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git/promisor-remote.c

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#include "git-compat-util.h"
#include "gettext.h"
#include "hex.h"
#include "object-store-ll.h"
#include "promisor-remote.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "trace2.h"
#include "transport.h"
#include "strvec.h"
#include "packfile.h"
#include "environment.h"
struct promisor_remote_config {
struct promisor_remote *promisors;
struct promisor_remote **promisors_tail;
};
static int fetch_objects(struct repository *repo,
const char *remote_name,
const struct object_id *oids,
int oid_nr)
{
struct child_process child = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
int i;
FILE *child_in;
int quiet;
if (git_env_bool(NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENVIRONMENT, 0)) {
upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default The upload-pack command tries to avoid trusting the repository in which it's run (e.g., by not running any hooks and not using any config that contains arbitrary commands). But if the server side of a fetch or a clone is a partial clone, then either upload-pack or its child pack-objects may run a lazy "git fetch" under the hood. And it is very easy to convince fetch to run arbitrary commands. The "server" side can be a local repository owned by someone else, who would be able to configure commands that are run during a clone with the current user's permissions. This issue has been designated CVE-2024-32004. The fix in this commit's parent helps in this scenario, as well as in related scenarios using SSH to clone, where the untrusted .git directory is owned by a different user id. But if you received one as a zip file, on a USB stick, etc, it may be owned by your user but still untrusted. This has been designated CVE-2024-32465. To mitigate the issue more completely, let's disable lazy fetching entirely during `upload-pack`. While fetching from a partial repository should be relatively rare, it is certainly not an unreasonable workflow. And thus we need to provide an escape hatch. This commit works by respecting a GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH environment variable (to skip the lazy-fetch), and setting it in upload-pack, but only when the user has not already done so (which gives us the escape hatch). The name of the variable is specifically chosen to match what has already been added in 'master' via e6d5479e7a (git: extend --no-lazy-fetch to work across subprocesses, 2024-02-27). Since we're building this fix as a backport for older versions, we could cherry-pick that patch and its earlier steps. However, we don't really need the niceties (like a "--no-lazy-fetch" option) that it offers. By using the same name, everything should just work when the two are eventually merged, but here are a few notes: - the blocking of the fetch in e6d5479e7a is incomplete! It sets fetch_if_missing to 0 when we setup the repository variable, but that isn't enough. pack-objects in particular will call prefetch_to_pack() even if that variable is 0. This patch by contrast checks the environment variable at the lowest level before we call the lazy fetch, where we can be sure to catch all code paths. Possibly the setting of fetch_if_missing from e6d5479e7a can be reverted, but it may be useful to have. For example, some code may want to use that flag to change behavior before it gets to the point of trying to start the fetch. At any rate, that's all outside the scope of this patch. - there's documentation for GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH in e6d5479e7a. We can live without that here, because for the most part the user shouldn't need to set it themselves. The exception is if they do want to override upload-pack's default, and that requires a separate documentation section (which is added here) - it would be nice to use the NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENVIRONMENT macro added by e6d5479e7a, but those definitions have moved from cache.h to environment.h between 2.39.3 and master. I just used the raw string literals, and we can replace them with the macro once this topic is merged to master. At least with respect to CVE-2024-32004, this does render this commit's parent commit somewhat redundant. However, it is worth retaining that commit as defense in depth, and because it may help other issues (e.g., symlink/hardlink TOCTOU races, where zip files are not really an interesting attack vector). The tests in t0411 still pass, but now we have _two_ mechanisms ensuring that the evil command is not run. Let's beef up the existing ones to check that they failed for the expected reason, that we refused to run upload-pack at all with an alternate user id. And add two new ones for the same-user case that both the restriction and its escape hatch. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2024-04-16 08:35:33 +00:00
