmp(answer, "no", sizeof(answer)))
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return 0;
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/* did not find an answer we understand */
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return -1;
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}
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static int ask_yes_no_if_possible(const char *format, ...)
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{
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char question[4096];
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const char *retry_hook[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL };
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va_list args;
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va_start(args, format);
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vsnprintf(question, sizeof(question), format, args);
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va_end(args);
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2011-06-06 07:06:02 +00:00
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if ((retry_hook[0] = mingw_getenv("GIT_ASK_YESNO"))) {
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2011-02-07 20:51:21 +00:00
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retry_hook[1] = question;
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return !run_command_v_opt(retry_hook, 0);
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}
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if (!isatty(_fileno(stdin)) || !isatty(_fileno(stderr)))
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return 0;
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while (1) {
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int answer;
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fprintf(stderr, "%s (y/n) ", question);
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if ((answer = read_yes_no_answer()) >= 0)
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return answer;
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fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, I did not understand your answer. "
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"Please type 'y' or 'n'\n");
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}
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}
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2011-02-07 20:49:33 +00:00
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int mingw_unlink(const char *pathname)
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{
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2011-02-07 20:50:26 +00:00
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int ret, tries = 0;
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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wchar_t wpathname[MAX_PATH];
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if (xutftowcs_path(wpathname, pathname) < 0)
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return -1;
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2011-02-07 20:50:26 +00:00
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2011-02-07 20:49:33 +00:00
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/* read-only files cannot be removed */
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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_wchmod(wpathname, 0666);
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while ((ret = _wunlink(wpathname)) == -1 && tries < ARRAY_SIZE(delay)) {
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2011-02-07 20:50:26 +00:00
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if (!is_file_in_use_error(GetLastError()))
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break;
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/*
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* We assume that some other process had the source or
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* destination file open at the wrong moment and retry.
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* In order to give the other process a higher chance to
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* complete its operation, we give up our time slice now.
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* If we have to retry again, we do sleep a bit.
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*/
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Sleep(delay[tries]);
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tries++;
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}
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2011-02-07 20:51:21 +00:00
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while (ret == -1 && is_file_in_use_error(GetLastError()) &&
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ask_yes_no_if_possible("Unlink of file '%s' failed. "
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"Should I try again?", pathname))
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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ret = _wunlink(wpathname);
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2011-02-07 20:50:26 +00:00
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return ret;
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2011-02-07 20:49:33 +00:00
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}
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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static int is_dir_empty(const wchar_t *wpath)
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2011-02-07 20:54:01 +00:00
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{
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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WIN32_FIND_DATAW findbuf;
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2011-02-07 20:54:01 +00:00
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HANDLE handle;
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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wchar_t wbuf[MAX_PATH + 2];
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wcscpy(wbuf, wpath);
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wcscat(wbuf, L"\\*");
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handle = FindFirstFileW(wbuf, &findbuf);
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if (handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
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2011-02-07 20:54:01 +00:00
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return GetLastError() == ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES;
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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while (!wcscmp(findbuf.cFileName, L".") ||
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!wcscmp(findbuf.cFileName, L".."))
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if (!FindNextFileW(handle, &findbuf)) {
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DWORD err = GetLastError();
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FindClose(handle);
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return err == ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES;
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2011-02-07 20:54:01 +00:00
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}
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FindClose(handle);
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return 0;
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}
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2011-02-07 20:52:34 +00:00
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int mingw_rmdir(const char *pathname)
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{
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int ret, tries = 0;
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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wchar_t wpathname[MAX_PATH];
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if (xutftowcs_path(wpathname, pathname) < 0)
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return -1;
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2011-02-07 20:52:34 +00:00
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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while ((ret = _wrmdir(wpathname)) == -1 && tries < ARRAY_SIZE(delay)) {
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2011-02-07 20:52:34 +00:00
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if (!is_file_in_use_error(GetLastError()))
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2012-12-10 14:42:27 +00:00
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errno = err_win_to_posix(GetLastError());
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if (errno != EACCES)
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2011-02-07 20:52:34 +00:00
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break;
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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if (!is_dir_empty(wpathname)) {
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2011-02-07 20:54:01 +00:00
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errno = ENOTEMPTY;
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break;
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}
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2011-02-07 20:52:34 +00:00
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/*
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* We assume that some other process had the source or
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* destination file open at the wrong moment and retry.
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* In order to give the other process a higher chance to
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* complete its operation, we give up our time slice now.
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* If we have to retry again, we do sleep a bit.
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*/
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Sleep(delay[tries]);
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tries++;
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}
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2012-12-10 14:42:27 +00:00
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while (ret == -1 && errno == EACCES && is_file_in_use_error(GetLastError()) &&
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2011-02-07 20:52:34 +00:00
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ask_yes_no_if_possible("Deletion of directory '%s' failed. "
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"Should I try again?", pathname))
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2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
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ret = _wrmdir(wpathname);
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return ret;
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}
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mingw: introduce the 'core.hideDotFiles' setting
On Unix (and Linux), files and directories whose names start with a dot
are usually not shown by default. This convention is used by Git: the
.git/ directory should be left alone by regular users, and only accessed
through Git itself.
On Windows, no such convention exists. Instead, there is an explicit flag
to mark files or directories as hidden.
In the early days, Git for Windows did not mark the .git/ directory (or
for that matter, any file or directory whose name starts with a dot)
hidden. This lead to quite a bit of confusion, and even loss of data.
Consequently, Git for Windows introduced the core.hideDotFiles setting,
with three possible values: true, false, and dotGitOnly, defaulting to
marking only the .git/ directory as hidden.
The rationale: users do not need to access .git/ directly, and indeed (as
was demonstrated) should not really see that directory, either. However,
not all dot files should be hidden by default, as e.g. Eclipse does not
show them (and the user would therefore be unable to see, say, a
.gitattributes file).
In over five years since the last attempt to bring this patch into core
Git, a slightly buggy version of this patch has served Git for Windows'
users well: no single report indicated problems with the hidden .git/
directory, and the stream of problems caused by the previously non-hidden
.git/ directory simply stopped. The bugs have been fixed during the
process of getting this patch upstream.
Note that there is a funny quirk we have to pay attention to when
creating hidden files: we use Win32's _wopen() function which
transmogrifies its arguments and hands off to Win32's CreateFile()
function. That latter function errors out with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (the
equivalent of EACCES) when the equivalent of the O_CREAT flag was passed
and the file attributes (including the hidden flag) do not match an
existing file's. And _wopen() accepts no parameter that would be
transmogrified into said hidden flag. Therefore, we simply try again
without O_CREAT.
A slightly different method is required for our fopen()/freopen()
function as we cannot even *remove* the implicit O_CREAT flag.
Therefore, we briefly mark existing files as unhidden when opening them
via fopen()/freopen().
The ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED error can also be triggered by opening a file
that is marked as a system file (which is unlikely to be tracked in
Git), and by trying to create a file that has *just* been deleted and is
awaiting the last open handles to be released (which would be handled
better by the "Try again?" logic, a story for a different patch series,
though). In both cases, it does not matter much if we try again without
the O_CREAT flag, read: it does not hurt, either.
For details how ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED can be triggered, see
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa363858
Original-patch-by: Erik Faye-Lund <kusmabite@gmail.com>
Initial-Test-By: Pat Thoyts <patthoyts@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-05-11 08:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline int needs_hiding(const char *path)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *basename;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hide_dotfiles == HIDE_DOTFILES_FALSE)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We cannot use basename(), as it would remove trailing slashes */
|
|
|
|
mingw_skip_dos_drive_prefix((char **)&path);
|
|
|
|
if (!*path)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (basename = path; *path; path++)
|
|
|
|
if (is_dir_sep(*path)) {
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
path++;
|
|
|
|
} while (is_dir_sep(*path));
|
|
|
|
/* ignore trailing slashes */
|
|
|
|
if (*path)
|
|
|
|
basename = path;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hide_dotfiles == HIDE_DOTFILES_TRUE)
|
|
|
|
return *basename == '.';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert(hide_dotfiles == HIDE_DOTFILES_DOTGITONLY);
|
|
|
|
return !strncasecmp(".git", basename, 4) &&
|
|
|
|
(!basename[4] || is_dir_sep(basename[4]));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int set_hidden_flag(const wchar_t *path, int set)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
DWORD original = GetFileAttributesW(path), modified;
|
|
|
|
if (set)
|
|
|
|
modified = original | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
modified = original & ~FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN;
|
|
|
|
if (original == modified || SetFileAttributesW(path, modified))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
errno = err_win_to_posix(GetLastError());
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int mingw_mkdir(const char *path, int mode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
wchar_t wpath[MAX_PATH];
|
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
When creating a directory on Windows whose path ends in a space or a
period (or chains thereof), the Win32 API "helpfully" trims those. For
example, `mkdir("abc ");` will return success, but actually create a
directory called `abc` instead.
This stems back to the DOS days, when all file names had exactly 8
characters plus exactly 3 characters for the file extension, and the
only way to have shorter names was by padding with spaces.
Sadly, this "helpful" behavior is a bit inconsistent: after a successful
`mkdir("abc ");`, a `mkdir("abc /def")` will actually _fail_ (because
the directory `abc ` does not actually exist).
Even if it would work, we now have a serious problem because a Git
repository could contain directories `abc` and `abc `, and on Windows,
they would be "merged" unintentionally.
As these paths are illegal on Windows, anyway, let's disallow any
accesses to such paths on that Operating System.
For practical reasons, this behavior is still guarded by the
config setting `core.protectNTFS`: it is possible (and at least two
regression tests make use of it) to create commits without involving the
worktree. In such a scenario, it is of course possible -- even on
Windows -- to create such file names.
Among other consequences, this patch disallows submodules' paths to end
in spaces on Windows (which would formerly have confused Git enough to
try to write into incorrect paths, anyway).
While this patch does not fix a vulnerability on its own, it prevents an
attack vector that was exploited in demonstrations of a number of
recently-fixed security bugs.
The regression test added to `t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh` reflects
that attack vector.
Note that we have to adjust the test case "prevent git~1 squatting on
Windows" in `t/t7415-submodule-names.sh` because of a very subtle issue.
It tries to clone two submodules whose names differ only in a trailing
period character, and as a consequence their git directories differ in
the same way. Previously, when Git tried to clone the second submodule,
it thought that the git directory already existed (because on Windows,
when you create a directory with the name `b.` it actually creates `b`),
but with this patch, the first submodule's clone will fail because of
the illegal name of the git directory. Therefore, when cloning the
second submodule, Git will take a different code path: a fresh clone
(without an existing git directory). Both code paths fail to clone the
second submodule, both because the the corresponding worktree directory
exists and is not empty, but the error messages are worded differently.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2019-09-05 11:27:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!is_valid_win32_path(path)) {
|
|
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wpath, path) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
ret = _wmkdir(wpath);
|
mingw: introduce the 'core.hideDotFiles' setting
On Unix (and Linux), files and directories whose names start with a dot
are usually not shown by default. This convention is used by Git: the
.git/ directory should be left alone by regular users, and only accessed
through Git itself.
On Windows, no such convention exists. Instead, there is an explicit flag
to mark files or directories as hidden.
In the early days, Git for Windows did not mark the .git/ directory (or
for that matter, any file or directory whose name starts with a dot)
hidden. This lead to quite a bit of confusion, and even loss of data.
Consequently, Git for Windows introduced the core.hideDotFiles setting,
with three possible values: true, false, and dotGitOnly, defaulting to
marking only the .git/ directory as hidden.
The rationale: users do not need to access .git/ directly, and indeed (as
was demonstrated) should not really see that directory, either. However,
not all dot files should be hidden by default, as e.g. Eclipse does not
show them (and the user would therefore be unable to see, say, a
.gitattributes file).
In over five years since the last attempt to bring this patch into core
Git, a slightly buggy version of this patch has served Git for Windows'
users well: no single report indicated problems with the hidden .git/
directory, and the stream of problems caused by the previously non-hidden
.git/ directory simply stopped. The bugs have been fixed during the
process of getting this patch upstream.
Note that there is a funny quirk we have to pay attention to when
creating hidden files: we use Win32's _wopen() function which
transmogrifies its arguments and hands off to Win32's CreateFile()
function. That latter function errors out with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (the
equivalent of EACCES) when the equivalent of the O_CREAT flag was passed
and the file attributes (including the hidden flag) do not match an
existing file's. And _wopen() accepts no parameter that would be
transmogrified into said hidden flag. Therefore, we simply try again
without O_CREAT.
A slightly different method is required for our fopen()/freopen()
function as we cannot even *remove* the implicit O_CREAT flag.
Therefore, we briefly mark existing files as unhidden when opening them
via fopen()/freopen().
The ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED error can also be triggered by opening a file
that is marked as a system file (which is unlikely to be tracked in
Git), and by trying to create a file that has *just* been deleted and is
awaiting the last open handles to be released (which would be handled
better by the "Try again?" logic, a story for a different patch series,
though). In both cases, it does not matter much if we try again without
the O_CREAT flag, read: it does not hurt, either.
For details how ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED can be triggered, see
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa363858
Original-patch-by: Erik Faye-Lund <kusmabite@gmail.com>
Initial-Test-By: Pat Thoyts <patthoyts@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-05-11 08:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ret && needs_hiding(path))
|
|
|
|
return set_hidden_flag(wpath, 1);
|
2011-02-07 20:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-15 21:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
int mingw_open (const char *filename, int oflags, ...)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
va_list args;
|
|
|
|
unsigned mode;
|
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
When creating a directory on Windows whose path ends in a space or a
period (or chains thereof), the Win32 API "helpfully" trims those. For
example, `mkdir("abc ");` will return success, but actually create a
directory called `abc` instead.
This stems back to the DOS days, when all file names had exactly 8
characters plus exactly 3 characters for the file extension, and the
only way to have shorter names was by padding with spaces.
Sadly, this "helpful" behavior is a bit inconsistent: after a successful
`mkdir("abc ");`, a `mkdir("abc /def")` will actually _fail_ (because
the directory `abc ` does not actually exist).
Even if it would work, we now have a serious problem because a Git
repository could contain directories `abc` and `abc `, and on Windows,
they would be "merged" unintentionally.
As these paths are illegal on Windows, anyway, let's disallow any
accesses to such paths on that Operating System.
For practical reasons, this behavior is still guarded by the
config setting `core.protectNTFS`: it is possible (and at least two
regression tests make use of it) to create commits without involving the
worktree. In such a scenario, it is of course possible -- even on
Windows -- to create such file names.
Among other consequences, this patch disallows submodules' paths to end
in spaces on Windows (which would formerly have confused Git enough to
try to write into incorrect paths, anyway).
While this patch does not fix a vulnerability on its own, it prevents an
attack vector that was exploited in demonstrations of a number of
recently-fixed security bugs.
The regression test added to `t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh` reflects
that attack vector.
Note that we have to adjust the test case "prevent git~1 squatting on
Windows" in `t/t7415-submodule-names.sh` because of a very subtle issue.
It tries to clone two submodules whose names differ only in a trailing
period character, and as a consequence their git directories differ in
the same way. Previously, when Git tried to clone the second submodule,
it thought that the git directory already existed (because on Windows,
when you create a directory with the name `b.` it actually creates `b`),
but with this patch, the first submodule's clone will fail because of
the illegal name of the git directory. Therefore, when cloning the
second submodule, Git will take a different code path: a fresh clone
(without an existing git directory). Both code paths fail to clone the
second submodule, both because the the corresponding worktree directory
exists and is not empty, but the error messages are worded differently.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2019-09-05 11:27:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd, create = (oflags & (O_CREAT | O_EXCL)) == (O_CREAT | O_EXCL);
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH];
|
2009-09-16 08:20:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-11-15 21:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
va_start(args, oflags);
|
|
|
|
mode = va_arg(args, int);
|
|
|
|
va_end(args);
|
|
|
|
|
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
When creating a directory on Windows whose path ends in a space or a
period (or chains thereof), the Win32 API "helpfully" trims those. For
example, `mkdir("abc ");` will return success, but actually create a
directory called `abc` instead.
This stems back to the DOS days, when all file names had exactly 8
characters plus exactly 3 characters for the file extension, and the
only way to have shorter names was by padding with spaces.
Sadly, this "helpful" behavior is a bit inconsistent: after a successful
`mkdir("abc ");`, a `mkdir("abc /def")` will actually _fail_ (because
the directory `abc ` does not actually exist).
Even if it would work, we now have a serious problem because a Git
repository could contain directories `abc` and `abc `, and on Windows,
they would be "merged" unintentionally.
As these paths are illegal on Windows, anyway, let's disallow any
accesses to such paths on that Operating System.
For practical reasons, this behavior is still guarded by the
config setting `core.protectNTFS`: it is possible (and at least two
regression tests make use of it) to create commits without involving the
worktree. In such a scenario, it is of course possible -- even on
Windows -- to create such file names.
