deno/ext/crypto/x25519.rs
Bartek Iwańczuk dda0f1c343
refactor(serde_v8): split ZeroCopyBuf into JsBuffer and ToJsBuffer (#19566)
`ZeroCopyBuf` was convenient to use, but sometimes it did hide details
that some copies were necessary in certain cases. Also it made it way to easy
for the caller to pass around and convert into different values. This commit
splits `ZeroCopyBuf` into `JsBuffer` (an array buffer coming from V8) and
`ToJsBuffer` (a Rust buffer that will be converted into a V8 array buffer).

As a result some magical conversions were removed (they were never used)
limiting the API surface and preparing for changes in #19534.
2023-06-22 23:37:56 +02:00

133 lines
3.5 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2018-2023 the Deno authors. All rights reserved. MIT license.
use curve25519_dalek::montgomery::MontgomeryPoint;
use deno_core::error::AnyError;
use deno_core::op;
use deno_core::ToJsBuffer;
use elliptic_curve::pkcs8::PrivateKeyInfo;
use elliptic_curve::subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
use rand::RngCore;
use spki::der::Decode;
use spki::der::Encode;
#[op(fast)]
pub fn op_crypto_generate_x25519_keypair(pkey: &mut [u8], pubkey: &mut [u8]) {
// u-coordinate of the base point.
const X25519_BASEPOINT_BYTES: [u8; 32] = [
9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
];
let mut rng = OsRng;
rng.fill_bytes(pkey);
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748#section-6.1
// pubkey = x25519(a, 9) which is constant-time Montgomery ladder.
// https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140.pdf page 4
// https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/212.pdf algorithm 8
// pubkey is in LE order.
let pkey: [u8; 32] = pkey.try_into().expect("Expected byteLength 32");
pubkey.copy_from_slice(&x25519_dalek::x25519(pkey, X25519_BASEPOINT_BYTES));
}
const MONTGOMERY_IDENTITY: MontgomeryPoint = MontgomeryPoint([0; 32]);
#[op(fast)]
pub fn op_crypto_derive_bits_x25519(
k: &[u8],
u: &[u8],
secret: &mut [u8],
) -> bool {
let k: [u8; 32] = k.try_into().expect("Expected byteLength 32");
let u: [u8; 32] = u.try_into().expect("Expected byteLength 32");
let sh_sec = x25519_dalek::x25519(k, u);
let point = MontgomeryPoint(sh_sec);
if point.ct_eq(&MONTGOMERY_IDENTITY).unwrap_u8() == 1 {
return false;
}
secret.copy_from_slice(&sh_sec);
true
}
// id-X25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 110 }
pub const X25519_OID: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier =
const_oid::ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap("1.3.101.110");
#[op(fast)]
pub fn op_crypto_import_spki_x25519(key_data: &[u8], out: &mut [u8]) -> bool {
// 2-3.
let pk_info = match spki::SubjectPublicKeyInfo::from_der(key_data) {
Ok(pk_info) => pk_info,
Err(_) => return false,
};
// 4.
let alg = pk_info.algorithm.oid;
if alg != X25519_OID {
return false;
}
// 5.
if pk_info.algorithm.parameters.is_some() {
return false;
}
out.copy_from_slice(pk_info.subject_public_key);
true
}
#[op(fast)]
pub fn op_crypto_import_pkcs8_x25519(key_data: &[u8], out: &mut [u8]) -> bool {
// 2-3.
// This should probably use OneAsymmetricKey instead
let pk_info = match PrivateKeyInfo::from_der(key_data) {
Ok(pk_info) => pk_info,
Err(_) => return false,
};
// 4.
let alg = pk_info.algorithm.oid;
if alg != X25519_OID {
return false;
}
// 5.
if pk_info.algorithm.parameters.is_some() {
return false;
}
// 6.
// CurvePrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
if pk_info.private_key.len() != 34 {
return false;
}
out.copy_from_slice(&pk_info.private_key[2..]);
true
}
#[op]
pub fn op_crypto_export_spki_x25519(
pubkey: &[u8],
) -> Result<ToJsBuffer, AnyError> {
let key_info = spki::SubjectPublicKeyInfo {
algorithm: spki::AlgorithmIdentifier {
// id-X25519
oid: X25519_OID,
parameters: None,
},
subject_public_key: pubkey,
};
Ok(key_info.to_vec()?.into())
}
#[op]
pub fn op_crypto_export_pkcs8_x25519(
pkey: &[u8],
) -> Result<ToJsBuffer, AnyError> {
// This should probably use OneAsymmetricKey instead
let pk_info = rsa::pkcs8::PrivateKeyInfo {
public_key: None,
algorithm: rsa::pkcs8::AlgorithmIdentifier {
// id-X25519
oid: X25519_OID,
parameters: None,
},
private_key: pkey, // OCTET STRING
};
Ok(pk_info.to_vec()?.into())
}