static int warning_shown;
if (!warning_shown) {
warning_shown = 1;
warning(_("lazy fetching disabled; some objects may not be available"));
}
return -1;
}
child.git_cmd = 1;
child.in = -1;
if (repo != the_repository)
prepare_other_repo_env(&child.env, repo->gitdir);
strvec_pushl(&child.args, "-c", "fetch.negotiationAlgorithm=noop",
"fetch", remote_name, "--no-tags",
"--no-write-fetch-head", "--recurse-submodules=no",
"--filter=blob:none", "--stdin", NULL);
if (!git_config_get_bool("promisor.quiet", &quiet) && quiet)
strvec_push(&child.args, "--quiet");
if (start_command(&child))
die(_("promisor-remote: unable to fork off fetch subprocess"));
child_in = xfdopen(child.in, "w");
trace2_data_intmax("promisor", repo, "fetch_count", oid_nr);
for (i = 0; i < oid_nr; i++) {
if (fputs(oid_to_hex(&oids[i]), child_in) < 0)
die_errno(_("promisor-remote: could not write to fetch subprocess"));
if (fputc('\n', child_in) < 0)
die_errno(_("promisor-remote: could not write to fetch subprocess"));
}
if (fclose(child_in) < 0)
die_errno(_("promisor-remote: could not close stdin to fetch subprocess"));
return finish_command(&child) ? -1 : 0;
}
static struct promisor_remote *promisor_remote_new(struct promisor_remote_config *config,
const char *remote_name)
{
struct promisor_remote *r;
if (*remote_name == '/') {
warning(_("promisor remote name cannot begin with '/': %s"),
remote_name);
return NULL;
}
FLEX_ALLOC_STR(r, name, remote_name);
*config->promisors_tail = r;
config->promisors_tail = &r->next;
return r;
}
static struct promisor_remote *promisor_remote_lookup(struct promisor_remote_config *config,
const char *remote_name,
struct promisor_remote **previous)
{
struct promisor_remote *r, *p;
for (p = NULL, r = config->promisors; r; p = r, r = r->next)
if (!strcmp(r->name, remote_name)) {
if (previous)
*previous = p;
return r;
}
return NULL;
}
static void promisor_remote_move_to_tail(struct promisor_remote_config *config,
struct promisor_remote *r,
struct promisor_remote *previous)
{
if (!r->next)
return;
if (previous)
previous->next = r->next;
else
config->promisors = r->next ? r->next : r;
r->next = NULL;
*config->promisors_tail = r;
config->promisors_tail = &r->next;
}
config: add ctx arg to config_fn_t Add a new "const struct config_context *ctx" arg to config_fn_t to hold additional information about the config iteration operation. config_context has a "struct key_value_info kvi" member that holds metadata about the config source being read (e.g. what kind of config source it is, the filename, etc). In this series, we're only interested in .kvi, so we could have just used "struct key_value_info" as an arg, but config_context makes it possible to add/adjust members in the future without changing the config_fn_t signature. We could also consider other ways of organizing the args (e.g. moving the config name and value into config_context or key_value_info), but in my experiments, the incremental benefit doesn't justify the added complexity (e.g. a config_fn_t will sometimes invoke another config_fn_t but with a different config value). In subsequent commits, the .kvi member will replace the global "struct config_reader" in config.c, making config iteration a global-free operation. It requires much more work for the machinery to provide meaningful values of .kvi, so for now, merely change the signature and call sites, pass NULL as a placeholder value, and don't rely on the arg in any meaningful way. Most of the changes are performed by contrib/coccinelle/config_fn_ctx.pending.cocci, which, for every config_fn_t: - Modifies the signature to accept "const struct config_context *ctx" - Passes "ctx" to any inner config_fn_t, if needed - Adds UNUSED attributes to "ctx", if needed Most config_fn_t instances are easily identified by seeing if they are called by the various config functions. Most of the remaining ones are manually named in the .cocci patch. Manual cleanups are still needed, but the majority of it is trivial; it's either adjusting config_fn_t that the .cocci patch didn't catch, or adding forward declarations of "struct config_context ctx" to make the signatures make sense. The non-trivial changes are in cases where we are invoking a config_fn_t outside of config machinery, and