Among other consequences, this patch disallows submodules' paths to end
in spaces on Windows (which would formerly have confused Git enough to
try to write into incorrect paths, anyway).
While this patch does not fix a vulnerability on its own, it prevents an
attack vector that was exploited in demonstrations of a number of
recently-fixed security bugs.
The regression test added to `t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh` reflects
that attack vector.
Note that we have to adjust the test case "prevent git~1 squatting on
Windows" in `t/t7415-submodule-names.sh` because of a very subtle issue.
It tries to clone two submodules whose names differ only in a trailing
period character, and as a consequence their git directories differ in
the same way. Previously, when Git tried to clone the second submodule,
it thought that the git directory already existed (because on Windows,
when you create a directory with the name `b.` it actually creates `b`),
but with this patch, the first submodule's clone will fail because of
the illegal name of the git directory. Therefore, when cloning the
second submodule, Git will take a different code path: a fresh clone
(without an existing git directory). Both code paths fail to clone the
second submodule, both because the the corresponding worktree directory
exists and is not empty, but the error messages are worded differently.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2019-09-05 11:27:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
|
|
|
|
errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-09-23 17:35:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
|
2007-11-15 21:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
filename = "nul";
|
2009-09-16 08:20:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, filename) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
fd = _wopen(wfilename, oflags, mode);
|
2009-09-16 08:20:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-16 21:06:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fd < 0 && (oflags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY && errno == EACCES) {
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
DWORD attrs = GetFileAttributesW(wfilename);
|
2007-11-15 21:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (attrs != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES && (attrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY))
|
|
|
|
errno = EISDIR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
mingw: introduce the 'core.hideDotFiles' setting
On Unix (and Linux), files and directories whose names start with a dot
are usually not shown by default. This convention is used by Git: the
.git/ directory should be left alone by regular users, and only accessed
through Git itself.
On Windows, no such convention exists. Instead, there is an explicit flag
to mark files or directories as hidden.
In the early days, Git for Windows did not mark the .git/ directory (or
for that matter, any file or directory whose name starts with a dot)
hidden. This lead to quite a bit of confusion, and even loss of data.
Consequently, Git for Windows introduced the core.hideDotFiles setting,
with three possible values: true, false, and dotGitOnly, defaulting to
marking only the .git/ directory as hidden.
The rationale: users do not need to access .git/ directly, and indeed (as
was demonstrated) should not really see that directory, either. However,
not all dot files should be hidden by default, as e.g. Eclipse does not
show them (and the user would therefore be unable to see, say, a
.gitattributes file).
In over five years since the last attempt to bring this patch into core
Git, a slightly buggy version of this patch has served Git for Windows'
users well: no single report indicated problems with the hidden .git/
directory, and the stream of problems caused by the previously non-hidden
.git/ directory simply stopped. The bugs have been fixed during the
process of getting this patch upstream.
Note that there is a funny quirk we have to pay attention to when
creating hidden files: we use Win32's _wopen() function which
transmogrifies its arguments and hands off to Win32's CreateFile()
function. That latter function errors out with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (the
equivalent of EACCES) when the equivalent of the O_CREAT flag was passed
and the file attributes (including the hidden flag) do not match an
existing file's. And _wopen() accepts no parameter that would be
transmogrified into said hidden flag. Therefore, we simply try again
without O_CREAT.
A slightly different method is required for our fopen()/freopen()
function as we cannot even *remove* the implicit O_CREAT flag.
Therefore, we briefly mark existing files as unhidden when opening them
via fopen()/freopen().
The ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED error can also be triggered by opening a file
that is marked as a system file (which is unlikely to be tracked in
Git), and by trying to create a file that has *just* been deleted and is
awaiting the last open handles to be released (which would be handled
better by the "Try again?" logic, a story for a different patch series,
though). In both cases, it does not matter much if we try again without
the O_CREAT flag, read: it does not hurt, either.
For details how ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED can be triggered, see
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa363858
Original-patch-by: Erik Faye-Lund <kusmabite@gmail.com>
Initial-Test-By: Pat Thoyts <patthoyts@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-05-11 08:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((oflags & O_CREAT) && needs_hiding(filename)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Internally, _wopen() uses the CreateFile() API which errors
|
|
|
|
* out with an ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED if CREATE_ALWAYS was
|
|
|
|
* specified and an already existing file's attributes do not
|
|
|
|
* match *exactly*. As there is no mode or flag we can set that
|
|
|
|
* would correspond to FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN, let's just try
|
|
|
|
* again *without* the O_CREAT flag (that corresponds to the
|
|
|
|
* CREATE_ALWAYS flag of CreateFile()).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (fd < 0 && errno == EACCES)
|
|
|
|
fd = _wopen(wfilename, oflags & ~O_CREAT, mode);
|
|
|
|
if (fd >= 0 && set_hidden_flag(wfilename, 1))
|
|
|
|
warning("could not mark '%s' as hidden.", filename);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-11-15 21:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
return fd;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-12-04 08:10:38 +00:00
|
|
|
static BOOL WINAPI ctrl_ignore(DWORD type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#undef fgetc
|
|
|
|
int mingw_fgetc(FILE *stream)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ch;
|
|
|
|
if (!isatty(_fileno(stream)))
|
|
|
|
return fgetc(stream);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SetConsoleCtrlHandler(ctrl_ignore, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
|
|
ch = fgetc(stream);
|
|
|
|
if (ch != EOF || GetLastError() != ERROR_OPERATION_ABORTED)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ctrl+C was pressed, simulate SIGINT and retry */
|
|
|
|
mingw_raise(SIGINT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SetConsoleCtrlHandler(ctrl_ignore, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
return ch;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-02-25 20:03:44 +00:00
|
|
|
#undef fopen
|
|
|
|
FILE *mingw_fopen (const char *filename, const char *otype)
|
|
|
|
{
|
mingw: introduce the 'core.hideDotFiles' setting
On Unix (and Linux), files and directories whose names start with a dot
are usually not shown by default. This convention is used by Git: the
.git/ directory should be left alone by regular users, and only accessed
through Git itself.
On Windows, no such convention exists. Instead, there is an explicit flag
to mark files or directories as hidden.
In the early days, Git for Windows did not mark the .git/ directory (or
for that matter, any file or directory whose name starts with a dot)
hidden. This lead to quite a bit of confusion, and even loss of data.
Consequently, Git for Windows introduced the core.hideDotFiles setting,
with three possible values: true, false, and dotGitOnly, defaulting to
marking only the .git/ directory as hidden.
The rationale: users do not need to access .git/ directly, and indeed (as
was demonstrated) should not really see that directory, either. However,
not all dot files should be hidden by default, as e.g. Eclipse does not
show them (and the user would therefore be unable to see, say, a
.gitattributes file).
In over five years since the last attempt to bring this patch into core
Git, a slightly buggy version of this patch has served Git for Windows'
users well: no single report indicated problems with the hidden .git/
directory, and the stream of problems caused by the previously non-hidden
.git/ directory simply stopped. The bugs have been fixed during the
process of getting this patch upstream.
Note that there is a funny quirk we have to pay attention to when
creating hidden files: we use Win32's _wopen() function which
transmogrifies its arguments and hands off to Win32's CreateFile()
function. That latter function errors out with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (the
equivalent of EACCES) when the equivalent of the O_CREAT flag was passed
and the file attributes (including the hidden flag) do not match an
existing file's. And _wopen() accepts no parameter that would be
transmogrified into said hidden flag. Therefore, we simply try again
without O_CREAT.
A slightly different method is required for our fopen()/freopen()
function as we cannot even *remove* the implicit O_CREAT flag.
Therefore, we briefly mark existing files as unhidden when opening them
via fopen()/freopen().
The ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED error can also be triggered by opening a file
that is marked as a system file (which is unlikely to be tracked in
Git), and by trying to create a file that has *just* been deleted and is
awaiting the last open handles to be released (which would be handled
better by the "Try again?" logic, a story for a different patch series,
though). In both cases, it does not matter much if we try again without
the O_CREAT flag, read: it does not hurt, either.
For details how ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED can be triggered, see
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa363858
Original-patch-by: Erik Faye-Lund <kusmabite@gmail.com>
Initial-Test-By: Pat Thoyts <patthoyts@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-05-11 08:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
int hide = needs_hiding(filename);
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
FILE *file;
|
|
|
|
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH], wotype[4];
|
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
When creating a directory on Windows whose path ends in a space or a
period (or chains thereof), the Win32 API "helpfully" trims those. For
example, `mkdir("abc ");` will return success, but actually create a
directory called `abc` instead.
This stems back to the DOS days, when all file names had exactly 8
characters plus exactly 3 characters for the file extension, and the
only way to have shorter names was by padding with spaces.
Sadly, this "helpful" behavior is a bit inconsistent: after a successful
`mkdir("abc ");`, a `mkdir("abc /def")` will actually _fail_ (because
the directory `abc ` does not actually exist).
Even if it would work, we now have a serious problem because a Git
repository could contain directories `abc` and `abc `, and on Windows,
they would be "merged" unintentionally.
As these paths are illegal on Windows, anyway, let's disallow any
accesses to such paths on that Operating System.
For practical reasons, this behavior is still guarded by the
config setting `core.protectNTFS`: it is possible (and at least two
regression tests make use of it) to create commits without involving the
worktree. In such a scenario, it is of course possible -- even on
Windows -- to create such file names.
Among other consequences, this patch disallows submodules' paths to end
in spaces on Windows (which would formerly have confused Git enough to
try to write into incorrect paths, anyway).
While this patch does not fix a vulnerability on its own, it prevents an
attack vector that was exploited in demonstrations of a number of
recently-fixed security bugs.
The regression test added to `t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh` reflects
that attack vector.
Note that we have to adjust the test case "prevent git~1 squatting on
Windows" in `t/t7415-submodule-names.sh` because of a very subtle issue.
It tries to clone two submodules whose names differ only in a trailing
period character, and as a consequence their git directories differ in
the same way. Previously, when Git tried to clone the second submodule,
it thought that the git directory already existed (because on Windows,
when you create a directory with the name `b.` it actually creates `b`),
but with this patch, the first submodule's clone will fail because of
the illegal name of the git directory. Therefore, when cloning the
second submodule, Git will take a different code path: a fresh clone
(without an existing git directory). Both code paths fail to clone the
second submodule, both because the the corresponding worktree directory
exists and is not empty, but the error messages are worded differently.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2019-09-05 11:27:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
|
|
|
|
int create = otype && strchr(otype, 'w');
|
|
|
|
errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-09-23 17:35:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
|
2010-02-25 20:03:44 +00:00
|
|
|
filename = "nul";
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, filename) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
xutftowcs(wotype, otype, ARRAY_SIZE(wotype)) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
mingw: introduce the 'core.hideDotFiles' setting
On Unix (and Linux), files and directories whose names start with a dot
are usually not shown by default. This convention is used by Git: the
.git/ directory should be left alone by regular users, and only accessed
through Git itself.
On Windows, no such convention exists. Instead, there is an explicit flag
to mark files or directories as hidden.
In the early days, Git for Windows did not mark the .git/ directory (or
for that matter, any file or directory whose name starts with a dot)
hidden. This lead to quite a bit of confusion, and even loss of data.
Consequently, Git for Windows introduced the core.hideDotFiles setting,
with three possible values: true, false, and dotGitOnly, defaulting to
marking only the .git/ directory as hidden.
The rationale: users do not need to access .git/ directly, and indeed (as
was demonstrated) should not really see that directory, either. However,
not all dot files should be hidden by default, as e.g. Eclipse does not
show them (and the user would therefore be unable to see, say, a
.gitattributes file).
In over five years since the last attempt to bring this patch into core
Git, a slightly buggy version of this patch has served Git for Windows'
users well: no single report indicated problems with the hidden .git/
directory, and the stream of problems caused by the previously non-hidden
.git/ directory simply stopped. The bugs have been fixed during the
process of getting this patch upstream.
Note that there is a funny quirk we have to pay attention to when
creating hidden files: we use Win32's _wopen() function which
transmogrifies its arguments and hands off to Win32's CreateFile()
function. That latter function errors out with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (the
equivalent of EACCES) when the equivalent of the O_CREAT flag was passed
and the file attributes (including the hidden flag) do not match an
existing file's. And _wopen() accepts no parameter that would be
transmogrified into said hidden flag. Therefore, we simply try again
without O_CREAT.
A slightly different method is required for our fopen()/freopen()
function as we cannot even *remove* the implicit O_CREAT flag.
Therefore, we briefly mark existing files as unhidden when opening them
via fopen()/freopen().
The ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED error can also be triggered by opening a file
that is marked as a system file (which is unlikely to be tracked in
Git), and by trying to create a file that has *just* been deleted and is
awaiting the last open handles to be released (which would be handled
better by the "Try again?" logic, a story for a different patch series,
though). In both cases, it does not matter much if we try again without
the O_CREAT flag, read: it does not hurt, either.
For details how ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED can be triggered, see
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa363858
Original-patch-by: Erik Faye-Lund <kusmabite@gmail.com>
Initial-Test-By: Pat Thoyts <patthoyts@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-05-11 08:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (hide && !access(filename, F_OK) && set_hidden_flag(wfilename, 0)) {
|
|
|
|
error("could not unhide %s", filename);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
file = _wfopen(wfilename, wotype);
|
2017-05-29 20:27:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!file && GetLastError() == ERROR_INVALID_NAME)
|
|
|
|
errno = ENOENT;
|
mingw: introduce the 'core.hideDotFiles' setting
On Unix (and Linux), files and directories whose names start with a dot
are usually not shown by default. This convention is used by Git: the
.git/ directory should be left alone by regular users, and only accessed
through Git itself.
On Windows, no such convention exists. Instead, there is an explicit flag
to mark files or directories as hidden.
In the early days, Git for Windows did not mark the .git/ directory (or
for that matter, any file or directory whose name starts with a dot)
hidden. This lead to quite a bit of confusion, and even loss of data.
Consequently, Git for Windows introduced the core.hideDotFiles setting,
with three possible values: true, false, and dotGitOnly, defaulting to
marking only the .git/ directory as hidden.
The rationale: users do not need to access .git/ directly, and indeed (as
was demonstrated) should not really see that directory, either. However,
not all dot files should be hidden by default, as e.g. Eclipse does not
show them (and the user would therefore be unable to see, say, a
.gitattributes file).
In over five years since the last attempt to bring this patch into core
Git, a slightly buggy version of this patch has served Git for Windows'
users well: no single report indicated problems with the hidden .git/
directory, and the stream of problems caused by the previously non-hidden
.git/ directory simply stopped. The bugs have been fixed during the
process of getting this patch upstream.
Note that there is a funny quirk we have to pay attention to when
creating hidden files: we use Win32's _wopen() function which
transmogrifies its arguments and hands off to Win32's CreateFile()
function. That latter function errors out with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (the
equivalent of EACCES) when the equivalent of the O_CREAT flag was passed
and the file attributes (including the hidden flag) do not match an
existing file's. And _wopen() accepts no parameter that would be
transmogrified into said hidden flag. Therefore, we simply try again
without O_CREAT.
A slightly different method is required for our fopen()/freopen()
function as we cannot even *remove* the implicit O_CREAT flag.
Therefore, we briefly mark existing files as unhidden when opening them
via fopen()/freopen().
The ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED error can also be triggered by opening a file
that is marked as a system file (which is unlikely to be tracked in
Git), and by trying to create a file that has *just* been deleted and is
awaiting the last open handles to be released (which would be handled
better by the "Try again?" logic, a story for a different patch series,
though). In both cases, it does not matter much if we try again without
the O_CREAT flag, read: it does not hurt, either.
For details how ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED can be triggered, see
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa363858
Original-patch-by: Erik Faye-Lund <kusmabite@gmail.com>
Initial-Test-By: Pat Thoyts <patthoyts@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-05-11 08:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (file && hide && set_hidden_flag(wfilename, 1))
|
|
|
|
warning("could not mark '%s' as hidden.", filename);
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return file;
|
2010-02-25 20:03:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
FILE *mingw_freopen (const char *filename, const char *otype, FILE *stream)
|
|
|
|
{
|
mingw: introduce the 'core.hideDotFiles' setting
On Unix (and Linux), files and directories whose names start with a dot
are usually not shown by default. This convention is used by Git: the
.git/ directory should be left alone by regular users, and only accessed
through Git itself.
On Windows, no such convention exists. Instead, there is an explicit flag
to mark files or directories as hidden.
In the early days, Git for Windows did not mark the .git/ directory (or
for that matter, any file or directory whose name starts with a dot)
hidden. This lead to quite a bit of confusion, and even loss of data.
Consequently, Git for Windows introduced the core.hideDotFiles setting,
with three possible values: true, false, and dotGitOnly, defaulting to
marking only the .git/ directory as hidden.
The rationale: users do not need to access .git/ directly, and indeed (as
was demonstrated) should not really see that directory, either. However,
not all dot files should be hidden by default, as e.g. Eclipse does not
show them (and the user would therefore be unable to see, say, a
.gitattributes file).
In over five years since the last attempt to bring this patch into core
Git, a slightly buggy version of this patch has served Git for Windows'
users well: no single report indicated problems with the hidden .git/
directory, and the stream of problems caused by the previously non-hidden
.git/ directory simply stopped. The bugs have been fixed during the
process of getting this patch upstream.
Note that there is a funny quirk we have to pay attention to when
creating hidden files: we use Win32's _wopen() function which
transmogrifies its arguments and hands off to Win32's CreateFile()
function. That latter function errors out with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (the
equivalent of EACCES) when the equivalent of the O_CREAT flag was passed
and the file attributes (including the hidden flag) do not match an
existing file's. And _wopen() accepts no parameter that would be
transmogrified into said hidden flag. Therefore, we simply try again
without O_CREAT.
A slightly different method is required for our fopen()/freopen()
function as we cannot even *remove* the implicit O_CREAT flag.
Therefore, we briefly mark existing files as unhidden when opening them
via fopen()/freopen().
The ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED error can also be triggered by opening a file
that is marked as a system file (which is unlikely to be tracked in
Git), and by trying to create a file that has *just* been deleted and is
awaiting the last open handles to be released (which would be handled
better by the "Try again?" logic, a story for a different patch series,
though). In both cases, it does not matter much if we try again without
the O_CREAT flag, read: it does not hurt, either.
For details how ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED can be triggered, see
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa363858
Original-patch-by: Erik Faye-Lund <kusmabite@gmail.com>
Initial-Test-By: Pat Thoyts <patthoyts@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-05-11 08:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
int hide = needs_hiding(filename);
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
FILE *file;
|
|
|
|
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH], wotype[4];
|
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
When creating a directory on Windows whose path ends in a space or a
period (or chains thereof), the Win32 API "helpfully" trims those. For
example, `mkdir("abc ");` will return success, but actually create a
directory called `abc` instead.
This stems back to the DOS days, when all file names had exactly 8
characters plus exactly 3 characters for the file extension, and the
only way to have shorter names was by padding with spaces.
Sadly, this "helpful" behavior is a bit inconsistent: after a successful
`mkdir("abc ");`, a `mkdir("abc /def")` will actually _fail_ (because
the directory `abc ` does not actually exist).
Even if it would work, we now have a serious problem because a Git
repository could contain directories `abc` and `abc `, and on Windows,
they would be "merged" unintentionally.
As these paths are illegal on Windows, anyway, let's disallow any
accesses to such paths on that Operating System.
For practical reasons, this behavior is still guarded by the
config setting `core.protectNTFS`: it is possible (and at least two
regression tests make use of it) to create commits without involving the
worktree. In such a scenario, it is of course possible -- even on
Windows -- to create such file names.
Among other consequences, this patch disallows submodules' paths to end
in spaces on Windows (which would formerly have confused Git enough to
try to write into incorrect paths, anyway).
While this patch does not fix a vulnerability on its own, it prevents an
attack vector that was exploited in demonstrations of a number of
recently-fixed security bugs.
The regression test added to `t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh` reflects
that attack vector.
Note that we have to adjust the test case "prevent git~1 squatting on
Windows" in `t/t7415-submodule-names.sh` because of a very subtle issue.
It tries to clone two submodules whose names differ only in a trailing
period character, and as a consequence their git directories differ in
the same way. Previously, when Git tried to clone the second submodule,
it thought that the git directory already existed (because on Windows,
when you create a directory with the name `b.` it actually creates `b`),
but with this patch, the first submodule's clone will fail because of
the illegal name of the git directory. Therefore, when cloning the
second submodule, Git will take a different code path: a fresh clone
(without an existing git directory). Both code paths fail to clone the
second submodule, both because the the corresponding worktree directory
exists and is not empty, but the error messages are worded differently.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2019-09-05 11:27:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
|
|
|
|
int create = otype && strchr(otype, 'w');
|
|
|
|
errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-02-25 20:03:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
|
|
|
|
filename = "nul";
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, filename) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
xutftowcs(wotype, otype, ARRAY_SIZE(wotype)) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
mingw: introduce the 'core.hideDotFiles' setting
On Unix (and Linux), files and directories whose names start with a dot
are usually not shown by default. This convention is used by Git: the
.git/ directory should be left alone by regular users, and only accessed
through Git itself.
On Windows, no such convention exists. Instead, there is an explicit flag
to mark files or directories as hidden.
In the early days, Git for Windows did not mark the .git/ directory (or
for that matter, any file or directory whose name starts with a dot)
hidden. This lead to quite a bit of confusion, and even loss of data.
Consequently, Git for Windows introduced the core.hideDotFiles setting,
with three possible values: true, false, and dotGitOnly, defaulting to
marking only the .git/ directory as hidden.
The rationale: users do not need to access .git/ directly, and indeed (as
was demonstrated) should not really see that directory, either. However,
not all dot files should be hidden by default, as e.g. Eclipse does not
show them (and the user would therefore be unable to see, say, a
.gitattributes file).
In over five years since the last attempt to bring this patch into core
Git, a slightly buggy version of this patch has served Git for Windows'
users well: no single report indicated problems with the hidden .git/
directory, and the stream of problems caused by the previously non-hidden
.git/ directory simply stopped. The bugs have been fixed during the
process of getting this patch upstream.
Note that there is a funny quirk we have to pay attention to when
creating hidden files: we use Win32's _wopen() function which
transmogrifies its arguments and hands off to Win32's CreateFile()
function. That latter function errors out with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (the
equivalent of EACCES) when the equivalent of the O_CREAT flag was passed
and the file attributes (including the hidden flag) do not match an
existing file's. And _wopen() accepts no parameter that would be
transmogrified into said hidden flag. Therefore, we simply try again
without O_CREAT.
A slightly different method is required for our fopen()/freopen()
function as we cannot even *remove* the implicit O_CREAT flag.
Therefore, we briefly mark existing files as unhidden when opening them
via fopen()/freopen().
The ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED error can also be triggered by opening a file
that is marked as a system file (which is unlikely to be tracked in
Git), and by trying to create a file that has *just* been deleted and is
awaiting the last open handles to be released (which would be handled
better by the "Try again?" logic, a story for a different patch series,
though). In both cases, it does not matter much if we try again without
the O_CREAT flag, read: it does not hurt, either.
For details how ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED can be triggered, see
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa363858
Original-patch-by: Erik Faye-Lund <kusmabite@gmail.com>
Initial-Test-By: Pat Thoyts <patthoyts@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-05-11 08:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (hide && !access(filename, F_OK) && set_hidden_flag(wfilename, 0)) {
|
|
|
|
error("could not unhide %s", filename);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
file = _wfreopen(wfilename, wotype, stream);
|
mingw: introduce the 'core.hideDotFiles' setting
On Unix (and Linux), files and directories whose names start with a dot
are usually not shown by default. This convention is used by Git: the
.git/ directory should be left alone by regular users, and only accessed
through Git itself.
On Windows, no such convention exists. Instead, there is an explicit flag
to mark files or directories as hidden.
In the early days, Git for Windows did not mark the .git/ directory (or
for that matter, any file or directory whose name starts with a dot)
hidden. This lead to quite a bit of confusion, and even loss of data.
Consequently, Git for Windows introduced the core.hideDotFiles setting,
with three possible values: true, false, and dotGitOnly, defaulting to
marking only the .git/ directory as hidden.
The rationale: users do not need to access .git/ directly, and indeed (as
was demonstrated) should not really see that directory, either. However,
not all dot files should be hidden by default, as e.g. Eclipse does not
show them (and the user would therefore be unable to see, say, a
.gitattributes file).
In over five years since the last attempt to bring this patch into core
Git, a slightly buggy version of this patch has served Git for Windows'
users well: no single report indicated problems with the hidden .git/
directory, and the stream of problems caused by the previously non-hidden
.git/ directory simply stopped. The bugs have been fixed during the
process of getting this patch upstream.
Note that there is a funny quirk we have to pay attention to when
creating hidden files: we use Win32's _wopen() function which
transmogrifies its arguments and hands off to Win32's CreateFile()
function. That latter function errors out with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (the
equivalent of EACCES) when the equivalent of the O_CREAT flag was passed
and the file attributes (including the hidden flag) do not match an
existing file's. And _wopen() accepts no parameter that would be
transmogrified into said hidden flag. Therefore, we simply try again
without O_CREAT.
A slightly different method is required for our fopen()/freopen()
function as we cannot even *remove* the implicit O_CREAT flag.
Therefore, we briefly mark existing files as unhidden when opening them
via fopen()/freopen().
The ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED error can also be triggered by opening a file
that is marked as a system file (which is unlikely to be tracked in
Git), and by trying to create a file that has *just* been deleted and is
awaiting the last open handles to be released (which would be handled
better by the "Try again?" logic, a story for a different patch series,
though). In both cases, it does not matter much if we try again without
the O_CREAT flag, read: it does not hurt, either.
For details how ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED can be triggered, see
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa363858
Original-patch-by: Erik Faye-Lund <kusmabite@gmail.com>
Initial-Test-By: Pat Thoyts <patthoyts@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-05-11 08:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (file && hide && set_hidden_flag(wfilename, 1))
|
|
|
|
warning("could not mark '%s' as hidden.", filename);
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return file;
|
2010-02-25 20:03:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-17 07:05:51 +00:00
|
|
|
#undef fflush
|
|
|
|
int mingw_fflush(FILE *stream)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = fflush(stream);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* write() is used behind the scenes of stdio output functions.
|
|
|
|
* Since git code does not check for errors after each stdio write
|
|
|
|
* operation, it can happen that write() is called by a later
|
|
|
|
* stdio function even if an earlier write() call failed. In the
|
|
|
|
* case of a pipe whose readable end was closed, only the first
|
|
|
|
* call to write() reports EPIPE on Windows. Subsequent write()
|
|
|
|
* calls report EINVAL. It is impossible to notice whether this
|
|
|
|
* fflush invocation triggered such a case, therefore, we have to
|
|
|
|
* catch all EINVAL errors whole-sale.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ret && errno == EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
errno = EPIPE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-17 17:08:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#undef write
|
|
|
|
ssize_t mingw_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ssize_t result = write(fd, buf, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (result < 0 && errno == EINVAL && buf) {
|
|
|
|
/* check if fd is a pipe */
|
|
|
|
HANDLE h = (HANDLE) _get_osfhandle(fd);
|
|
|
|
if (GetFileType(h) == FILE_TYPE_PIPE)
|
|
|
|
errno = EPIPE;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int mingw_access(const char *filename, int mode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH];
|
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, filename) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* X_OK is not supported by the MSVCRT version */
|
|
|
|
return _waccess(wfilename, mode & ~X_OK);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int mingw_chdir(const char *dirname)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
wchar_t wdirname[MAX_PATH];
|
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wdirname, dirname) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return _wchdir(wdirname);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int mingw_chmod(const char *filename, int mode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH];
|
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, filename) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return _wchmod(wfilename, mode);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-01-15 20:12:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The unit of FILETIME is 100-nanoseconds since January 1, 1601, UTC.
|
|
|
|
* Returns the 100-nanoseconds ("hekto nanoseconds") since the epoch.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline long long filetime_to_hnsec(const FILETIME *ft)
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
long long winTime = ((long long)ft->dwHighDateTime << 32) + ft->dwLowDateTime;
|
2010-01-15 20:12:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Windows to Unix Epoch conversion */
|
|
|
|
return winTime - 116444736000000000LL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline time_t filetime_to_time_t(const FILETIME *ft)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (time_t)(filetime_to_hnsec(ft) / 10000000);
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-26 14:34:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Verifies that safe_create_leading_directories() would succeed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int has_valid_directory_prefix(wchar_t *wfilename)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int n = wcslen(wfilename);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (n > 0) {
|
|
|
|
wchar_t c = wfilename[--n];
|
|
|
|
DWORD attributes;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!is_dir_sep(c))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wfilename[n] = L'\0';
|
|
|
|
attributes = GetFileAttributesW(wfilename);
|
|
|
|
wfilename[n] = c;
|
|
|
|
if (attributes == FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY ||
|
|
|
|
attributes == FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DEVICE)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (attributes == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES)
|
|
|
|
switch (GetLastError()) {
|
|
|
|
case ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND:
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
case ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND:
|
|
|
|
/* This implies parent directory exists. */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We keep the do_lstat code in a separate function to avoid recursion.
|
|
|
|
* When a path ends with a slash, the stat will fail with ENOENT. In
|
|
|
|
* this case, we strip the trailing slashes and stat again.
|
2010-03-17 15:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If follow is true then act like stat() and report on the link
|
|
|
|
* target. Otherwise report on the link itself.
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-03-17 15:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
static int do_lstat(int follow, const char *file_name, struct stat *buf)
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WIN32_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DATA fdata;
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH];
|
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, file_name) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (GetFileAttributesExW(wfilename, GetFileExInfoStandard, &fdata)) {
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
buf->st_ino = 0;
|
|
|
|
buf->st_gid = 0;
|
|
|
|
buf->st_uid = 0;
|
2008-08-18 20:01:06 +00:00
|
|
|
buf->st_nlink = 1;
|
2008-09-27 08:43:01 +00:00
|
|
|
buf->st_mode = file_attr_to_st_mode(fdata.dwFileAttributes);
|
2009-03-05 16:05:12 +00:00
|
|
|
buf->st_size = fdata.nFileSizeLow |
|
|
|
|
(((off_t)fdata.nFileSizeHigh)<<32);
|
2008-09-27 08:39:45 +00:00
|
|
|
buf->st_dev = buf->st_rdev = 0; /* not used by Git */
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
buf->st_atime = filetime_to_time_t(&(fdata.ftLastAccessTime));
|
|
|
|
buf->st_mtime = filetime_to_time_t(&(fdata.ftLastWriteTime));
|
|
|
|
buf->st_ctime = filetime_to_time_t(&(fdata.ftCreationTime));
|
2010-03-17 15:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fdata.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT) {
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
WIN32_FIND_DATAW findbuf;
|
|
|
|
HANDLE handle = FindFirstFileW(wfilename, &findbuf);
|
2010-03-17 15:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (handle != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
|
|
|
|
if ((findbuf.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT) &&
|
|
|
|
(findbuf.dwReserved0 == IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK)) {
|
|
|
|
if (follow) {
|
|
|
|
char buffer[MAXIMUM_REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
buf->st_size = readlink(file_name, buffer, MAXIMUM_REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
buf->st_mode = S_IFLNK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buf->st_mode |= S_IREAD;
|
|
|
|
if (!(findbuf.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY))
|
|
|
|
buf->st_mode |= S_IWRITE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
FindClose(handle);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (GetLastError()) {
|
|
|
|
case ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED:
|
|
|
|
case ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION:
|
|
|
|
case ERROR_LOCK_VIOLATION:
|
|
|
|
case ERROR_SHARING_BUFFER_EXCEEDED:
|
|
|
|
errno = EACCES;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW:
|
|
|
|
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY:
|
|
|
|
errno = ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2016-01-26 14:34:52 +00:00
|
|
|
case ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND:
|
|
|
|
if (!has_valid_directory_prefix(wfilename)) {
|
|
|
|
errno = ENOTDIR;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* fallthru */
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
errno = ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We provide our own lstat/fstat functions, since the provided
|
|
|
|
* lstat/fstat functions are so slow. These stat functions are
|
|
|
|
* tailored for Git's usage (read: fast), and are not meant to be
|
|
|
|
* complete. Note that Git stat()s are redirected to mingw_lstat()
|
|
|
|
* too, since Windows doesn't really handle symlinks that well.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-03-17 15:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
static int do_stat_internal(int follow, const char *file_name, struct stat *buf)
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int namelen;
|
2011-01-07 17:04:16 +00:00
|
|
|
char alt_name[PATH_MAX];
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-03-17 15:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!do_lstat(follow, file_name, buf))
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if file_name ended in a '/', Windows returned ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
* try again without trailing slashes
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (errno != ENOENT)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
namelen = strlen(file_name);
|
|
|
|
if (namelen && file_name[namelen-1] != '/')
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
while (namelen && file_name[namelen-1] == '/')
|
|
|
|
--namelen;
|
|
|
|
if (!namelen || namelen >= PATH_MAX)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(alt_name, file_name, namelen);
|
|
|
|
alt_name[namelen] = 0;
|
2010-03-17 15:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return do_lstat(follow, alt_name, buf);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int mingw_lstat(const char *file_name, struct stat *buf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return do_stat_internal(0, file_name, buf);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int mingw_stat(const char *file_name, struct stat *buf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return do_stat_internal(1, file_name, buf);
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-18 20:01:06 +00:00
|
|
|
int mingw_fstat(int fd, struct stat *buf)
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
HANDLE fh = (HANDLE)_get_osfhandle(fd);
|
|
|
|
BY_HANDLE_FILE_INFORMATION fdata;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fh == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
|
|
|
|
errno = EBADF;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* direct non-file handles to MS's fstat() */
|
2008-08-18 20:01:06 +00:00
|
|
|
if (GetFileType(fh) != FILE_TYPE_DISK)
|
2009-03-05 16:05:12 +00:00
|
|
|
return _fstati64(fd, buf);
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (GetFileInformationByHandle(fh, &fdata)) {
|
|
|
|
buf->st_ino = 0;
|
|
|
|
buf->st_gid = 0;
|
|
|
|
buf->st_uid = 0;
|
2008-08-18 20:01:06 +00:00
|
|
|
buf->st_nlink = 1;
|
2008-09-27 08:43:01 +00:00
|
|
|
buf->st_mode = file_attr_to_st_mode(fdata.dwFileAttributes);
|
2009-03-05 16:05:12 +00:00
|
|
|
buf->st_size = fdata.nFileSizeLow |
|
|
|
|
(((off_t)fdata.nFileSizeHigh)<<32);
|
2008-09-27 08:39:45 +00:00
|
|
|
buf->st_dev = buf->st_rdev = 0; /* not used by Git */
|
2007-09-03 18:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
buf->st_atime = filetime_to_time_t(&(fdata.ftLastAccessTime));
|
|
|
|
buf->st_mtime = filetime_to_time_t(&(fdata.ftLastWriteTime));
|
|
|
|
buf->st_ctime = filetime_to_time_t(&(fdata.ftCreationTime));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
errno = EBADF;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-09-07 11:05:00 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline void time_t_to_filetime(time_t t, FILETIME *ft)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
long long winTime = t * 10000000LL + 116444736000000000LL;
|
|
|
|
ft->dwLowDateTime = winTime;
|
|
|
|
ft->dwHighDateTime = winTime >> 32;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int mingw_utime (const char *file_name, const struct utimbuf *times)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
FILETIME mft, aft;
|
|
|
|
int fh, rc;
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
DWORD attrs;
|
|
|
|
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH];
|
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, file_name) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2007-09-07 11:05:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* must have write permission */
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
attrs = GetFileAttributesW(wfilename);
|
2010-03-30 07:46:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (attrs != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES &&
|
|
|
|
(attrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY)) {
|
|
|
|
/* ignore errors here; open() will report them */
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
SetFileAttributesW(wfilename, attrs & ~FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY);
|
2010-03-30 07:46:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((fh = _wopen(wfilename, O_RDWR | O_BINARY)) < 0) {
|
2010-03-30 07:46:23 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto revert_attrs;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-09-07 11:05:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-07-12 23:42:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (times) {
|
|
|
|
time_t_to_filetime(times->modtime, &mft);
|
|
|
|
time_t_to_filetime(times->actime, &aft);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&mft);
|
|
|
|
aft = mft;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-09-07 11:05:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!SetFileTime((HANDLE)_get_osfhandle(fh), NULL, &aft, &mft)) {
|
|
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
rc = -1;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
close(fh);
|
2010-03-30 07:46:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
revert_attrs:
|
|
|
|
if (attrs != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES &&
|
|
|
|
(attrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY)) {
|
|
|
|
/* ignore errors again */
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
SetFileAttributesW(wfilename, attrs);
|
2010-03-30 07:46:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-09-07 11:05:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int sleep (unsigned int seconds)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Sleep(seconds*1000);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
char *mingw_mktemp(char *template)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
wchar_t wtemplate[MAX_PATH];
|
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wtemplate, template) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!_wmktemp(wtemplate))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (xwcstoutf(template, wtemplate, strlen(template) + 1) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
return template;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
int mkstemp(char *template)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *filename = mktemp(template);
|
|
|
|
if (filename == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return open(filename, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int gettimeofday(struct timeval *tv, void *tz)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-01-15 20:12:21 +00:00
|
|
|
FILETIME ft;
|
|
|
|
long long hnsec;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ft);
|
|
|
|
hnsec = filetime_to_hnsec(&ft);
|
|
|
|
tv->tv_sec = hnsec / 10000000;
|
|
|
|
tv->tv_usec = (hnsec % 10000000) / 10;
|
2007-12-01 20:51:20 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Windows: A pipe() replacement whose ends are not inherited to children.