we now need to decide what value of "ctx" to pass. These cases are: - trace2/tr2_cfg.c:tr2_cfg_set_fl() This is indirectly called by git_config_set() so that the trace2 machinery can notice the new config values and update its settings using the tr2 config parsing function, i.e. tr2_cfg_cb(). - builtin/checkout.c:checkout_main() This calls git_xmerge_config() as a shorthand for parsing a CLI arg. This might be worth refactoring away in the future, since git_xmerge_config() can call git_default_config(), which can do much more than just parsing. Handle them by creating a KVI_INIT macro that initializes "struct key_value_info" to a reasonable default, and use that to construct the "ctx" arg. Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2023-06-28 19:26:22 +00:00
static int promisor_remote_config(const char *var, const char *value,
const struct config_context *ctx UNUSED,
void *data)
{
struct promisor_remote_config *config = data;
const char *name;
size_t namelen;
const char *subkey;
if (parse_config_key(var, "remote", &name, &namelen, &subkey) < 0)
return 0;
if (!strcmp(subkey, "promisor")) {
char *remote_name;
if (!git_config_bool(var, value))
return 0;
remote_name = xmemdupz(name, namelen);
if (!promisor_remote_lookup(config, remote_name, NULL))
promisor_remote_new(config, remote_name);
free(remote_name);
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(subkey, "partialclonefilter")) {
struct promisor_remote *r;
char *remote_name = xmemdupz(name, namelen);
r = promisor_remote_lookup(config, remote_name, NULL);
if (!r)
r = promisor_remote_new(config, remote_name);
free(remote_name);
if (!r)
return 0;
return git_config_string(&r->partial_clone_filter, var, value);
}
return 0;
}
static void promisor_remote_init(struct repository *r)
{
struct promisor_remote_config *config;
if (r->promisor_remote_config)
return;
config = r->promisor_remote_config =
xcalloc(1, sizeof(*r->promisor_remote_config));
config->promisors_tail = &config->promisors;
repo_config(r, promisor_remote_config, config);
if (r->repository_format_partial_clone) {
struct promisor_remote *o, *previous;
o = promisor_remote_lookup(config,
r->repository_format_partial_clone,
&previous);
if (o)
promisor_remote_move_to_tail(config, o, previous);
else
promisor_remote_new(config, r->repository_format_partial_clone);
}
}
void promisor_remote_clear(struct promisor_remote_config *config)
{
while (config->promisors) {
struct promisor_remote *r = config->promisors;
config->promisors = config->promisors->next;
free(r);
}
config->promisors_tail = &config->promisors;
}
void repo_promisor_remote_reinit(struct repository *r)
{
promisor_remote_clear(r->promisor_remote_config);
FREE_AND_NULL(r->promisor_remote_config);
promisor_remote_init(r);
}
struct promisor_remote *repo_promisor_remote_find(struct repository *r,
const char *remote_name)
{
promisor_remote_init(r);
if (!remote_name)
return r->promisor_remote_config->promisors;
return promisor_remote_lookup(r->promisor_remote_config, remote_name, NULL);
}
int repo_has_promisor_remote(struct repository *r)
{
return !!repo_promisor_remote_find(r, NULL);
}
static int remove_fetched_oids(struct repository *repo,
struct object_id **oids,
int oid_nr, int to_free)
{
int i, remaining_nr = 0;
int *remaining = xcalloc(oid_nr, sizeof(*remaining));
struct object_id *old_oids = *oids;
struct object_id *new_oids;
for (i = 0; i < oid_nr; i++)
if (oid_object_info_extended(repo, &old_oids[i], NULL,
OBJECT_INFO_SKIP_FETCH_OBJECT)) {
remaining[i] = 1;
remaining_nr++;
}
if (remaining_nr) {
int j = 0;
CALLOC_ARRAY(new_oids, remaining_nr);
for (i = 0; i < oid_nr; i++)
if (remaining[i])
oidcpy(&new_oids[j++], &old_oids[i]);
*oids = new_oids;
if (to_free)
free(old_oids);
}
free(remaining);
return remaining_nr;
}
void promisor_remote_get_direct(struct repository *repo,
const struct object_id *oids,
int oid_nr)
{
struct promisor_remote *r;
struct object_id *remaining_oids = (struct object_id *)oids;
int remaining_nr = oid_nr;
int to_free = 0;
int i;
if (oid_nr == 0)
return;
promisor_remote_init(repo);
for (r = repo->promisor_remote_config->promisors; r; r = r->next) {
if (fetch_objects(repo, r->name, remaining_oids, remaining_nr) < 0) {
if (remaining_nr == 1)
continue;
remaining_nr = remove_fetched_oids(repo, &remaining_oids,
remaining_nr, to_free);
if (remaining_nr) {
to_free = 1;
continue;
}
}
goto all_fetched;
}
for (i = 0; i < remaining_nr; i++) {
if (is_promisor_object(&remaining_oids[i]))
die(_("could not fetch %s from promisor remote"),
oid_to_hex(&remaining_oids[i]));
}
all_fetched:
if (to_free)
free(remaining_oids);
}