On Unix the idiom to use a pipe is as follows:
pipe(fd);
pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
dup2(fd[1], 1);
close(fd[1]);
close(fd[0]);
...
}
close(fd[1]);
i.e. the child process closes the both pipe ends after duplicating one
to the file descriptors where they are needed.
On Windows, which does not have fork(), we never have an opportunity to
(1) duplicate a pipe end in the child, (2) close unused pipe ends. Instead,
we must use this idiom:
save1 = dup(1);
pipe(fd);
dup2(fd[1], 1);
spawn(...);
dup2(save1, 1);
close(fd[1]);
i.e. save away the descriptor at the destination slot, replace by the pipe
end, spawn process, restore the saved file.
But there is a problem: Notice that the child did not only inherit the
dup2()ed descriptor, but also *both* original pipe ends. Although the one
end that was dup()ed could be closed before the spawn(), we cannot close
the other end - the child inherits it, no matter what.
The solution is to generate non-inheritable pipes. At the first glance,
this looks strange: The purpose of pipes is usually to be inherited to
child processes. But notice that in the course of actions as outlined
above, the pipe descriptor that we want to inherit to the child is
dup2()ed, and as it so happens, Windows's dup2() creates inheritable
duplicates.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <johannes.sixt@telecom.at>
2007-12-07 21:05:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int pipe(int filedes[2])
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-01-15 20:12:17 +00:00
|
|
|
HANDLE h[2];
|
Windows: A pipe() replacement whose ends are not inherited to children.
On Unix the idiom to use a pipe is as follows:
pipe(fd);
pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
dup2(fd[1], 1);
close(fd[1]);
close(fd[0]);
...
}
close(fd[1]);
i.e. the child process closes the both pipe ends after duplicating one
to the file descriptors where they are needed.
On Windows, which does not have fork(), we never have an opportunity to
(1) duplicate a pipe end in the child, (2) close unused pipe ends. Instead,
we must use this idiom:
save1 = dup(1);
pipe(fd);
dup2(fd[1], 1);
spawn(...);
dup2(save1, 1);
close(fd[1]);
i.e. save away the descriptor at the destination slot, replace by the pipe
end, spawn process, restore the saved file.
But there is a problem: Notice that the child did not only inherit the
dup2()ed descriptor, but also *both* original pipe ends. Although the one
end that was dup()ed could be closed before the spawn(), we cannot close
the other end - the child inherits it, no matter what.
The solution is to generate non-inheritable pipes. At the first glance,
this looks strange: The purpose of pipes is usually to be inherited to
child processes. But notice that in the course of actions as outlined
above, the pipe descriptor that we want to inherit to the child is
dup2()ed, and as it so happens, Windows's dup2() creates inheritable
duplicates.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <johannes.sixt@telecom.at>
2007-12-07 21:05:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-01-15 20:12:17 +00:00
|
|
|
/* this creates non-inheritable handles */
|
|
|
|
if (!CreatePipe(&h[0], &h[1], NULL, 8192)) {
|
|
|
|
errno = err_win_to_posix(GetLastError());
|
Windows: A pipe() replacement whose ends are not inherited to children.
On Unix the idiom to use a pipe is as follows:
pipe(fd);
pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
dup2(fd[1], 1);
close(fd[1]);
close(fd[0]);
...
}
close(fd[1]);
i.e. the child process closes the both pipe ends after duplicating one
to the file descriptors where they are needed.
On Windows, which does not have fork(), we never have an opportunity to
(1) duplicate a pipe end in the child, (2) close unused pipe ends. Instead,
we must use this idiom:
save1 = dup(1);
pipe(fd);
dup2(fd[1], 1);
spawn(...);
dup2(save1, 1);
close(fd[1]);
i.e. save away the descriptor at the destination slot, replace by the pipe
end, spawn process, restore the saved file.
But there is a problem: Notice that the child did not only inherit the
dup2()ed descriptor, but also *both* original pipe ends. Although the one
end that was dup()ed could be closed before the spawn(), we cannot close
the other end - the child inherits it, no matter what.
The solution is to generate non-inheritable pipes. At the first glance,
this looks strange: The purpose of pipes is usually to be inherited to
child processes. But notice that in the course of actions as outlined
above, the pipe descriptor that we want to inherit to the child is
dup2()ed, and as it so happens, Windows's dup2() creates inheritable
duplicates.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <johannes.sixt@telecom.at>
2007-12-07 21:05:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-15 13:24:34 +00:00
|
|
|
filedes[0] = _open_osfhandle(HCAST(int, h[0]), O_NOINHERIT);
|
2010-01-15 20:12:17 +00:00
|
|
|
if (filedes[0] < 0) {
|
Windows: A pipe() replacement whose ends are not inherited to children.
On Unix the idiom to use a pipe is as follows:
pipe(fd);
pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
dup2(fd[1], 1);
close(fd[1]);
close(fd[0]);
...
}
close(fd[1]);
i.e. the child process closes the both pipe ends after duplicating one
to the file descriptors where they are needed.
On Windows, which does not have fork(), we never have an opportunity to
(1) duplicate a pipe end in the child, (2) close unused pipe ends. Instead,
we must use this idiom:
save1 = dup(1);
pipe(fd);
dup2(fd[1], 1);
spawn(...);
dup2(save1, 1);
close(fd[1]);
i.e. save away the descriptor at the destination slot, replace by the pipe
end, spawn process, restore the saved file.
But there is a problem: Notice that the child did not only inherit the
dup2()ed descriptor, but also *both* original pipe ends. Although the one
end that was dup()ed could be closed before the spawn(), we cannot close
the other end - the child inherits it, no matter what.
The solution is to generate non-inheritable pipes. At the first glance,
this looks strange: The purpose of pipes is usually to be inherited to
child processes. But notice that in the course of actions as outlined
above, the pipe descriptor that we want to inherit to the child is
dup2()ed, and as it so happens, Windows's dup2() creates inheritable
duplicates.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <johannes.sixt@telecom.at>
2007-12-07 21:05:36 +00:00
|
|
|
CloseHandle(h[0]);
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(h[1]);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-15 13:24:34 +00:00
|
|
|
filedes[1] = _open_osfhandle(HCAST(int, h[1]), O_NOINHERIT);
|
2015-08-28 09:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (filedes[1] < 0) {
|
Windows: A pipe() replacement whose ends are not inherited to children.
On Unix the idiom to use a pipe is as follows:
pipe(fd);
pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
dup2(fd[1], 1);
close(fd[1]);
close(fd[0]);
...
}
close(fd[1]);
i.e. the child process closes the both pipe ends after duplicating one
to the file descriptors where they are needed.
On Windows, which does not have fork(), we never have an opportunity to
(1) duplicate a pipe end in the child, (2) close unused pipe ends. Instead,
we must use this idiom:
save1 = dup(1);
pipe(fd);
dup2(fd[1], 1);
spawn(...);
dup2(save1, 1);
close(fd[1]);
i.e. save away the descriptor at the destination slot, replace by the pipe
end, spawn process, restore the saved file.
But there is a problem: Notice that the child did not only inherit the
dup2()ed descriptor, but also *both* original pipe ends. Although the one
end that was dup()ed could be closed before the spawn(), we cannot close
the other end - the child inherits it, no matter what.
The solution is to generate non-inheritable pipes. At the first glance,
this looks strange: The purpose of pipes is usually to be inherited to
child processes. But notice that in the course of actions as outlined
above, the pipe descriptor that we want to inherit to the child is
dup2()ed, and as it so happens, Windows's dup2() creates inheritable
duplicates.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <johannes.sixt@telecom.at>
2007-12-07 21:05:36 +00:00
|
|
|
close(filedes[0]);
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(h[1]);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
struct tm *gmtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* gmtime() in MSVCRT.DLL is thread-safe, but not reentrant */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(result, gmtime(timep), sizeof(struct tm));
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct tm *localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* localtime() in MSVCRT.DLL is thread-safe, but not reentrant */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(result, localtime(timep), sizeof(struct tm));
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-05 20:51:27 +00:00
|
|
|
char *mingw_getcwd(char *pointer, int len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
wchar_t wpointer[MAX_PATH];
|
|
|
|
if (!_wgetcwd(wpointer, ARRAY_SIZE(wpointer)))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (xwcstoutf(pointer, wpointer, len) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2016-04-02 19:03:14 +00:00
|
|
|
convert_slashes(pointer);
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return pointer;
|
2008-03-05 20:51:27 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* See http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/17w5ykft(vs.71).aspx
|
|
|
|
* (Parsing C++ Command-Line Arguments)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static const char *quote_arg(const char *arg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* count chars to quote */
|
|
|
|
int len = 0, n = 0;
|
|
|
|
int force_quotes = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *q, *d;
|
|
|
|
const char *p = arg;
|
|
|
|
if (!*p) force_quotes = 1;
|
|
|
|
while (*p) {
|
2009-03-24 20:43:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (isspace(*p) || *p == '*' || *p == '?' || *p == '{' || *p == '\'')
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
force_quotes = 1;
|
|
|
|
else if (*p == '"')
|
|
|
|
n++;
|
|
|
|
else if (*p == '\\') {
|
|
|
|
int count = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (*p == '\\') {
|
|
|
|
count++;
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
len++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
We need to be careful to follow proper quoting rules. For example, if an
argument contains spaces, we have to quote them. Double-quotes need to
be escaped. Backslashes need to be escaped, but only if they are
followed by a double-quote character.
We need to be _extra_ careful to consider the case where an argument
ends in a backslash _and_ needs to be quoted: in this case, we append a
double-quote character, i.e. the backslash now has to be escaped!
The current code, however, fails to recognize that, and therefore can
turn an argument that ends in a single backslash into a quoted argument
that now ends in an escaped double-quote character. This allows
subsequent command-line parameters to be split and part of them being
mistaken for command-line options, e.g. through a maliciously-crafted
submodule URL during a recursive clone.
Technically, we would not need to quote _all_ arguments which end in a
backslash _unless_ the argument needs to be quoted anyway. For example,
`test\` would not need to be quoted, while `test \` would need to be.
To keep the code simple, however, and therefore easier to reason about
and ensure its correctness, we now _always_ quote an argument that ends
in a backslash.
This addresses CVE-2019-1350.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2019-09-13 14:32:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*p == '"' || !*p)
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
n += count*2 + 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len++;
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!force_quotes && n == 0)
|
|
|
|
return arg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* insert \ where necessary */
|
2016-02-22 22:44:35 +00:00
|
|
|
d = q = xmalloc(st_add3(len, n, 3));
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
*d++ = '"';
|
|
|
|
while (*arg) {
|
|
|
|
if (*arg == '"')
|
|
|
|
*d++ = '\\';
|
|
|
|
else if (*arg == '\\') {
|
|
|
|
int count = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (*arg == '\\') {
|
|
|
|
count++;
|
|
|
|
*d++ = *arg++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
We need to be careful to follow proper quoting rules. For example, if an
argument contains spaces, we have to quote them. Double-quotes need to
be escaped. Backslashes need to be escaped, but only if they are
followed by a double-quote character.
We need to be _extra_ careful to consider the case where an argument
ends in a backslash _and_ needs to be quoted: in this case, we append a
double-quote character, i.e. the backslash now has to be escaped!
The current code, however, fails to recognize that, and therefore can
turn an argument that ends in a single backslash into a quoted argument
that now ends in an escaped double-quote character. This allows
subsequent command-line parameters to be split and part of them being
mistaken for command-line options, e.g. through a maliciously-crafted
submodule URL during a recursive clone.
Technically, we would not need to quote _all_ arguments which end in a
backslash _unless_ the argument needs to be quoted anyway. For example,
`test\` would not need to be quoted, while `test \` would need to be.
To keep the code simple, however, and therefore easier to reason about
and ensure its correctness, we now _always_ quote an argument that ends
in a backslash.
This addresses CVE-2019-1350.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2019-09-13 14:32:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*arg == '"' || !*arg) {
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
while (count-- > 0)
|
|
|
|
*d++ = '\\';
|
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
We need to be careful to follow proper quoting rules. For example, if an
argument contains spaces, we have to quote them. Double-quotes need to
be escaped. Backslashes need to be escaped, but only if they are
followed by a double-quote character.
We need to be _extra_ careful to consider the case where an argument
ends in a backslash _and_ needs to be quoted: in this case, we append a
double-quote character, i.e. the backslash now has to be escaped!
The current code, however, fails to recognize that, and therefore can
turn an argument that ends in a single backslash into a quoted argument
that now ends in an escaped double-quote character. This allows
subsequent command-line parameters to be split and part of them being
mistaken for command-line options, e.g. through a maliciously-crafted
submodule URL during a recursive clone.
Technically, we would not need to quote _all_ arguments which end in a
backslash _unless_ the argument needs to be quoted anyway. For example,
`test\` would not need to be quoted, while `test \` would need to be.
To keep the code simple, however, and therefore easier to reason about
and ensure its correctness, we now _always_ quote an argument that ends
in a backslash.
This addresses CVE-2019-1350.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2019-09-13 14:32:43 +00:00
|
|
|
/* don't escape the surrounding end quote */
|
|
|
|
if (!*arg)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
*d++ = '\\';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*d++ = *arg++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*d++ = '"';
|
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
We need to be careful to follow proper quoting rules. For example, if an
argument contains spaces, we have to quote them. Double-quotes need to
be escaped. Backslashes need to be escaped, but only if they are
followed by a double-quote character.
We need to be _extra_ careful to consider the case where an argument
ends in a backslash _and_ needs to be quoted: in this case, we append a
double-quote character, i.e. the backslash now has to be escaped!
The current code, however, fails to recognize that, and therefore can
turn an argument that ends in a single backslash into a quoted argument
that now ends in an escaped double-quote character. This allows
subsequent command-line parameters to be split and part of them being
mistaken for command-line options, e.g. through a maliciously-crafted
submodule URL during a recursive clone.
Technically, we would not need to quote _all_ arguments which end in a
backslash _unless_ the argument needs to be quoted anyway. For example,
`test\` would not need to be quoted, while `test \` would need to be.
To keep the code simple, however, and therefore easier to reason about
and ensure its correctness, we now _always_ quote an argument that ends
in a backslash.
This addresses CVE-2019-1350.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2019-09-13 14:32:43 +00:00
|
|
|
*d++ = '\0';
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
return q;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
static const char *parse_interpreter(const char *cmd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static char buf[100];
|
|
|
|
char *p, *opt;
|
|
|
|
int n, fd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* don't even try a .exe */
|
|
|
|
n = strlen(cmd);
|
|
|
|
if (n >= 4 && !strcasecmp(cmd+n-4, ".exe"))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fd = open(cmd, O_RDONLY);
|
|
|
|
if (fd < 0)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)-1);
|
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
if (n < 4) /* at least '#!/x' and not error */
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (buf[0] != '#' || buf[1] != '!')
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
buf[n] = '\0';
|
2009-05-23 08:04:47 +00:00
|
|
|
p = buf + strcspn(buf, "\r\n");
|
|
|
|
if (!*p)
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*p = '\0';
|
|
|
|
if (!(p = strrchr(buf+2, '/')) && !(p = strrchr(buf+2, '\\')))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* strip options */
|
|
|
|
if ((opt = strchr(p+1, ' ')))
|
|
|
|
*opt = '\0';
|
|
|
|
return p+1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* exe_only means that we only want to detect .exe files, but not scripts
|
|
|
|
* (which do not have an extension)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-05-20 19:35:37 +00:00
|
|
|
static char *lookup_prog(const char *dir, int dirlen, const char *cmd,
|
|
|
|
int isexe, int exe_only)
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char path[MAX_PATH];
|
2017-05-20 19:35:37 +00:00
|
|
|
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%.*s\\%s.exe", dirlen, dir, cmd);
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!isexe && access(path, F_OK) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return xstrdup(path);
|
|
|
|
path[strlen(path)-4] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
if ((!exe_only || isexe) && access(path, F_OK) == 0)
|
2008-07-18 07:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(GetFileAttributes(path) & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY))
|
|
|
|
return xstrdup(path);
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2010-08-22 11:12:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* Determines the absolute path of cmd using the split path in path.
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* If cmd contains a slash or backslash, no lookup is performed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-05-20 19:35:37 +00:00
|
|
|
static char *path_lookup(const char *cmd, int exe_only)
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-05-20 19:35:37 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *path;
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *prog = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int len = strlen(cmd);
|
|
|
|
int isexe = len >= 4 && !strcasecmp(cmd+len-4, ".exe");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strchr(cmd, '/') || strchr(cmd, '\\'))
|
2017-05-20 19:35:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return xstrdup(cmd);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
path = mingw_getenv("PATH");
|
|
|
|
if (!path)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-20 19:35:37 +00:00
|
|
|
while (!prog) {
|
|
|
|
const char *sep = strchrnul(path, ';');
|
|
|
|
int dirlen = sep - path;
|
|
|
|
if (dirlen)
|
|
|
|
prog = lookup_prog(path, dirlen, cmd, isexe, exe_only);
|
|
|
|
if (!*sep)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
path = sep + 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return prog;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
static int do_putenv(char **env, const char *name, int size, int free_old);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* used number of elements of environ array, including terminating NULL */
|
|
|
|
static int environ_size = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* allocated size of environ array, in bytes */
|
|
|
|
static int environ_alloc = 0;
|
2014-07-17 15:38:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-07-17 15:38:01 +00:00
|
|
|
* Create environment block suitable for CreateProcess. Merges current
|
|
|
|
* process environment and the supplied environment changes.
|
2014-07-17 15:38:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-07-17 15:38:01 +00:00
|
|
|
static wchar_t *make_environment_block(char **deltaenv)
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-17 15:38:00 +00:00
|
|
|
wchar_t *wenvblk = NULL;
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
char **tmpenv;
|
|
|
|
int i = 0, size = environ_size, wenvsz = 0, wenvpos = 0;
|
2014-07-17 15:38:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
while (deltaenv && deltaenv[i])
|
|
|
|
i++;
|
2014-07-17 15:38:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/* copy the environment, leaving space for changes */
|
2016-02-22 22:44:25 +00:00
|
|
|
ALLOC_ARRAY(tmpenv, size + i);
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(tmpenv, environ, size * sizeof(char*));
|
2014-07-17 15:38:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* merge supplied environment changes into the temporary environment */
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; deltaenv && deltaenv[i]; i++)
|
|
|
|
size = do_putenv(tmpenv, deltaenv[i], size, 0);
|
2014-07-17 15:38:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/* create environment block from temporary environment */
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; tmpenv[i]; i++) {
|
|
|
|
size = 2 * strlen(tmpenv[i]) + 2; /* +2 for final \0 */
|
2014-07-17 15:38:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ALLOC_GROW(wenvblk, (wenvpos + size) * sizeof(wchar_t), wenvsz);
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
wenvpos += xutftowcs(&wenvblk[wenvpos], tmpenv[i], size) + 1;
|
2014-07-17 15:38:00 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* add final \0 terminator */
|
|
|
|
wenvblk[wenvpos] = 0;
|
|
|
|
free(tmpenv);
|
|
|
|
return wenvblk;
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-04 01:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct pinfo_t {
|
|
|
|
struct pinfo_t *next;
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid;
|
|
|
|
HANDLE proc;
|
2013-04-27 19:18:55 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct pinfo_t *pinfo = NULL;
|
2010-11-04 01:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
CRITICAL_SECTION pinfo_cs;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:01 +00:00
|
|
|
static pid_t mingw_spawnve_fd(const char *cmd, const char **argv, char **deltaenv,
|
2010-04-11 20:40:12 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *dir,
|
Windows: avoid the "dup dance" when spawning a child process
When stdin, stdout, or stderr must be redirected for a child process that
on Windows is spawned using one of the spawn() functions of Microsoft's
C runtime, then there is no choice other than to
1. make a backup copy of fd 0,1,2 with dup
2. dup2 the redirection source fd into 0,1,2
3. spawn
4. dup2 the backup back into 0,1,2
5. close the backup copy and the redirection source
We used this idiom as well -- but we are not using the spawn() functions
anymore!
Instead, we have our own implementation. We had hardcoded that stdin,
stdout, and stderr of the child process were inherited from the parent's
fds 0, 1, and 2. But we can actually specify any fd.
With this patch, the fds to inherit are passed from start_command()'s
WIN32 section to our spawn implementation. This way, we can avoid the
backup copies of the fds.
The backup copies were a bug waiting to surface: The OS handles underlying
the dup()ed fds were inherited by the child process (but were not
associated with a file descriptor in the child). Consequently, the file or
pipe represented by the OS handle remained open even after the backup copy
was closed in the parent process until the child exited.
Since our implementation of pipe() creates non-inheritable OS handles, we
still dup() file descriptors in start_command() because dup() happens to
create inheritable duplicates. (A nice side effect is that the fd cleanup
in start_command is the same for Windows and Unix and remains unchanged.)
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-01-15 20:12:18 +00:00
|
|
|
int prepend_cmd, int fhin, int fhout, int fherr)
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-01-16 17:27:53 +00:00
|
|
|
STARTUPINFOW si;
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
|
2014-07-17 15:37:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct strbuf args;
|
|
|
|
wchar_t wcmd[MAX_PATH], wdir[MAX_PATH], *wargs, *wenvblk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned flags = CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT;
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
BOOL ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Determine whether or not we are associated to a console */
|
|
|
|
HANDLE cons = CreateFile("CONOUT$", GENERIC_WRITE,
|
|
|
|
FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING,
|
|
|
|
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (cons == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
|
|
|
|
/* There is no console associated with this process.
|
|
|
|
* Since the child is a console process, Windows
|
|
|
|
* would normally create a console window. But
|
|
|
|
* since we'll be redirecting std streams, we do
|
|
|
|
* not need the console.
|
2008-11-02 17:11:13 +00:00
|
|
|
* It is necessary to use DETACHED_PROCESS
|
|
|
|
* instead of CREATE_NO_WINDOW to make ssh
|
|
|
|
* recognize that it has no console.
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-07-17 15:37:55 +00:00
|
|
|
flags |= DETACHED_PROCESS;
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* There is already a console. If we specified
|
2008-11-02 17:11:13 +00:00
|
|
|
* DETACHED_PROCESS here, too, Windows would
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
* disassociate the child from the console.
|
2008-11-02 17:11:13 +00:00
|
|
|
* The same is true for CREATE_NO_WINDOW.
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
* Go figure!
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(cons);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(&si, 0, sizeof(si));
|
|
|
|
si.cb = sizeof(si);
|
|
|
|
si.dwFlags = STARTF_USESTDHANDLES;
|
Win32: Thread-safe windows console output
Winansi.c has many static variables that are accessed and modified from
the [v][f]printf / fputs functions overridden in the file. This may cause
multi threaded git commands that print to the console to produce corrupted
output or even crash.
Additionally, winansi.c doesn't override all functions that can be used to
print to the console (e.g. fwrite, write, fputc are missing), so that ANSI
escapes don't work properly for some git commands (e.g. git-grep).
Instead of doing ANSI emulation in just a few wrapped functions on top of
the IO API, let's plug into the IO system and take advantage of the thread
safety inherent to the IO system.
Redirect stdout and stderr to a pipe if they point to the console. A
background thread reads from the pipe, handles ANSI escape sequences and
UTF-8 to UTF-16 conversion, then writes to the console.
The pipe-based stdout and stderr replacements must be set to unbuffered, as
MSVCRT doesn't support line buffering and fully buffered streams are
inappropriate for console output.
Due to the byte-oriented pipe, ANSI escape sequences and multi-byte UTF-8
sequences can no longer be expected to arrive in one piece. Replace the
string-based ansi_emulate() with a simple stateful parser (this also fixes
colored diff hunk headers, which were broken as of commit 2efcc977).
Override isatty to return true for the pipes redirecting to the console.
Exec/spawn obtain the original console handle to pass to the next process
via winansi_get_osfhandle().
All other overrides are gone, the default stdio implementations work as
expected with the piped stdout/stderr descriptors.
Global variables are either initialized on startup (single threaded) or
exclusively modified by the background thread. Threads communicate through
the pipe, no further synchronization is necessary.
The background thread is terminated by disonnecting the pipe after flushing
the stdio and pipe buffers. This doesn't work for anonymous pipes (created
via CreatePipe), as DisconnectNamedPipe only works on the read end, which
discards remaining data. Thus we have to setup the pipe manually, with the
write end beeing the server (opened with CreateNamedPipe) and the read end
the client (opened with CreateFile).
Limitations: doesn't track reopened or duped file descriptors, i.e.:
- fdopen(1/2) returns fully buffered streams
- dup(1/2), dup2(1/2) returns normal pipe descriptors (i.e. isatty() =
false, winansi_get_osfhandle won't return the original console handle)
Currently, only the git-format-patch command uses xfdopen(xdup(1)) (see
"realstdout" in builtin/log.c), but works well with these limitations.
Many thanks to Atsushi Nakagawa <atnak@chejz.com> for suggesting and
reviewing the thread-exit-mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Karsten Blees <blees@dcon.de>
Signed-off-by: Stepan Kasal <kasal@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2012-01-14 21:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
si.hStdInput = winansi_get_osfhandle(fhin);
|
|
|
|
si.hStdOutput = winansi_get_osfhandle(fhout);
|
|
|
|
si.hStdError = winansi_get_osfhandle(fherr);
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-01-16 17:27:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wcmd, cmd) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (dir && xutftowcs_path(wdir, dir) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* concatenate argv, quoting args as we go */
|
|
|
|
strbuf_init(&args, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (prepend_cmd) {
|
|
|
|
char *quoted = (char *)quote_arg(cmd);
|
|
|
|
strbuf_addstr(&args, quoted);
|
|
|
|
if (quoted != cmd)
|
|
|
|
free(quoted);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (; *argv; argv++) {
|
|
|
|
char *quoted = (char *)quote_arg(*argv);
|
|
|
|
if (*args.buf)
|
|
|
|
strbuf_addch(&args, ' ');
|
|
|
|
strbuf_addstr(&args, quoted);
|
|
|
|
if (quoted != *argv)
|
|
|
|
free(quoted);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-29 10:02:59 +00:00
|
|
|
ALLOC_ARRAY(wargs, st_add(st_mult(2, args.len), 1));
|
2011-01-16 17:27:53 +00:00
|
|
|
xutftowcs(wargs, args.buf, 2 * args.len + 1);
|
|
|
|
strbuf_release(&args);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:01 +00:00
|
|
|
wenvblk = make_environment_block(deltaenv);
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi));
|
2011-01-16 17:27:53 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = CreateProcessW(wcmd, wargs, NULL, NULL, TRUE, flags,
|
2014-07-17 15:37:55 +00:00
|
|
|
wenvblk, dir ? wdir : NULL, &si, &pi);
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:37:55 +00:00
|
|
|
free(wenvblk);
|
2011-01-16 17:27:53 +00:00
|
|
|
free(wargs);
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ret) {
|
|
|
|
errno = ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
|
2010-11-04 01:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The process ID is the human-readable identifier of the process
|
|
|
|
* that we want to present in log and error messages. The handle
|
|
|
|
* is not useful for this purpose. But we cannot close it, either,
|
|
|
|
* because it is not possible to turn a process ID into a process
|
|
|
|
* handle after the process terminated.
|
|
|
|
* Keep the handle in a list for waitpid.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
EnterCriticalSection(&pinfo_cs);
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct pinfo_t *info = xmalloc(sizeof(struct pinfo_t));
|
|
|
|
info->pid = pi.dwProcessId;
|
|
|
|
info->proc = pi.hProcess;
|
|
|
|
info->next = pinfo;
|
|
|
|
pinfo = info;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LeaveCriticalSection(&pinfo_cs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (pid_t)pi.dwProcessId;
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-11-25 20:33:17 +00:00
|
|
|
static pid_t mingw_spawnv(const char *cmd, const char **argv, int prepend_cmd)
|
Windows: avoid the "dup dance" when spawning a child process
When stdin, stdout, or stderr must be redirected for a child process that
on Windows is spawned using one of the spawn() functions of Microsoft's
C runtime, then there is no choice other than to
1. make a backup copy of fd 0,1,2 with dup
2. dup2 the redirection source fd into 0,1,2
3. spawn
4. dup2 the backup back into 0,1,2
5. close the backup copy and the redirection source
We used this idiom as well -- but we are not using the spawn() functions
anymore!
Instead, we have our own implementation. We had hardcoded that stdin,
stdout, and stderr of the child process were inherited from the parent's
fds 0, 1, and 2. But we can actually specify any fd.
With this patch, the fds to inherit are passed from start_command()'s
WIN32 section to our spawn implementation. This way, we can avoid the
backup copies of the fds.
The backup copies were a bug waiting to surface: The OS handles underlying
the dup()ed fds were inherited by the child process (but were not
associated with a file descriptor in the child). Consequently, the file or
pipe represented by the OS handle remained open even after the backup copy
was closed in the parent process until the child exited.
Since our implementation of pipe() creates non-inheritable OS handles, we
still dup() file descriptors in start_command() because dup() happens to
create inheritable duplicates. (A nice side effect is that the fd cleanup
in start_command is the same for Windows and Unix and remains unchanged.)
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-01-15 20:12:18 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-17 15:38:01 +00:00
|
|
|
return mingw_spawnve_fd(cmd, argv, NULL, NULL, prepend_cmd, 0, 1, 2);
|
Windows: avoid the "dup dance" when spawning a child process
When stdin, stdout, or stderr must be redirected for a child process that
on Windows is spawned using one of the spawn() functions of Microsoft's
C runtime, then there is no choice other than to
1. make a backup copy of fd 0,1,2 with dup
2. dup2 the redirection source fd into 0,1,2
3. spawn
4. dup2 the backup back into 0,1,2
5. close the backup copy and the redirection source
We used this idiom as well -- but we are not using the spawn() functions
anymore!
Instead, we have our own implementation. We had hardcoded that stdin,
stdout, and stderr of the child process were inherited from the parent's
fds 0, 1, and 2. But we can actually specify any fd.
With this patch, the fds to inherit are passed from start_command()'s
WIN32 section to our spawn implementation. This way, we can avoid the
backup copies of the fds.
The backup copies were a bug waiting to surface: The OS handles underlying
the dup()ed fds were inherited by the child process (but were not
associated with a file descriptor in the child). Consequently, the file or
pipe represented by the OS handle remained open even after the backup copy
was closed in the parent process until the child exited.
Since our implementation of pipe() creates non-inheritable OS handles, we
still dup() file descriptors in start_command() because dup() happens to
create inheritable duplicates. (A nice side effect is that the fd cleanup
in start_command is the same for Windows and Unix and remains unchanged.)
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-01-15 20:12:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:01 +00:00
|
|
|
pid_t mingw_spawnvpe(const char *cmd, const char **argv, char **deltaenv,
|
2010-04-11 20:40:12 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *dir,
|
Windows: avoid the "dup dance" when spawning a child process
When stdin, stdout, or stderr must be redirected for a child process that
on Windows is spawned using one of the spawn() functions of Microsoft's
C runtime, then there is no choice other than to
1. make a backup copy of fd 0,1,2 with dup
2. dup2 the redirection source fd into 0,1,2
3. spawn
4. dup2 the backup back into 0,1,2
5. close the backup copy and the redirection source
We used this idiom as well -- but we are not using the spawn() functions
anymore!
Instead, we have our own implementation. We had hardcoded that stdin,
stdout, and stderr of the child process were inherited from the parent's
fds 0, 1, and 2. But we can actually specify any fd.
With this patch, the fds to inherit are passed from start_command()'s
WIN32 section to our spawn implementation. This way, we can avoid the
backup copies of the fds.
The backup copies were a bug waiting to surface: The OS handles underlying
the dup()ed fds were inherited by the child process (but were not
associated with a file descriptor in the child). Consequently, the file or
pipe represented by the OS handle remained open even after the backup copy
was closed in the parent process until the child exited.
Since our implementation of pipe() creates non-inheritable OS handles, we
still dup() file descriptors in start_command() because dup() happens to
create inheritable duplicates. (A nice side effect is that the fd cleanup
in start_command is the same for Windows and Unix and remains unchanged.)
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-01-15 20:12:18 +00:00
|
|
|
int fhin, int fhout, int fherr)
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid;
|
2017-05-20 19:35:37 +00:00
|
|
|
char *prog = path_lookup(cmd, 0);
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!prog) {
|
|
|
|
errno = ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
pid = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
const char *interpr = parse_interpreter(prog);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (interpr) {
|
|
|
|
const char *argv0 = argv[0];
|
2017-05-20 19:35:37 +00:00
|
|
|
char *iprog = path_lookup(interpr, 1);
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
argv[0] = prog;
|
|
|
|
if (!iprog) {
|
|
|
|
errno = ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
pid = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else {
|
2014-07-17 15:38:01 +00:00
|
|
|
pid = mingw_spawnve_fd(iprog, argv, deltaenv, dir, 1,
|
Windows: avoid the "dup dance" when spawning a child process
When stdin, stdout, or stderr must be redirected for a child process that
on Windows is spawned using one of the spawn() functions of Microsoft's
C runtime, then there is no choice other than to
1. make a backup copy of fd 0,1,2 with dup
2. dup2 the redirection source fd into 0,1,2
3. spawn
4. dup2 the backup back into 0,1,2
5. close the backup copy and the redirection source
We used this idiom as well -- but we are not using the spawn() functions
anymore!
Instead, we have our own implementation. We had hardcoded that stdin,
stdout, and stderr of the child process were inherited from the parent's
fds 0, 1, and 2. But we can actually specify any fd.
With this patch, the fds to inherit are passed from start_command()'s
WIN32 section to our spawn implementation. This way, we can avoid the
backup copies of the fds.
The backup copies were a bug waiting to surface: The OS handles underlying
the dup()ed fds were inherited by the child process (but were not
associated with a file descriptor in the child). Consequently, the file or
pipe represented by the OS handle remained open even after the backup copy
was closed in the parent process until the child exited.
Since our implementation of pipe() creates non-inheritable OS handles, we
still dup() file descriptors in start_command() because dup() happens to
create inheritable duplicates. (A nice side effect is that the fd cleanup
in start_command is the same for Windows and Unix and remains unchanged.)
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-01-15 20:12:18 +00:00
|
|
|
fhin, fhout, fherr);
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
free(iprog);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
argv[0] = argv0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
2014-07-17 15:38:01 +00:00
|
|
|
pid = mingw_spawnve_fd(prog, argv, deltaenv, dir, 0,
|
Windows: avoid the "dup dance" when spawning a child process
When stdin, stdout, or stderr must be redirected for a child process that
on Windows is spawned using one of the spawn() functions of Microsoft's
C runtime, then there is no choice other than to
1. make a backup copy of fd 0,1,2 with dup
2. dup2 the redirection source fd into 0,1,2
3. spawn
4. dup2 the backup back into 0,1,2
5. close the backup copy and the redirection source
We used this idiom as well -- but we are not using the spawn() functions
anymore!
Instead, we have our own implementation. We had hardcoded that stdin,
stdout, and stderr of the child process were inherited from the parent's
fds 0, 1, and 2. But we can actually specify any fd.
With this patch, the fds to inherit are passed from start_command()'s
WIN32 section to our spawn implementation. This way, we can avoid the
backup copies of the fds.
The backup copies were a bug waiting to surface: The OS handles underlying
the dup()ed fds were inherited by the child process (but were not
associated with a file descriptor in the child). Consequently, the file or
pipe represented by the OS handle remained open even after the backup copy
was closed in the parent process until the child exited.
Since our implementation of pipe() creates non-inheritable OS handles, we
still dup() file descriptors in start_command() because dup() happens to
create inheritable duplicates. (A nice side effect is that the fd cleanup
in start_command is the same for Windows and Unix and remains unchanged.)
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-01-15 20:12:18 +00:00
|
|
|
fhin, fhout, fherr);
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
free(prog);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return pid;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-11-25 20:33:17 +00:00
|
|
|
static int try_shell_exec(const char *cmd, char *const *argv)
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *interpr = parse_interpreter(cmd);
|
|
|
|
char *prog;
|
|
|
|
int pid = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!interpr)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-05-20 19:35:37 +00:00
|
|
|
prog = path_lookup(interpr, 1);
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (prog) {
|
|
|
|
int argc = 0;
|
|
|
|
const char **argv2;
|
|
|
|
while (argv[argc]) argc++;
|
2016-02-22 22:44:25 +00:00
|
|
|
ALLOC_ARRAY(argv2, argc + 1);
|
2007-11-24 21:49:16 +00:00
|
|
|
argv2[0] = (char *)cmd; /* full path to the script file */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&argv2[1], &argv[1], sizeof(*argv) * argc);
|
2011-11-25 20:33:17 +00:00
|
|
|
pid = mingw_spawnv(prog, argv2, 1);
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pid >= 0) {
|
|
|
|
int status;
|
|
|
|
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
|
|
|
|
status = 255;
|
|
|
|
exit(status);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pid = 1; /* indicate that we tried but failed */
|
|
|
|
free(prog);
|
|
|
|
free(argv2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return pid;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-11-25 20:33:17 +00:00
|
|
|
int mingw_execv(const char *cmd, char *const *argv)
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* check if git_command is a shell script */
|
2011-11-25 20:33:17 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!try_shell_exec(cmd, argv)) {
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int pid, status;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-11-25 20:33:17 +00:00
|
|
|
pid = mingw_spawnv(cmd, (const char **)argv, 0);
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pid < 0)
|
2012-05-29 02:21:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
|
|
|
|
status = 255;
|
|
|
|
exit(status);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-05-29 02:21:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-05 17:48:46 +00:00
|
|
|
int mingw_execvp(const char *cmd, char *const *argv)
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-05-20 19:35:37 +00:00
|
|
|
char *prog = path_lookup(cmd, 0);
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prog) {
|
2011-11-25 20:33:17 +00:00
|
|
|
mingw_execv(prog, argv);
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
free(prog);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
errno = ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-05 17:48:46 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2007-12-04 11:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-04 01:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
int mingw_kill(pid_t pid, int sig)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (pid > 0 && sig == SIGTERM) {
|
|
|
|
HANDLE h = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE, FALSE, pid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (TerminateProcess(h, -1)) {
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(h);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
errno = err_win_to_posix(GetLastError());
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(h);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2013-08-08 11:05:38 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (pid > 0 && sig == 0) {
|
|
|
|
HANDLE h = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid);
|
|
|
|
if (h) {
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(h);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-11-04 01:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Compare environment entries by key (i.e. stopping at '=' or '\0').
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int compareenv(const void *v1, const void *v2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *e1 = *(const char**)v1;
|
|
|
|
const char *e2 = *(const char**)v2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
int c1 = *e1++;
|
|
|
|
int c2 = *e2++;
|
|
|
|
c1 = (c1 == '=') ? 0 : tolower(c1);
|
|
|
|
c2 = (c2 == '=') ? 0 : tolower(c2);
|
|
|
|
if (c1 > c2)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (c1 < c2)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (c1 == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-07 21:08:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:04 +00:00
|
|
|
static int bsearchenv(char **env, const char *name, size_t size)
|
2007-12-07 21:08:59 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-17 15:38:04 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned low = 0, high = size;
|
|
|
|
while (low < high) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned mid = low + ((high - low) >> 1);
|
|
|
|
int cmp = compareenv(&env[mid], &name);
|
|
|
|
if (cmp < 0)
|
|
|
|
low = mid + 1;
|
|
|
|
else if (cmp > 0)
|
|
|
|
high = mid;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return mid;
|
2007-12-07 21:08:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-07-17 15:38:04 +00:00
|
|
|
return ~low; /* not found, return 1's complement of insert position */
|
2007-12-07 21:08:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If name contains '=', then sets the variable, otherwise it unsets it
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* Size includes the terminating NULL. Env must have room for size + 1 entries
|
|
|
|
* (in case of insert). Returns the new size. Optionally frees removed entries.
|
2007-12-07 21:08:59 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
static int do_putenv(char **env, const char *name, int size, int free_old)
|
2007-12-07 21:08:59 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-17 15:38:04 +00:00
|
|
|
int i = bsearchenv(env, name, size - 1);
|
2007-12-07 21:08:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/* optionally free removed / replaced entry */
|
|
|
|
if (i >= 0 && free_old)
|
2007-12-07 21:08:59 +00:00
|
|
|
free(env[i]);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (strchr(name, '=')) {
|
|
|
|
/* if new value ('key=value') is specified, insert or replace entry */
|
|
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
|
|
i = ~i;
|
|
|
|
memmove(&env[i + 1], &env[i], (size - i) * sizeof(char*));
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
size++;
|
2007-12-07 21:08:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-07-17 15:38:04 +00:00
|
|
|
env[i] = (char*) name;
|
|
|
|
} else if (i >= 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* otherwise ('key') remove existing entry */
|
|
|
|
size--;
|
|
|
|
memmove(&env[i], &env[i + 1], (size - i) * sizeof(char*));
|
2007-12-07 21:08:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return size;
|
2009-09-11 17:40:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:05 +00:00
|
|
|
char *mingw_getenv(const char *name)
|
2011-06-06 07:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-17 15:38:04 +00:00
|
|
|
char *value;
|
|
|
|
int pos = bsearchenv(environ, name, environ_size - 1);
|
|
|
|
if (pos < 0)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
value = strchr(environ[pos], '=');
|
|
|
|
return value ? &value[1] : NULL;
|
2011-06-06 07:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:37:56 +00:00
|
|
|
int mingw_putenv(const char *namevalue)
|
2011-06-06 07:06:02 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ALLOC_GROW(environ, (environ_size + 1) * sizeof(char*), environ_alloc);
|
|
|
|
environ_size = do_putenv(environ, namevalue, environ_size, 1);
|
2014-07-17 15:37:56 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-06-06 07:06:02 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Note, this isn't a complete replacement for getaddrinfo. It assumes
|
2011-04-13 15:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
* that service contains a numerical port, or that it is null. It
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* does a simple search using gethostbyname, and returns one IPv4 host
|
|
|
|
* if one was found.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int WSAAPI getaddrinfo_stub(const char *node, const char *service,
|
|
|
|
const struct addrinfo *hints,
|
|
|
|
struct addrinfo **res)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-11-04 01:35:18 +00:00
|
|
|
struct hostent *h = NULL;
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
struct addrinfo *ai;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-04 01:35:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (node) {
|
|
|
|
h = gethostbyname(node);
|
|
|
|
if (!h)
|
|
|
|
return WSAGetLastError();
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ai = xmalloc(sizeof(struct addrinfo));
|
|
|
|
*res = ai;
|
|
|
|
ai->ai_flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
ai->ai_family = AF_INET;
|
2010-11-04 01:35:18 +00:00
|
|
|
ai->ai_socktype = hints ? hints->ai_socktype : 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (ai->ai_socktype) {
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
case SOCK_STREAM:
|
|
|
|
ai->ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SOCK_DGRAM:
|
|
|
|
ai->ai_protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
ai->ai_protocol = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
|
2010-11-04 01:35:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (hints && (hints->ai_flags & AI_CANONNAME))
|
2011-10-06 18:22:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ai->ai_canonname = h ? xstrdup(h->h_name) : NULL;
|
2010-11-04 01:35:18 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ai->ai_canonname = NULL;
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-19 13:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
sin = xcalloc(1, ai->ai_addrlen);
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
|
2010-11-04 01:35:18 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Note: getaddrinfo is supposed to allow service to be a string,
|
|
|
|
* which should be looked up using getservbyname. This is
|
|
|
|
* currently not implemented */
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (service)
|
|
|
|
sin->sin_port = htons(atoi(service));
|
2010-11-04 01:35:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (h)
|
|
|
|
sin->sin_addr = *(struct in_addr *)h->h_addr;
|
|
|
|
else if (hints && (hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE))
|
|
|
|
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_LOOPBACK;
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)sin;
|
2013-04-27 19:18:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ai->ai_next = NULL;
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void WSAAPI freeaddrinfo_stub(struct addrinfo *res)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
free(res->ai_canonname);
|
|
|
|
free(res->ai_addr);
|
|
|
|
free(res);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int WSAAPI getnameinfo_stub(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen,
|
|
|
|
char *host, DWORD hostlen,
|
|
|
|
char *serv, DWORD servlen, int flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
|
|
|
|
if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET)
|
|
|
|
return EAI_FAMILY;
|
|
|
|
if (!host && !serv)
|
|
|
|
return EAI_NONAME;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (host && hostlen > 0) {
|
|
|
|
struct hostent *ent = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!(flags & NI_NUMERICHOST))
|
|
|
|
ent = gethostbyaddr((const char *)&sin->sin_addr,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(sin->sin_addr), AF_INET);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ent)
|
|
|
|
snprintf(host, hostlen, "%s", ent->h_name);
|
|
|
|
else if (flags & NI_NAMEREQD)
|
|
|
|
return EAI_NONAME;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
snprintf(host, hostlen, "%s", inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (serv && servlen > 0) {
|
|
|
|
struct servent *ent = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!(flags & NI_NUMERICSERV))
|
|
|
|
ent = getservbyport(sin->sin_port,
|
|
|
|
flags & NI_DGRAM ? "udp" : "tcp");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ent)
|
|
|
|
snprintf(serv, servlen, "%s", ent->s_name);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
snprintf(serv, servlen, "%d", ntohs(sin->sin_port));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static HMODULE ipv6_dll = NULL;
|
|
|
|
static void (WSAAPI *ipv6_freeaddrinfo)(struct addrinfo *res);
|
|
|
|
static int (WSAAPI *ipv6_getaddrinfo)(const char *node, const char *service,
|
|
|
|
const struct addrinfo *hints,
|
|
|
|
struct addrinfo **res);
|
|
|
|
static int (WSAAPI *ipv6_getnameinfo)(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen,
|
|
|
|
char *host, DWORD hostlen,
|
|
|
|
char *serv, DWORD servlen, int flags);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* gai_strerror is an inline function in the ws2tcpip.h header, so we
|
|
|
|
* don't need to try to load that one dynamically.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void socket_cleanup(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WSACleanup();
|
|
|
|
if (ipv6_dll)
|
|
|
|
FreeLibrary(ipv6_dll);
|
|
|
|
ipv6_dll = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ipv6_freeaddrinfo = freeaddrinfo_stub;
|
|
|
|
ipv6_getaddrinfo = getaddrinfo_stub;
|
|
|
|
ipv6_getnameinfo = getnameinfo_stub;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-11-23 22:55:12 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ensure_socket_initialization(void)
|
2007-12-26 12:51:18 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WSADATA wsa;
|
2009-11-23 22:55:12 +00:00
|
|
|
static int initialized = 0;
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *libraries[] = { "ws2_32.dll", "wship6.dll", NULL };
|
|
|
|
const char **name;
|
2009-11-23 22:55:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (initialized)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-12-26 12:51:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsa))
|
|
|
|
die("unable to initialize winsock subsystem, error %d",
|
|
|
|
WSAGetLastError());
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (name = libraries; *name; name++) {
|
|
|
|
ipv6_dll = LoadLibrary(*name);
|
|
|
|
if (!ipv6_dll)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ipv6_freeaddrinfo = (void (WSAAPI *)(struct addrinfo *))
|
|
|
|
GetProcAddress(ipv6_dll, "freeaddrinfo");
|
|
|
|
ipv6_getaddrinfo = (int (WSAAPI *)(const char *, const char *,
|
|
|
|
const struct addrinfo *,
|
|
|
|
struct addrinfo **))
|
|
|
|
GetProcAddress(ipv6_dll, "getaddrinfo");
|
|
|
|
ipv6_getnameinfo = (int (WSAAPI *)(const struct sockaddr *,
|
|
|
|
socklen_t, char *, DWORD,
|
|
|
|
char *, DWORD, int))
|
|
|
|
GetProcAddress(ipv6_dll, "getnameinfo");
|
|
|
|
if (!ipv6_freeaddrinfo || !ipv6_getaddrinfo || !ipv6_getnameinfo) {
|
|
|
|
FreeLibrary(ipv6_dll);
|
|
|
|
ipv6_dll = NULL;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ipv6_freeaddrinfo || !ipv6_getaddrinfo || !ipv6_getnameinfo) {
|
|
|
|
ipv6_freeaddrinfo = freeaddrinfo_stub;
|
|
|
|
ipv6_getaddrinfo = getaddrinfo_stub;
|
|
|
|
ipv6_getnameinfo = getnameinfo_stub;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
atexit(socket_cleanup);
|
2009-11-23 22:55:12 +00:00
|
|
|
initialized = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-10-15 14:05:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#undef gethostname
|
|
|
|
int mingw_gethostname(char *name, int namelen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ensure_socket_initialization();
|
|
|
|
return gethostname(name, namelen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-11-23 22:55:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#undef gethostbyname
|
|
|
|
struct hostent *mingw_gethostbyname(const char *host)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ensure_socket_initialization();
|
2007-12-26 12:51:18 +00:00
|
|
|
return gethostbyname(host);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-11-23 22:55:50 +00:00
|
|
|
void mingw_freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *res)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ipv6_freeaddrinfo(res);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int mingw_getaddrinfo(const char *node, const char *service,
|
|
|
|
const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ensure_socket_initialization();
|
|
|
|
return ipv6_getaddrinfo(node, service, hints, res);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int mingw_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen,
|
|
|
|
char *host, DWORD hostlen, char *serv, DWORD servlen,
|
|
|
|
int flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ensure_socket_initialization();
|
|
|
|
return ipv6_getnameinfo(sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-26 12:51:18 +00:00
|
|
|
int mingw_socket(int domain, int type, int protocol)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int sockfd;
|
2010-11-04 01:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
SOCKET s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ensure_socket_initialization();
|
|
|
|
s = WSASocket(domain, type, protocol, NULL, 0, 0);
|
2007-12-26 12:51:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s == INVALID_SOCKET) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* WSAGetLastError() values are regular BSD error codes
|
|
|
|
* biased by WSABASEERR.
|
|
|
|
* However, strerror() does not know about networking
|
|
|
|
* specific errors, which are values beginning at 38 or so.
|
|
|
|
* Therefore, we choose to leave the biased error code
|
|
|
|
* in errno so that _if_ someone looks up the code somewhere,
|
|
|
|
* then it is at least the number that are usually listed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
errno = WSAGetLastError();
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* convert into a file descriptor */
|
|
|
|
if ((sockfd = _open_osfhandle(s, O_RDWR|O_BINARY)) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
closesocket(s);
|
|
|
|
return error("unable to make a socket file descriptor: %s",
|
|
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return sockfd;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#undef connect
|
|
|
|
int mingw_connect(int sockfd, struct sockaddr *sa, size_t sz)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SOCKET s = (SOCKET)_get_osfhandle(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
return connect(s, sa, sz);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-04 01:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
#undef bind
|
|
|
|
int mingw_bind(int sockfd, struct sockaddr *sa, size_t sz)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SOCKET s = (SOCKET)_get_osfhandle(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
return bind(s, sa, sz);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#undef setsockopt
|
|
|
|
int mingw_setsockopt(int sockfd, int lvl, int optname, void *optval, int optlen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SOCKET s = (SOCKET)_get_osfhandle(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
return setsockopt(s, lvl, optname, (const char*)optval, optlen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-18 20:24:37 +00:00
|
|
|
#undef shutdown
|
|
|
|
int mingw_shutdown(int sockfd, int how)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SOCKET s = (SOCKET)_get_osfhandle(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
return shutdown(s, how);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-04 01:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
#undef listen
|
|
|
|
int mingw_listen(int sockfd, int backlog)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SOCKET s = (SOCKET)_get_osfhandle(sockfd);
|
|
|
|
return listen(s, backlog);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#undef accept
|
|
|
|
int mingw_accept(int sockfd1, struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t *sz)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int sockfd2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SOCKET s1 = (SOCKET)_get_osfhandle(sockfd1);
|
|
|
|
SOCKET s2 = accept(s1, sa, sz);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* convert into a file descriptor */
|
|
|
|
if ((sockfd2 = _open_osfhandle(s2, O_RDWR|O_BINARY)) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
int err = errno;
|
|
|
|
closesocket(s2);
|
|
|
|
return error("unable to make a socket file descriptor: %s",
|
|
|
|
strerror(err));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return sockfd2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-07 21:19:40 +00:00
|
|
|
#undef rename
|
|
|
|
int mingw_rename(const char *pold, const char *pnew)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-04-03 06:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
DWORD attrs, gle;
|
|
|
|
int tries = 0;
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
wchar_t wpold[MAX_PATH], wpnew[MAX_PATH];
|
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(wpold, pold) < 0 || xutftowcs_path(wpnew, pnew) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2008-11-19 16:25:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-12-07 21:19:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Try native rename() first to get errno right.
|
|
|
|
* It is based on MoveFile(), which cannot overwrite existing files.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!_wrename(wpold, wpnew))
|
2007-12-07 21:19:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (errno != EEXIST)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2009-04-03 06:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
repeat:
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (MoveFileExW(wpold, wpnew, MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING))
|
2007-12-07 21:19:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: translate more errors */
|
2009-04-03 06:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
gle = GetLastError();
|
|
|
|
if (gle == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED &&
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
(attrs = GetFileAttributesW(wpnew)) != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
|
2008-11-19 16:25:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (attrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) {
|
2016-01-26 14:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
DWORD attrsold = GetFileAttributesW(wpold);
|
|
|
|
if (attrsold == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES ||
|
|
|
|
!(attrsold & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY))
|
|
|
|
errno = EISDIR;
|
|
|
|
else if (!_wrmdir(wpnew))
|
|
|
|
goto repeat;
|
2007-12-07 21:19:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-11-19 16:25:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((attrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY) &&
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
SetFileAttributesW(wpnew, attrs & ~FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY)) {
|
|
|
|
if (MoveFileExW(wpold, wpnew, MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING))
|
2008-11-19 16:25:27 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-04-03 06:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
gle = GetLastError();
|
2008-11-19 16:25:27 +00:00
|
|
|
/* revert file attributes on failure */
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
SetFileAttributesW(wpnew, attrs);
|
2008-11-19 16:25:27 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-07 21:19:40 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-04-03 06:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tries < ARRAY_SIZE(delay) && gle == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We assume that some other process had the source or
|
|
|
|
* destination file open at the wrong moment and retry.
|
|
|
|
* In order to give the other process a higher chance to
|
|
|
|
* complete its operation, we give up our time slice now.
|
|
|
|
* If we have to retry again, we do sleep a bit.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
Sleep(delay[tries]);
|
|
|
|
tries++;
|
|
|
|
goto repeat;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-07 20:51:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (gle == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED &&
|
|
|
|
ask_yes_no_if_possible("Rename from '%s' to '%s' failed. "
|
|
|
|
"Should I try again?", pold, pnew))
|
|
|
|
goto repeat;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-07 21:19:40 +00:00
|
|
|
errno = EACCES;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-11-07 20:10:31 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Note that this doesn't return the actual pagesize, but
|
|
|
|
* the allocation granularity. If future Windows specific git code
|
|
|
|
* needs the real getpagesize function, we need to find another solution.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int mingw_getpagesize(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SYSTEM_INFO si;
|
|
|
|
GetSystemInfo(&si);
|
|
|
|
return si.dwAllocationGranularity;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
struct passwd *getpwuid(int uid)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2007-12-01 21:09:17 +00:00
|
|
|
static char user_name[100];
|
2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct passwd p;
|
2007-12-01 21:09:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DWORD len = sizeof(user_name);
|
|
|
|
if (!GetUserName(user_name, &len))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
p.pw_name = user_name;
|
|
|
|
p.pw_gecos = "unknown";
|
|
|
|
p.pw_dir = NULL;
|
2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
return &p;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-13 09:14:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static HANDLE timer_event;
|
|
|
|
static HANDLE timer_thread;
|
|
|
|
static int timer_interval;
|
|
|
|
static int one_shot;
|
2012-12-04 08:10:38 +00:00
|
|
|
static sig_handler_t timer_fn = SIG_DFL, sigint_fn = SIG_DFL;
|
2007-11-13 09:14:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The timer works like this:
|
|
|
|
* The thread, ticktack(), is a trivial routine that most of the time
|
|
|
|
* only waits to receive the signal to terminate. The main thread tells
|
|
|
|
* the thread to terminate by setting the timer_event to the signalled
|
|
|
|
* state.
|
|
|
|
* But ticktack() interrupts the wait state after the timer's interval
|
|
|
|
* length to call the signal handler.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-16 08:20:21 +00:00
|
|
|
static unsigned __stdcall ticktack(void *dummy)
|
2007-11-13 09:14:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
while (WaitForSingleObject(timer_event, timer_interval) == WAIT_TIMEOUT) {
|
2012-12-04 08:10:38 +00:00
|
|
|
mingw_raise(SIGALRM);
|
2007-11-13 09:14:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (one_shot)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int start_timer_thread(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
timer_event = CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (timer_event) {
|
|
|
|
timer_thread = (HANDLE) _beginthreadex(NULL, 0, ticktack, NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!timer_thread )
|
|
|
|
return errno = ENOMEM,
|
|
|
|
error("cannot start timer thread");
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
return errno = ENOMEM,
|
|
|
|
error("cannot allocate resources for timer");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void stop_timer_thread(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (timer_event)
|
|
|
|
SetEvent(timer_event); /* tell thread to terminate */
|
|
|
|
if (timer_thread) {
|
|
|
|
int rc = WaitForSingleObject(timer_thread, 1000);
|
|
|
|
if (rc == WAIT_TIMEOUT)
|
|
|
|
error("timer thread did not terminate timely");
|
|
|
|
else if (rc != WAIT_OBJECT_0)
|
|
|
|
error("waiting for timer thread failed: %lu",
|
|
|
|
GetLastError());
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(timer_thread);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (timer_event)
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(timer_event);
|
|
|
|
timer_event = NULL;
|
|
|
|
timer_thread = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int is_timeval_eq(const struct timeval *i1, const struct timeval *i2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return i1->tv_sec == i2->tv_sec && i1->tv_usec == i2->tv_usec;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
int setitimer(int type, struct itimerval *in, struct itimerval *out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2007-11-13 09:14:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct timeval zero;
|
|
|
|
static int atexit_done;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (out != NULL)
|
|
|
|
return errno = EINVAL,
|
|
|
|
error("setitimer param 3 != NULL not implemented");
|
|
|
|
if (!is_timeval_eq(&in->it_interval, &zero) &&
|
|
|
|
!is_timeval_eq(&in->it_interval, &in->it_value))
|
|
|
|
return errno = EINVAL,
|
|
|
|
error("setitimer: it_interval must be zero or eq it_value");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (timer_thread)
|
|
|
|
stop_timer_thread();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (is_timeval_eq(&in->it_value, &zero) &&
|
|
|
|
is_timeval_eq(&in->it_interval, &zero))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
timer_interval = in->it_value.tv_sec * 1000 + in->it_value.tv_usec / 1000;
|
|
|
|
one_shot = is_timeval_eq(&in->it_interval, &zero);
|
|
|
|
if (!atexit_done) {
|
|
|
|
atexit(stop_timer_thread);
|
|
|
|
atexit_done = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return start_timer_thread();
|
2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *in, struct sigaction *out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2007-11-13 09:14:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sig != SIGALRM)
|
|
|
|
return errno = EINVAL,
|
|
|
|
error("sigaction only implemented for SIGALRM");
|
|
|
|
if (out != NULL)
|
|
|
|
return errno = EINVAL,
|
|
|
|
error("sigaction: param 3 != NULL not implemented");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
timer_fn = in->sa_handler;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#undef signal
|
|
|
|
sig_handler_t mingw_signal(int sig, sig_handler_t handler)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-06-10 05:48:17 +00:00
|
|
|
sig_handler_t old;
|
2012-12-04 08:10:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (sig) {
|
|
|
|
case SIGALRM:
|
2013-06-10 05:48:17 +00:00
|
|
|
old = timer_fn;
|
2012-12-04 08:10:38 +00:00
|
|
|
timer_fn = handler;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SIGINT:
|
2013-06-10 05:48:17 +00:00
|
|
|
old = sigint_fn;
|
2012-12-04 08:10:38 +00:00
|
|
|
sigint_fn = handler;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2007-11-13 09:14:45 +00:00
|
|
|
return signal(sig, handler);
|
2012-12-04 08:10:38 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-13 09:14:45 +00:00
|
|
|
return old;
|
2007-12-01 20:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-07-13 20:31:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-12-04 08:10:38 +00:00
|
|
|
#undef raise
|
|
|
|
int mingw_raise(int sig)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (sig) {
|
|
|
|
case SIGALRM:
|
|
|
|
if (timer_fn == SIG_DFL) {
|
|
|
|
if (isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
|
|
|
|
fputs("Alarm clock\n", stderr);
|
|
|
|
exit(128 + SIGALRM);
|
|
|
|
} else if (timer_fn != SIG_IGN)
|
|
|
|
timer_fn(SIGALRM);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SIGINT:
|
|
|
|
if (sigint_fn == SIG_DFL)
|
|
|
|
exit(128 + SIGINT);
|
|
|
|
else if (sigint_fn != SIG_IGN)
|
|
|
|
sigint_fn(SIGINT);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return raise(sig);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-24 14:04:39 +00:00
|
|
|
int link(const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef BOOL (WINAPI *T)(LPCWSTR, LPCWSTR, LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES);
|
2009-01-24 14:04:39 +00:00
|
|
|
static T create_hard_link = NULL;
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
wchar_t woldpath[MAX_PATH], wnewpath[MAX_PATH];
|
|
|
|
if (xutftowcs_path(woldpath, oldpath) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
xutftowcs_path(wnewpath, newpath) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-24 14:04:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!create_hard_link) {
|
|
|
|
create_hard_link = (T) GetProcAddress(
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), "CreateHardLinkW");
|
2009-01-24 14:04:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!create_hard_link)
|
|
|
|
create_hard_link = (T)-1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (create_hard_link == (T)-1) {
|
|
|
|
errno = ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-15 17:21:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!create_hard_link(wnewpath, woldpath, NULL)) {
|
2009-01-24 14:04:39 +00:00
|
|
|
errno = err_win_to_posix(GetLastError());
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-05-23 08:04:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-12-08 19:39:57 +00:00
|
|
|
pid_t waitpid(pid_t pid, int *status, int options)
|
2010-11-04 01:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
HANDLE h = OpenProcess(SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
|
|
|
|
FALSE, pid);
|
|
|
|
if (!h) {
|
|
|
|
errno = ECHILD;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-04 01:35:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pid > 0 && options & WNOHANG) {
|
|
|
|
if (WAIT_OBJECT_0 != WaitForSingleObject(h, 0)) {
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(h);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
options &= ~WNOHANG;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-04 01:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (options == 0) {
|
|
|
|
struct pinfo_t **ppinfo;
|
|
|
|
if (WaitForSingleObject(h, INFINITE) != WAIT_OBJECT_0) {
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(h);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (status)
|
|
|
|
GetExitCodeProcess(h, (LPDWORD)status);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EnterCriticalSection(&pinfo_cs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ppinfo = &pinfo;
|
|
|
|
while (*ppinfo) {
|
|
|
|
struct pinfo_t *info = *ppinfo;
|
|
|
|
if (info->pid == pid) {
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(info->proc);
|
|
|
|
*ppinfo = info->next;
|
|
|
|
free(info);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ppinfo = &info->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LeaveCriticalSection(&pinfo_cs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(h);
|
|
|
|
return pid;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(h);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-07-13 14:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-01-25 21:47:56 +00:00
|
|
|
int mingw_skip_dos_drive_prefix(char **path)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = has_dos_drive_prefix(*path);
|
|
|
|
*path += ret;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-13 14:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int mingw_offset_1st_component(const char *path)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-01-12 07:57:22 +00:00
|
|
|
char *pos = (char *)path;
|
2010-07-13 14:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* unc paths */
|
2016-01-12 07:57:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!skip_dos_drive_prefix(&pos) &&
|
|
|
|
is_dir_sep(pos[0]) && is_dir_sep(pos[1])) {
|
2010-07-13 14:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
/* skip server name */
|
2016-01-12 07:57:22 +00:00
|
|
|
pos = strpbrk(pos + 2, "\\/");
|
2010-07-13 14:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pos)
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* Error: malformed unc path */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
pos++;
|
|
|
|
} while (*pos && !is_dir_sep(*pos));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-12 07:57:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return pos + is_dir_sep(*pos) - path;
|
2010-07-13 14:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-01-07 18:47:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-11-25 20:05:06 +00:00
|
|
|
int xutftowcsn(wchar_t *wcs, const char *utfs, size_t wcslen, int utflen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int upos = 0, wpos = 0;
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *utf = (const unsigned char*) utfs;
|
|
|
|
if (!utf || !wcs || wcslen < 1) {
|
|
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* reserve space for \0 */
|
|
|
|
wcslen--;
|
|
|
|
if (utflen < 0)
|
|
|
|
utflen = INT_MAX;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (upos < utflen) {
|
|
|
|
int c = utf[upos++] & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
if (utflen == INT_MAX && c == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (wpos >= wcslen) {
|
|
|
|
wcs[wpos] = 0;
|
|
|
|
errno = ERANGE;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (c < 0x80) {
|
|
|
|
/* ASCII */
|
|
|
|
wcs[wpos++] = c;
|
|
|
|
} else if (c >= 0xc2 && c < 0xe0 && upos < utflen &&
|
|
|
|
(utf[upos] & 0xc0) == 0x80) {
|
|
|
|
/* 2-byte utf-8 */
|
|
|
|
c = ((c & 0x1f) << 6);
|
|
|
|
c |= (utf[upos++] & 0x3f);
|
|
|
|
wcs[wpos++] = c;
|
|
|
|
} else if (c >= 0xe0 && c < 0xf0 && upos + 1 < utflen &&
|
|
|
|
!(c == 0xe0 && utf[upos] < 0xa0) && /* over-long encoding */
|
|
|
|
(utf[upos] & 0xc0) == 0x80 &&
|
|
|
|
(utf[upos + 1] & 0xc0) == 0x80) {
|
|
|
|
/* 3-byte utf-8 */
|
|
|
|
c = ((c & 0x0f) << 12);
|
|
|
|
c |= ((utf[upos++] & 0x3f) << 6);
|
|
|
|
c |= (utf[upos++] & 0x3f);
|
|
|
|
wcs[wpos++] = c;
|
|
|
|
} else if (c >= 0xf0 && c < 0xf5 && upos + 2 < utflen &&
|
|
|
|
wpos + 1 < wcslen &&
|
|
|
|
!(c == 0xf0 && utf[upos] < 0x90) && /* over-long encoding */
|
|
|
|
!(c == 0xf4 && utf[upos] >= 0x90) && /* > \u10ffff */
|
|
|
|
(utf[upos] & 0xc0) == 0x80 &&
|
|
|
|
(utf[upos + 1] & 0xc0) == 0x80 &&
|
|
|
|
(utf[upos + 2] & 0xc0) == 0x80) {
|
|
|
|
/* 4-byte utf-8: convert to \ud8xx \udcxx surrogate pair */
|
|
|
|
c = ((c & 0x07) << 18);
|
|
|
|
c |= ((utf[upos++] & 0x3f) << 12);
|
|
|
|
c |= ((utf[upos++] & 0x3f) << 6);
|
|
|
|
c |= (utf[upos++] & 0x3f);
|
|
|
|
c -= 0x10000;
|
|
|
|
wcs[wpos++] = 0xd800 | (c >> 10);
|
|
|
|
wcs[wpos++] = 0xdc00 | (c & 0x3ff);
|
|
|
|
} else if (c >= 0xa0) {
|
|
|
|
/* invalid utf-8 byte, printable unicode char: convert 1:1 */
|
|
|
|
wcs[wpos++] = c;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* invalid utf-8 byte, non-printable unicode: convert to hex */
|
|
|
|
static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
|
|
|
|
wcs[wpos++] = hex[c >> 4];
|
|
|
|
if (wpos < wcslen)
|
|
|
|
wcs[wpos++] = hex[c & 0x0f];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wcs[wpos] = 0;
|
|
|
|
return wpos;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int xwcstoutf(char *utf, const wchar_t *wcs, size_t utflen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!wcs || !utf || utflen < 1) {
|
|
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
utflen = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, wcs, -1, utf, utflen, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (utflen)
|
|
|
|
return utflen - 1;
|
|
|
|
errno = ERANGE;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-18 12:38:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static void setup_windows_environment(void)
|
2016-01-26 14:34:38 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-01-26 14:34:43 +00:00
|
|
|
char *tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-26 14:34:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/* on Windows it is TMP and TEMP */
|
2016-01-26 14:34:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!tmp) {
|
|
|
|
if (!(tmp = getenv("TMP")))
|
2016-01-26 14:34:38 +00:00
|
|
|
tmp = getenv("TEMP");
|
2016-01-26 14:34:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tmp) {
|
2016-01-26 14:34:38 +00:00
|
|
|
setenv("TMPDIR", tmp, 1);
|
2016-01-26 14:34:43 +00:00
|
|
|
tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tmp) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Convert all dir separators to forward slashes,
|
|
|
|
* to help shell commands called from the Git
|
|
|
|
* executable (by not mistaking the dir separators
|
|
|
|
* for escape characters).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-04-02 19:03:14 +00:00
|
|
|
convert_slashes(tmp);
|
2016-01-26 14:34:38 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* simulate TERM to enable auto-color (see color.c) */
|
|
|
|
if (!getenv("TERM"))
|
|
|
|
setenv("TERM", "cygwin", 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
When creating a directory on Windows whose path ends in a space or a
period (or chains thereof), the Win32 API "helpfully" trims those. For
example, `mkdir("abc ");` will return success, but actually create a
directory called `abc` instead.
This stems back to the DOS days, when all file names had exactly 8
characters plus exactly 3 characters for the file extension, and the
only way to have shorter names was by padding with spaces.
Sadly, this "helpful" behavior is a bit inconsistent: after a successful
`mkdir("abc ");`, a `mkdir("abc /def")` will actually _fail_ (because
the directory `abc ` does not actually exist).
Even if it would work, we now have a serious problem because a Git
repository could contain directories `abc` and `abc `, and on Windows,
they would be "merged" unintentionally.
As these paths are illegal on Windows, anyway, let's disallow any
accesses to such paths on that Operating System.
For practical reasons, this behavior is still guarded by the
config setting `core.protectNTFS`: it is possible (and at least two
regression tests make use of it) to create commits without involving the
worktree. In such a scenario, it is of course possible -- even on
Windows -- to create such file names.
Among other consequences, this patch disallows submodules' paths to end
in spaces on Windows (which would formerly have confused Git enough to
try to write into incorrect paths, anyway).
While this patch does not fix a vulnerability on its own, it prevents an
attack vector that was exploited in demonstrations of a number of
recently-fixed security bugs.
The regression test added to `t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh` reflects
that attack vector.
Note that we have to adjust the test case "prevent git~1 squatting on
Windows" in `t/t7415-submodule-names.sh` because of a very subtle issue.
It tries to clone two submodules whose names differ only in a trailing
period character, and as a consequence their git directories differ in
the same way. Previously, when Git tried to clone the second submodule,
it thought that the git directory already existed (because on Windows,
when you create a directory with the name `b.` it actually creates `b`),
but with this patch, the first submodule's clone will fail because of
the illegal name of the git directory. Therefore, when cloning the
second submodule, Git will take a different code path: a fresh clone
(without an existing git directory). Both code paths fail to clone the
second submodule, both because the the corresponding worktree directory
exists and is not empty, but the error messages are worded differently.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2019-09-05 11:27:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int is_valid_win32_path(const char *path)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int preceding_space_or_period = 0, i = 0, periods = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!protect_ntfs)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
char c = *(path++);
|
|
|
|
switch (c) {
|
|
|
|
case '\0':
|
|
|
|
case '/': case '\\':
|
|
|
|
/* cannot end in ` ` or `.`, except for `.` and `..` */
|
|
|
|
if (preceding_space_or_period &&
|
|
|
|
(i != periods || periods > 2))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!c)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i = periods = preceding_space_or_period = 0;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
case '.':
|
|
|
|
periods++;
|
|
|
|
/* fallthru */
|
|
|
|
case ' ':
|
|
|
|
preceding_space_or_period = 1;
|
|
|
|
i++;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
preceding_space_or_period = 0;
|
|
|
|
i++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-01-07 18:52:20 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Disable MSVCRT command line wildcard expansion (__getmainargs called from
|
|
|
|
* mingw startup code, see init.c in mingw runtime).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int _CRT_glob = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-01-16 17:28:27 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
|
|
int newmode;
|
|
|
|
} _startupinfo;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
extern int __wgetmainargs(int *argc, wchar_t ***argv, wchar_t ***env, int glob,
|
|
|
|
_startupinfo *si);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-18 12:38:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static NORETURN void die_startup(void)
|
2011-01-16 17:28:27 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
fputs("fatal: not enough memory for initialization", stderr);
|
|
|
|
exit(128);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:03 +00:00
|
|
|
static void *malloc_startup(size_t size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
void *result = malloc(size);
|
|
|
|
if (!result)
|
|
|
|
die_startup();
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static char *wcstoutfdup_startup(char *buffer, const wchar_t *wcs, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
len = xwcstoutf(buffer, wcs, len) + 1;
|
|
|
|
return memcpy(malloc_startup(len), buffer, len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-18 12:38:36 +00:00
|
|
|
void mingw_startup(void)
|
2011-01-07 18:47:23 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-17 15:38:03 +00:00
|
|
|
int i, maxlen, argc;
|
2011-01-16 17:28:27 +00:00
|
|
|
char *buffer;
|
|
|
|
wchar_t **wenv, **wargv;
|
|
|
|
_startupinfo si;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get wide char arguments and environment */
|
|
|
|
si.newmode = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (__wgetmainargs(&argc, &wargv, &wenv, _CRT_glob, &si) < 0)
|
|
|
|
die_startup();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* determine size of argv and environ conversion buffer */
|
|
|
|
maxlen = wcslen(_wpgmptr);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
|
|
|
|
maxlen = max(maxlen, wcslen(wargv[i]));
|
2014-07-17 15:37:56 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; wenv[i]; i++)
|
|
|
|
maxlen = max(maxlen, wcslen(wenv[i]));
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:03 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* nedmalloc can't free CRT memory, allocate resizable environment
|
|
|
|
* list. Note that xmalloc / xmemdupz etc. call getenv, so we cannot
|
|
|
|
* use it while initializing the environment itself.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
environ_size = i + 1;
|
2014-07-17 15:38:03 +00:00
|
|
|
environ_alloc = alloc_nr(environ_size * sizeof(char*));
|
|
|
|
environ = malloc_startup(environ_alloc);
|
2011-01-16 17:28:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* allocate buffer (wchar_t encodes to max 3 UTF-8 bytes) */
|
|
|
|
maxlen = 3 * maxlen + 1;
|
2014-07-17 15:38:03 +00:00
|
|
|
buffer = malloc_startup(maxlen);
|
2011-01-16 17:28:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* convert command line arguments and environment to UTF-8 */
|
2014-07-17 15:38:03 +00:00
|
|
|
__argv[0] = wcstoutfdup_startup(buffer, _wpgmptr, maxlen);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
|
|
|
|
__argv[i] = wcstoutfdup_startup(buffer, wargv[i], maxlen);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; wenv[i]; i++)
|
|
|
|
environ[i] = wcstoutfdup_startup(buffer, wenv[i], maxlen);
|
2014-07-17 15:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
environ[i] = NULL;
|
2011-01-16 17:28:27 +00:00
|
|
|
free(buffer);
|
2011-01-07 18:47:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/* sort environment for O(log n) getenv / putenv */
|
|
|
|
qsort(environ, i, sizeof(char*), compareenv);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-17 15:38:05 +00:00
|
|
|
/* fix Windows specific environment settings */
|
2016-01-26 14:34:38 +00:00
|
|
|
setup_windows_environment();
|
2014-07-17 15:38:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-01-07 18:47:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* initialize critical section for waitpid pinfo_t list */
|
|
|
|
InitializeCriticalSection(&pinfo_cs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set up default file mode and file modes for stdin/out/err */
|
|
|
|
_fmode = _O_BINARY;
|
|
|
|
_setmode(_fileno(stdin), _O_BINARY);
|
|
|
|
_setmode(_fileno(stdout), _O_BINARY);
|
|
|
|
_setmode(_fileno(stderr), _O_BINARY);
|
Win32: Thread-safe windows console output
Winansi.c has many static variables that are accessed and modified from
the [v][f]printf / fputs functions overridden in the file. This may cause
multi threaded git commands that print to the console to produce corrupted
output or even crash.
Additionally, winansi.c doesn't override all functions that can be used to
print to the console (e.g. fwrite, write, fputc are missing), so that ANSI
escapes don't work properly for some git commands (e.g. git-grep).
Instead of doing ANSI emulation in just a few wrapped functions on top of
the IO API, let's plug into the IO system and take advantage of the thread
safety inherent to the IO system.
Redirect stdout and stderr to a pipe if they point to the console. A
background thread reads from the pipe, handles ANSI escape sequences and
UTF-8 to UTF-16 conversion, then writes to the console.
The pipe-based stdout and stderr replacements must be set to unbuffered, as
MSVCRT doesn't support line buffering and fully buffered streams are
inappropriate for console output.
Due to the byte-oriented pipe, ANSI escape sequences and multi-byte UTF-8
sequences can no longer be expected to arrive in one piece. Replace the
string-based ansi_emulate() with a simple stateful parser (this also fixes
colored diff hunk headers, which were broken as of commit 2efcc977).
Override isatty to return true for the pipes redirecting to the console.
Exec/spawn obtain the original console handle to pass to the next process
via winansi_get_osfhandle().
All other overrides are gone, the default stdio implementations work as
expected with the piped stdout/stderr descriptors.
Global variables are either initialized on startup (single threaded) or
exclusively modified by the background thread. Threads communicate through
the pipe, no further synchronization is necessary.
The background thread is terminated by disonnecting the pipe after flushing
the stdio and pipe buffers. This doesn't work for anonymous pipes (created
via CreatePipe), as DisconnectNamedPipe only works on the read end, which
discards remaining data. Thus we have to setup the pipe manually, with the
write end beeing the server (opened with CreateNamedPipe) and the read end
the client (opened with CreateFile).
Limitations: doesn't track reopened or duped file descriptors, i.e.:
- fdopen(1/2) returns fully buffered streams
- dup(1/2), dup2(1/2) returns normal pipe descriptors (i.e. isatty() =
false, winansi_get_osfhandle won't return the original console handle)
Currently, only the git-format-patch command uses xfdopen(xdup(1)) (see
"realstdout" in builtin/log.c), but works well with these limitations.
Many thanks to Atsushi Nakagawa <atnak@chejz.com> for suggesting and
reviewing the thread-exit-mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Karsten Blees <blees@dcon.de>
Signed-off-by: Stepan Kasal <kasal@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2012-01-14 21:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* initialize Unicode console */
|
|
|
|
winansi_init();
|
2011-01-07 18:47:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-08 10:12:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int uname(struct utsname *buf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-10-23 06:02:52 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned v = (unsigned)GetVersion();
|
2015-03-08 10:12:45 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(*buf));
|
2015-09-24 21:06:08 +00:00
|
|
|
xsnprintf(buf->sysname, sizeof(buf->sysname), "Windows");
|
|
|
|
xsnprintf(buf->release, sizeof(buf->release),
|
|
|
|
"%u.%u", v & 0xff, (v >> 8) & 0xff);
|
2015-03-08 10:12:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/* assuming NT variants only.. */
|
2015-09-24 21:06:08 +00:00
|
|
|
xsnprintf(buf->version, sizeof(buf->version),
|
|
|
|
"%u", (v >> 16) & 0x7fff);
|
2015-03-08 10:12:45 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|